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The thesis examines the emergence and operation of public-private
partnership for economic regeneration in Sheffield since c1985. The
argument advanced is that changes in approach to economic policy
over this period were part of a process of economic and political
restructuring and fragmentation in the local state. The original
contribution of this research is that it offers a detailed insight
into one aspect of this process - the development of local economic
policy that drew on a range of institutional and individual actors,
producing both formal and informal mechanisms for articulating this
approach. The co-operative framework that emerged was one which
allowed the local authority a key position in the mediation of local
interests, but that also magnified business input into local
economic policy. This framework produced a politics that was about
how the partners established co-operation, sought to resolve
conflicts, and develop a consensus package for the city's
regeneration.
Acknowledging the emergence of a system of fragmented government
suggests the need to tie together some general theoretical insights
about the process of restructuring with the experience of change in
particular places. Several perspectives are considered, but the
thesis focuses on local corporatism, growth coalition and regime
theory. The thesis suggests that despite some limitations,
coalition and regime theory are useful for developing our
understanding of partnership in Sheffield.
The thesis is divided into two main sections. Firstly, it discusses
some theoretical and interpretive issues within the literature on
local government restructuring. Secondly, the thesis analyses the
empirical investigation into the development and operation of the
partnership in what was its formative stage. It considers why co-
operation developed around the issue of economic regeneration, how
such co-operation worked in practice, and the degree to which it
represented a realignment in the structures and mechanisms for
coping with urban economic change.
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INTRODUCTION
AIMS AND OBJECTIVES
Partnerships for economic regeneration occupy a central place in the
political economy of the regeneration of Britain's inner city and
urban areas. Collaborative working between public and private
sector agencies is integral to many programmes and initiatives
designed to reconstruct local economies. Such co-operation is a key
feature within any analysis that seeks to explain how the political
and economic profiles of cities were shaped over the 1980s, and how
they are being shaped in the 1990s. The aim of the thesis is to
explore this emerging characteristic in local politics within a
single city - Sheffield between c1985 and 1991 - a city which
claimed to have 'invented the modern partnership principle' (ST.
2.8.91). It examines the emergence and operation of a series of
increasingly institutionalised measures for public-private co-
operation in the field of local economic policy.
The research operates on two levels: on one it involves a discussion
of the relationship between the state and the local economy; on the
other, it involves a detailed analysis of the interaction between
local authority, centrally accountable institutions and the private
sector in restructuring the urban form. The thesis analyses these
collaborative relations by focussing on the co-operative
participation of political and organisational interests within the
city, and their policy objectives and strategies for economic
regeneration.
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The research studies a city which has sought to tackle its economic
problems in seemingly divergent ways. From an apparently radical
and alternative economic policy in the early 1980s to a putative
entrepreneurialism in the latter part of the decade, Sheffield
provides a good location to consider this change in relation to a
restructuring of local government. The argument advanced here is
that the movement in economic policy in Sheffield over the 1980s and
into the 1990s was part of a wider process of political and economic
restructuring within the local state: that is, the transformation of
the system of local government to a system of local governance
involving a range of government and non-government actors working
together in mobilising resources for effective government. The
original contribution of this research is that it offers a detailed
insight into one aspect of this process - the development of a local
economic policy which drew on a range of institutional and
individual actors, producing both formal and informal mechanisms for
expressing this approach.
Acknowledging the emergence of a system of local governance suggests
the need to attempt to tie together some general theoretical
insights about this process of restructuring with the experience of
local politics in specific places. In seeking to analyse the
politics of local economic policy-making in Sheffield within a wider
theoretical and conceptual framework the research advances on the
work of the few previously short (Seyd, 1990), or descriptive
(Field, 1990; Lawless, 1990; Lawless and Ramsden, 1990b) accounts of
partnership in the city.
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The purpose of this research is not to produce an evaluation of the
success of partnership in Sheffield. Such a study would encompass
significant methodological problems in measuring any degree of
success. This is partly because of the fact that within the
partnership there has been little systematic identification of its
objectives (apart from vague statements of intent), and also because
evaluating the extent of success is inevitably a subjective and
partial exercise - success for whom and for what? This aside, there
is also the problem of whether one evaluates the partnership as a
whole or the impact of various projects and initiatives within the
overall remit of the partnership? For example, some initiatives may
be successful in their own right, but may add little to the general
air of collaborative working in the city. There is also the problem
of additionality: what has partnership brought that would not have
happened if there had been no partnership? These issues are not
judged in terms of whether or not the partnership produced a
successful end-product which needs to be assessed. But they are
considered more generally within the analysis of the operation of
the partnership through establishing the implied evaluative
standpoints of partnership's participants.
Predominantly, the thesis is an analysis of the development and
operation of the partnership in what was its formative stage. It
considers why co-operation developed around the issue of economic
regeneration, how such co-operation worked in practice in the city,
and to what extent there was a political realignment within the
structures and mechanisms for coping with urban change. In tssence,
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this issue can be contextualised within the general question of the
degree to which structural change within the urban economy and the
impact of four consecutive Conservative governments have worked to
bring about a change in the nature of local state input in the field
of urban regeneration policy. Thus, the research is located within
the continuing debate on the nature of the local government system,
and the role the public and private sectors have played and might
play in coping with systemic change. It is hoped that this thesis
contributes to the debate on the nature of urban policy processes in
a changing and fragmented system of local government.
THE RESEARCH CONTEXT
Britain's cities are in the process of substantial economic and
social restructuring. The decline of older and larger urban centres
stands in marked contrast to the growth of smaller towns and rural
areas. That the main dynamic of this process is a change in
economic activity and capital interests is difficult to deny. The
manufacturing base of many cities has collapsed, their populations
have declined and concentrations of unskilled and socially
disadvantaged labour forces have been the result. Equally, British
cities are subject to changing global economic patterns,
particularly the internationalisation of capital and the growth of
the world economy. As production is becoming more 'efficient' and
'profitable' in newly industrialising countries, the relative
advantage of the more advanced industrial powers, and their cities,
erodes.
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However, it is recognised that the development of urban regeneration
policy is influenced by forces other than economic. Problems of
public order and a weakening of the state's legitimacy to rule
informed policy developments over the 1980s. As such the state has
had to respond to political alienation and social unrest in order
to maintain its legitimacy and power. Although it is accepted that
both economic and other factors influence urban policy, the
assertion here is that economic forces are more powerful over the
long term and that other forces are more apparent in the short term.
In contemporary Britain, concerns with legitimation and self-
maintenance appear to have been '...subordinated to the larger
objective of facilitating economic growth on the basis of private
capital investment' (King, 1987).
The role of the state in responding to structural economic change
underwent a radical reassessment during the 1980s. The
proliferation of 'semi-autonomous' and/or centrally accountable
state institutions, and the introduction of new resource allocation
schemes within the sphere of urban policy formulation, heralded the
development of policy aligned with a market based approach to the
solution of urban problems. The regeneration of cities has come to
be conceived in terms of economic development programmes, or to be
more specific, centrally controlled local economic development.
However, despite this centralising tendency central government has
created new agencies for tackling urban regeneration - for example
Urban Development Corporations and inner city Task Forces. These new
forms of policy have by-passed the 'traditional' channels and
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methods of local authorities with respect to the process of
regeneration, and have made inroads into local controls and
functions. In contrast, concern about local economic development
has also manifested itself within particular localities. In the
early 1980s, this was most clearly expressed through the programmes
of a number of radical Labour local authorities, whilst the latter
part of the decade witnessed the rise of local public-private
partnerships drawing on a range of actors to regenerate local
economies.
That partnerships have become de rigeur as an approach to the
regeneration of Britain's cities owes much to the continuing
metamorphosis of the system of local government into a system of
local governance. During the 1980s the role, function and
organisation of local government became an area of political and
ideological debate as a range of measures concerned with its
restructuring were advanced under successive Conservative
governments. Tense relations between central and local government,
an often volatile local political climate, and the emergence of new
economic and social agendas for local authorities that went beyond
their traditional functions, contributed to the production of a
programme (admittedly ad hoc) to restructure local government. This
programme focuses on issues of public service delivery; the demand
for greater flexibility and responsiveness to meet local needs; the
structure of local authorities; and the development of the concept
of the 'enabling' authority.1
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Clearly, the components of this programme may be visible, but the
nature and the direction of change that they will bring for local
government is less easy to decipher. 2 Whilst there is a growing
body of literature seeking to analyse this transformation, much of
it is general in nature and there are comparatively few empirical
studies which examine aspects of this process in detail. In terms
of theoretical perspectives it is possible to identify a range of
interpretive positions within which much of the literature is
located. Broadly, these are public choice, neo-pluralist and neo-
marxist approaches, and within each lie a number of critical
paradigms that offer specific insights into the process of local
government change. What follows is a brief outline of the main
analytic approaches applied to the study of the changing pattern of
local government. A more detailed and critical commentary on
aspects of these approaches appears in the first two chapters of
this thesis.
Within public choice theory the centralised and bureaucratic
elements of local government were criticised within a framework
built on the assumptions of liberal economics and New Right
ideology. However, the synonymity of public choice theory with
right-wing political values has been challenged by those seeking to
redefine the rational actor model at the core of the public choice
perspective, re-evaluating the public choice approach in relation to
its analysis of local government (see Jacobs, 1992;22-28).
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Similarly, within the neo-pluralist perspective a range of
literature has developed to explain the challenges facing local
government. Neo-corporatist works have sought to articulate the
movement toward the blurring of the boundaries between the public
and private sectors (Cawson, 1985; King, 1985). The policy network
literature has also offered insights into intergovernmental
relations as well as styles of policy-making between government and
non-government organisations and interests (Leach 1985; Parkinson
and Wilks, 1986; Rhodes, 1986; 1988). The reformulation of the
community power debate in the USA also presents opportunities for
analysing changing public-private relations at the local level.
Urban regime theory offers relevance here in its attempt to provide
an explanation for co-operation between government and non-
government actors and institutions within a fragmented system of
local government (Elkin, 1987; Stone and Sanders, 1987; Stone,
1989).
Within neo-marxist literature, the 'social relations' and
'localities' approach has similar concerns with much of the recent
American literature on regime building and growth coalitions (Jonas,
1992). Locality studies have played an important part in developing
our understanding of the interaction between the broader processes
of social and economic restructuring and the operation of political,
economic, and social practices in particular places (Cooke, 1989;
Barloe et al, 1990). This 'local' approach is complemented at a
macro-level by regulation theory which focuses on broad economic and
social changes in the organisation of capitalism. The assertion is
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that we are in the process of transition from one set of production
and consumption norms to another - that is from Fordism to post-
Fordism (Aglietta, 1979). The utilisation of a transition framework
in the analysis of local level change has been principally found in
the work of Hoggett (1987), Geddes (1988), and Stoker (1989b; 1990).
The analyses of Hoggett and Geddes are directed towards studies of
local authority service delivery and their relationship with the
local economy. Stoker (1990), moving away from analyses of
production and labour processes and discussions of technological
Change, considers the role of local government within the context of
a new mode of regulation and the break-up of social democracy and
the welfare state (see chapter one).
Given these broad theoretical perspectives for analysing the process
of local government change, how does this thesis relate to these
approaches? The thesis draws on neo-pluralist theories,
particularly those which seek to explain the organisation and
strategies of urban regimes and coalitions. This does not mean that
the insights of other approaches are to be ignored. For example,
despite the deterministic accounts of 'a transition from Fordism to
post-Fordism offered by some regulationist work, the Fordist/post-
Fordist paradigm usefully depicts general characteristics of
economic change in the late twentieth century (Stoker, 1990;249).
However, it says little about how specific policies designed to cope
with economic and social restructuring develop in particular places.
The relevance of the research lies in its contribution to the
development of an informed understanding of how such place-specifc
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restructuring strategies emerge. Specifically, it constructs a
detailed picture of the role of the actors and institutions involved
in the process of formulating economic regeneration initiatives in
Sheffield since the mid-1980s. It also illuminates the mechanisms
and systems of local policy-making and the links between government
and non-government actors and institutions working in co-operation.
Urban regime and coalition theory, with its focus on how government
and non-government actors mobilise to produce an effective system of
co-operation in the wake of fragmented government, is thus
particularly appropriate for informing our understanding of how
local political processes interact with changing conditions in the
wider political economy (Harding, 1990;124). 3
 As one commentator on
the urban policy process suggests:
Governments at the national and local levels play
a role in effecting changes in policies that impact
upon communities and economic growth...Governmental
systems and political regimes are important. Different
political dispositions create different environments
for capital to relate to. Differences in organisation
and style can have profound affects upon ways in which
policies work. (sic) (Jacobs, 1992;49).
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
A qualitative methodology was employed throughout the course of the
research. In-depth interviews, of a mainly semi-structured form,
was one qualitative technique. The interview process was designed
to develop an understanding of the attitudes and beliefs of those
who have informed and influenced economic policy within Sheffield.
Interviews were also used to construct a substantive body of
information about the climate and development of local economic
10
policy in the city. The network of respondents included past and
present city councillors; past and present council officers,
particularly those from the Department of EMployment and Economic
Development and the Department of Land and Planning; leading
representatives of the Sheffield Chamber of Commerce; board members
and directors of the Sheffield Development Corporation;
representatives from local trades unions; representatives from the
voluntary sector in the city; Sheffield Members of Parliament; and
civil servants within the Department of Environment.
In total, interviews were held with thirty respondents during the
course of the research, with a number being interviewed twice. The
group of potential respondents was constructed through an
examination of relevant documentary sources. This indicated those
who participated in the emergence of partnership in the city, or
those who had recorded views (either positive or negative) on local
public-private relations in the field of economic regeneration
policy. Supplementing this network with additional respondents was
achieved by further consideration of documentary materials and
through the initial series of interviews. The majority of those
approached responded favourably, agreeing to interview, and of those
contacted only two declined the request for a meeting. 4 All the
interviews were conducted with an agreement to confidentiality.
Consequently, within the text, where information or quotes have
originated from interview the source has been given anonymity.
Interviews are referred to by number and by a general indication of
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the source; for example, city councillor, local authority officer,
or business person.
Complementary to the data generated by interview was that generated
by the use and analysis of documentary sources. These sources
included minutes, reports and papers of various committees and sub-
committees of Sheffield City Council; documentation from the
Sheffield Chamber of Commerce; minutes, reports and publications of
the Sheffield Development Corporation; local and national
newspapers; papers, reports and publications from central goveLinfient
departments; and other relevant secondary material such as books,
journals and articles. These documentary sources were used to
construct a body of factual information about economic policy in the
city, and to allow for the development of a chronology of
partnership events. This latter aspect provided a local historical
dimension within which to contextualise the research, and to
indicate when, where and by whom policy was made. On occasions,
documentary sources were cross referenced with interviews to verify
respondents' accounts of the timing of particular events. In this
way, the analysis of documentary evidence and in depth interviews
was mutually reinforcing.
The rationale for adopting these qualitative methods was twofold.
Firstly, the search for the implied meanings of action and structure
within the sphere of local policy development is as important as the
search for causal links in the chain of policy development. The
methods chosen were considered appropriate to elicit the implied
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meanings and perceptions of the various actors involved in the
regeneration of Sheffield's economy. By adopting a qualitative
stance we gain insights into the assumptive worlds of local policy
makers and their social constructions of reality (Young & Mills,
1981; Edwards, 1981). Thus, the qualitative approach provides a
technique for the study of social processes, actions and structures
in context, and reflects the subjective reality of those actors
charged with policy-making at the local level. Indeed, interview
recollections and documentary materials are inevitably subjective
sources of information eliciting the meaning of actions and causal
links in particular processes. The emergence of public-private co-
operation in Sheffield considered in this thesis is not excluded
from this subjectivity, and it is acknowledged that by interpreting
this phenomenon in this way, the thesis also creates a subjective
form of recollection.
Secondly, the methodology employed lent itself to the case study
approach. The justification for carrying out a case study of local
economic policy in Sheffield can be based on both pragmatic and
methodological grounds. It is possible to argue that a case study
format is required because the changes that have occurred in the
city over the last decade have not been studied in detail. Indeed,
while there have been a number of studies of the city under the new
urban left in the early 1980s, relatively little has been written on
the response of the city's Labour council to the continued decline
of the local economy, the emergence of new public-private relations
to cope with decline, and the place such developments occupy within
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a wider process of local government restructuring. Clearly, the
changing economic base of Sheffield, the ensuing process of
regeneration programmes and policies, and the posited 'new realism'
of the local authority, provide an ideal site for a detailed study
of a stage in the transition to a system of local governance.
On methodological grounds many points can be used to justify
adopting a case study approach (Yin, 1989; 10/26). However, four
basic points will suffice as justification here: firstly, case
studies allow for a reconstruction of policy makers and
implementors' constructions of social reality - their assumptive
worlds; secondly, they allow for a check of internal consistency,
with each new piece of information providing a point of 'leverage'
from which to test previous interpretations; thirdly, case studies
provide a framework for considerable detailed analysis within a
local context; and fourthly, they allow for a grounded assessment of
that local context. Indeed, such a methodological approach provides
a means of communicating information that is contextually grounded
in the particular location studied (Yin, 1989; Niles and Hbberman,
1984).
However, the problem of the case study approach is that it is
difficult to make generalisations from detailed findings about the
broader class of phenomenon that is being studied. In this thesis,
the detail centres on the emergence and operation of measures for
co-operation to cope with the problems of de-industrialisation and
the decline of the local economy. Yet the broader issue is the
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ingression into a system of local governance with its range of
actors and institutions in the management of particular places, of
which local economic policy-making is one aspect. Acknowledging
this structural problem with the case study approach does not
however mean that tentative attempts at generalisation should not be
made. The conclusions presented at the end of the thesis seek to
relate not only to the specifics of the experience of Sheffield, but
also to the inter-relation between the operation of local politics
in particular places and more general processes of local government
restructuring.
THESIS OUTLINE
Broadly, this thesis has a three part structure: the first part
consists of a discussion of some theoretical and interpretative
issues within the literature on local government and its
restructuring (chapters 1-3); the second part (chapters 4-9) reports
and analyses the results of the empirical investigation into the
emergence and operation of partnership for economic regeneration in
Sheffield; finally, the conclusions of this research are presented.
In chapter one, a range of theoretical perspectives within the
literature on local government change is examined including public
choice, neo-marxist and neo-pluralist approaches. This is followed
in chapter two by a detailed analysis of the inter-relations between
three paradigms within neo-pluralist literature (the concepts of
local corporatism, growth coalitions and urban regimes), in order to
provide a more detailed context forthe subsequent empirical analysis
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and investigation of local public-private relations in Sheffield.
Chapter three then focuses on the notion of partnership by analysing
this concept in relation to urban regeneration and local economic
development policy.
The case study of Sheffield begins proper in chapter four with a
short account of the local authority's approach to economic policy
between 1980 and c1983. In chapter five, a case report is presented
in the form of a detailed narrative account of the emergence and
operation of partnership for economic regeneration in the city
between c1985 and 1991. Chapter six begins the analysis of this
account by examining the structure and organisation of the
partnership in terms of its participation, networking and cross -
memberships. In chapter seven, the relationship of the Labour
Council with measures for public-private co-operation is examined,
by focussing on the changing nature of local economic policy during
the 1980s. This line of analysis is also extended to Sheffield's
business community, and the second part of the chapter focuses on
its changing approach to local economic policy. Following this,
chapter eight examines policy development in two areas of the
partnership's work. The development of an image policy is
considered, as is the attempt to integrate economic and social
policy into a regeneration package for the city. Chapter nine
explores the issues of accountability and managerial style in
Sheffield's partnership through an analysis of three of the city's
partnership institutions.	 Finally, the major findings of this
research are summarized, and conclusions are drawn, both about the
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specific example of Sheffield and how its experience relates to
broader processes of local government change.
NOTES
1. See chapter one for a more detailed discussion.
2. The ESRC Local Governance Initiative aims to provide a fuller
understanding of 'the transformation of the structure of government
beyond Whitehall and Westminster from a system of local government
into a system of local governance' (ESRC Local Governance 
Initiative: The Purpose of the Proposed Initiative, 1992, p.1).
3. The 'localities' literature attempts to relate wider socio-
economic change to its effects in particular places. In this sense,
it is not too dissimilar to the concerns of regime theory (see
Jonas, 1992;285/286).
4. Problems arose mainly with the SDC. Interviews were not
conducted with the chair, chief executive and planning directors.
Unfortunately, requests for interview coincided with the preamble to
the Garlick Inquiry into the operation of the Development
Corporation.
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CHAPTER ONE 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE 1980s AND EARLY 1990s:
INTERPRETING CHANGE AND RESTRUCTURING
INTRODUCTION
During the 1980s, and early 1990s, two themes emerge which
characterize the thrust of sucessive Conservative administrations'
policy stance towards local government. The first is the
restriction and constraint of local expenditure levels; the second
concerns the restructuring of the role, organisation, and management
of local government through the introduction of new institutional
forms and initiatives at the local political level (Stewart and
Stoker, 1989;2). Although both themes have operated in tandem, and
represent the hallmark of Conservative local government policy, it
is possible to separate them in terms of their temporal location
within the Conservatives' political agenda. The encroachment on
local fiscal autonomy and the imposition of financial controls was
particularly characteristic of the early to mid 1980s, and has
remained a central policy feature of Conservative administrations.
If the first theme of restraining local government finance and
spending was particularly characteristic of the early to mid-1980s,
the second theme has formed the core of the Conservatives' local
government agenda for the latter part of the decade. The objective
of this chapter is firstly, albeit briefly, to outline the main
features of both these processes as they have impacted on local
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government, and secondly (and more substantively), to examine some
of the interpretive frameworks that have been constructed to explain
these developments in local government.
RESTRUCTURING LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Since 1979 systematic attempts have been made to control the
financial base of local authorities through the introduction of a
number of strategies. These have included; grant related expenditure
(GRE), block grant, rate-capping, and the introduction of the
community charge. During the first two Conservative
administrations between 1979 and 1987 block grant, GRE and rate-
capping were the dominant policy strategies with which the
Government orchestrated their campaign to reduce local expenditure
levels.
The introduction of the block grant and GRE into the operation of
the rate support grant (RSG) during the early 1980s was a
particularly novel feature within the system of local government
finance. Since 1967 the method of distributing government grants to
local authorities had been the RSG. This comprised three elements;
domestic rate relief (a per capita subsidy to domestic rate payers),
resources equalisation (an attempt to iron out the differences in
the tax base of different local authority's), and needs equalisation
(a mechanism to equalise the expenditure requirements of different
local authorities). From 1981 the resources and needs components
were combined in the form of a block grant payable to all local
authorities. The block grant entitlement was assessed on 'the
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difference between a local authorities expenditure and the amount it
was considered able to raise from the rates in order to finance that
expenditure (Hampton, 1987;101). Thus, a mechanism designed to
redistribute resources to areas of special need was now further
controlled from Westminster
GRE was intended to reflect that 'need' and was the government's
assessment of how much it would cost a local authority to provide a
'typical standard of service' with regard to its 'general
circumstances and responsibilities' (Hampton, 1987;102). In essence
it was an indicator to local authorities of what they ought to be
spending. If their actual expenditure however was above the target
figure then financial penalties and a reduced proportion of grant
were imposed. In practice the majority of local authorities were
spending less than the government's target figures. Thus rather than
reduce spending the new grant regime actively encouraged local
authorities to spend more. It was only in the larger metropolitan
Labour controlled authorities, where GRE had been underestimated,
that penalties and RSG 'claw back' were seriously imposed.
The retention of the targets and penalties system was however short-
lived and by 1985 it had been abolished. This was due to three main
factors. First, it encouraged increased rather than reduced
spending. Those authorities which spent up to their GREA target
received higher levels of funding, whereas those which adopted a
cautious and prudent attitude to their expenditure lost grant
(Butcher et al, 1990;70). Second, some local authorities had been
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penalised so much that they were no longer in a position to receive
any grant. Third, many local authorities were unwilling or unable to
meet their GREA targets. The Rates Act of 1983 was seen as the
answer to the problem. The 'over-spending' and 'recalcitrant' local
authorities could be further legislated against. With this piece of
legislation the phrase 'rate-capping' was introduced into local
government discourse and a new phase of central control of local
government finance was ushered in. This Act allowed the Secretary
of State for the Environment to determine the maximum level of rate
a local authority could set. The Government's position was
unequivocal - selective powers were necessary to bring into line a
handful of maverick local authorities who steadfastly refused to
accept the philosophy of central government's economic policy and
reduce their levels of expenditure. Indeed the full weight of
historical convention was brought to bear by the Government in their
claim that a number of socialist local authorities were breaking
with precedent in their refusal to comply with Government policy.
Despite the apparently inconsistent, and 'learning on the job'
nature of Conservative local government finance policy, a clear
objective is not difficult to detect. Primarily, central government
has sought control of local government through restricting the rate
of growth of public expenditure, attempting to reduce local spending
programmes so as to fit into a long-term macro-economic policy of
reducing the ratio of public expenditure in relation to national
income. In addition, Conservative local government finance policy
has sought to cultivate an understanding of the relationship between
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what a local authority spends and what it costs to achieve that
level of spending. This concept they considered had become lost in a
political mist as a consequence of continual increases in the
proportion of local expenditure covered by central government grant,
and because of the separation between those who paid for local
services and those who used them (Hampton, 1987;99).
The whole thrust of local government finance policy, the
introduction of block grant, GREs, and rate-capping, has been
directed towards reducing the amount of grant payable to local
authorities and restricting their ability to finance any deficit by
raising the rates. However, this process did not suddenly begin in
1979. The reduction in grants to local authorities as a consequence
of policies to reduce public expenditure was a feature of
Conservative and Labour governments of the 1970s. Local capital
expenditure cuts have been considered a politically easy path to
follow, encountering little local resistance. Indeed, the local
expenditure cuts on housing and roads in the mid-1970s allowed the
first Conservative administration to claim that it was merely
following in Labour's footsteps. Nevertheless, reductions in local
public spending have continued apace under successive Conservative
governments. Rate-capping, GRES, and the community charge (despite
the latter's demise), illustrate an attempt to weaken the fiscal
autonomy of local government. Indeed, experience has demonstrated
that there has been a commitment to change the structure of local
government finance in an attempt to alter perceptions about the
financing of local services.
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Control over the financial base of local authorities retains an
important position within the overall political agenda of
Conservative administrations, as witnessed by the introduction of
the now defunct community charge. However, following the 1987
general election, a broader concern with the role, function, and
organisation of local government developed as a policy priority for
central government (Stewart and Stoker, 1989;2). Tense relations
between central and local government, an often volatile local
political climate, and the emergence of new economic and social
agendas for local authorities taking them beyond their traditional
functions, has contributed to the production of a programme
(admittedly ad hoc) to restructure local government. This programme
focuses on issues of public service delivery; the demand for greater
flexibility and responsiveness to meet local needs; the structure of
local authorities; and the development of the concept of the
'enabling' authority.
A plethora of measures concerned with restructuring have been put
into practice, from initiatives aimed at dealing with local economic
regeneration and the reform of the internal operations of local
authorities to those intended to reorganise their housing, education
and social service provision. It is the combination of changes
within policy content and measures that is characteristic of the
restructuring of local government. Effectively these measures have
attempted to 'marketise' local authority activities and services
(Stoker, 1989), and have sought to fragment public sector provision
and offer a private sector alternative. A new local government
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discourse has been constructed around the concepts of competition,
choice, and opportunity cost.
A related issue is the growth in the extent to which local
authorities are considered, 'facilitators and providers of the last
resort' (N.Ridley, Conference of Northern Conservative Women,
November 1987). This view implies a separation of the authorisation
and production roles of local government. Here the process of
service provision is to be disengaged from the process of
implementation. The 'enabling' authority will authorise the type and
range of provision whilst the implementation or delivery of
particular services will lie with competing service suppliers. In
turn these suppliers will identify 'on the ground' needs which are
then translated into the policy priorities of the 'enabling' agent.
The restructuring programme thus contained new strands in terms of
haw a local authority should be organised and managed but preserved
elements of a previous phase of prudent expenditure. The collection
of measures which revolve around 'marketisation' and 'separation'
operate to narrow the gap between the public and the private in
their simultaneous preoccupation with organisational and functional
issues. In essence, the attempt to de-municipalize features of local
authority service provision reflects both an assault on the
previously understood nature of local government and a restatement
of earlier concerns with public expenditure.
24
CHANGE AND RESTRUCTURING: POLITICAL INTERPRETATIONS
The dual themes of the restriction of the financial base of local
authorities, and the attempt to transform their role, function, and
organisation represent a change within the context of the local
government system. Although the components of this change are
visible, the nature and direction of change is not fully understood.
Clearly, the documentation of the process of change is easier than
its interpretation. Nevertheless, there is a growing body of
theoretically diverse literature seeking to analyse this
transformation. In general, interpretative positions fall into
three main categories: public choice; neo-marxist; and neo-pluralist
approaches. Within each lie critical paradigms that offer specific
insights into the process of local government Change. Sbsequent
sections of this chapter consider new right and public choice
analyses of local governemnt; the application of neo-marxist
regulation theory to local government change; finally, it offers
initial comments on the relevance of 'middle range' neo-pluralist
based perspectives for interpreting change, to be considered in more
detail in chapter two. Firstly, however, we examine a literature
which analyses the restructuring of local government in terms of a
policy of centralisation and privatisation followed by successive
Conservative governments.
Centralisation and Control
The attempts by central government to reduce the financial and legal
autonomy of local authorities, and restructure their role and
functions has been interpreted by many writers as an attempt to
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construct and implement a policy of centralisation (Jones & Stewart,
1985; Newton & Karran, 1988; Gurr & King, 1987). The foundations
of the centralisation thesis rest on the argument that the Thatcher
governments, in particular, engendered a constitutional change
within the local government system. Five areas of change have been
identified: an interpretation of parliamentary sovereignty as
government supremacy; a redefinition of the functions of local
government, particularly a reduction in their policy making powers;
central determination of expenditure; alterations to the tax and
revenue raising powers of local authorities; and a disregard for the
local electoral voice (Jones, 1988). Certainly, the trend towards
centralisation is a notable feature of developments in central-local
relations over the last ten years, particularly-with the movement of
power away from local to central government has increased apace
under successive Conservative administrations.
The centralisation thesis is both powerful and persuasive. In terms
of the restriction and controls placed on local government's
financial autonomy, the grip of Westminster has been especially
tightened. While a hallmark of Conservative policy with regard to
local government has been an increase in centralisation, counter
arguments exist which claim that it is a necessary evil on the road
to greater individual freedom and choice (Pine, 1988). Criticisms
of the centralisation thesis have also come from those who question
the assumption that local interests and the interests of local
authorities are analogous. Bulpitt (1989) has argued that local
democracy has traditionally, without question, been considered a
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good thing. According to this line of argument there has been
little critical analysis of what is required by a local electorate
and what is meant by local democracy. Instead, arguments
surrounding the need for local democracy have have been based upon
an idealised vision of local consensus and a depoliticised decision-
making process. When the notion of local community is broken down,
runs the argument, all that is left are those who have benefited and
those who have lost as a consequence of the various policies and
actions of the state. Thus local government is directly located in
the political arena and should not be considered as somehow
'outside' of politics. Given this interpretation, is it merely sour
grapes to claim that if central government seeks to favour and
protect certain local interests, it is undermining local democracy?
In an attempt to explain the restructuring of local government in
these terms the notion of party advantage has been utilised. For
some writers (Hambleton, 1988) the restructuring of local government
has been a mechanism by Which the power of the Conservative
government at national level has been used to benefit its
favourites and plot against its adversaries. Thus the Conservatives
have systematically sought to bolster national support and sabotage
the political base of the Labour party, and socialism in general.
The backdrop to this line of argument follows from the consequences
of local government reorganisation in the early 1970s. The result
of this was a system which gave large parliamentary majorities to
the Conservatives but left many local authority areas, particularly
within the inner cities, in the hands of non-Conservative control.
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The acuteness of this problem manifested itself particularly by the
mid-1980s. At national level Conservative control was
insurmountable, but at local level there was little likelihood of
the Conservatives making significant inroads into Labour's control
of the urban centres.
Developing from this interpretation Bulpitt (1989) views the process
of local government restructuring in terms of party elite
'statecraft'. This analysis suggests that pragmatism, party
interests and advantage have priority over ideology. Thus,
Conservative local government policies are seen as the playing- out
of 'statecraft' where ministers have sought to defend and enhance
their party's interests. Within this interpretation, restructuring
is seen as a consequence of the economic crisis of the 1970s and the
growth in the left wing domination of some local authorities. This,
Bulpitt suggests, was the catalyst to the break-up in the historical
indifference to local government by national politicians. Both the
frustration with 'high' spending and 'recalcitrant' local
authorities and the political convenience of using these as 'fall
guys' (sic) for failing to reduce spending set the programme of
restructuring rolling. With the introduction of more radical
Secretaries of State from the mid-1980s an ideological gloss was
added which contributed towards the establishment of a more
explicitly market based approach to the restructuring of local
government. If 'statecraft' considerations are a suitable way of
interpretating the restructuring of local government, then it is
possible that a new government with a different 'statecraft' will
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use its power to engender reforms, and change policy in a manner
that will foster and protect its own interests. In this sense,
Conservative local government policy may yet turn out to be merely
an undulation on the political map.
New Right Ideology: Markets and Public Choice
Within this approach local government restructuring is seen as a
consequence of the triumph of new right ideology. The process of
restructuring is considered a necessary consequence of other
policies designed to rectify the 'ills' of the public sector through
the application of assumptions and principles derived from the
'public choice' school of thought. New right thinking is seen as
the driving force of change. Old patterns are challenged and
replaced by new right perscriptions and perspectives (Pine, 1988).
Essential to public choice theory is the establishment of a
binaryopposition in the process of the distribution and allocation
of resources; that is between the operation of the 'free' market and
the operation of public bureaucracies and institutions. The former
is seen as the'optimal' mechanism for the allocation of goods and
services, whilst the latter is inflexible and prone to over-produce.
This critique of contemporary democracy does not stop at economics,
it raises a number of arguments about the political process. These
include the claim that the electoral promises of politicians will
always include more than they can ever deliver; that sectional
interests pursue their own positions and that in consequence it is
the disorganised and 'silent majority' who are the losers; and that
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self-seeking government bureaucrats will pursue budget maximisation
and the aggrandisement of their departments (Stoker, 1990;12).
Considered in this light local government and the services it
provides is an obstacle to future change. Yet it is also seen as a
testing ground for the application of new prescriptions and
policies. The prescriptive options for change include: small scale
enterprise in public service provision; performance contracting - no
direct labour and open ended employment contracts; the introduction
of competitive tendering; multiple provider service provision; user
charges; and private enterprise as the agent for public service
provision (Hood, 1987). Here is a package to fashion a political
environment which seeks to 'alter the Choices people make by
altering the circumstances' (Pine, 1988;127). This change is to be
brought about by making 'trade offs' with interest groups and not
through direct imposition. At the local level this form of
transition, it is suggested, can be seen in the government's
decision not to apply 'pure' market solutions to perceived problems,
for example contracting out has been favoured instead of a system of
user charges. The introduction of the former was considered less
politically volatile than the pure market approach of the latter.
Thus the local political environment is seen as undergoing
alteration by the offering of opportunities to contractors, local
authority managers, and a reduced but higher paid workforce.
Clearly, elements within public choice prescriptions for change have
been incorporated into the political and legislative agenda of
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successive Conservative governments. There has been a reduction in
public spending and there are limitations on local political
initiative. Market or quasi-market mechanisms have been introduced
into the production and distribution processes of public service
provision, and a new discourse has been constructed around the
concepts of efficiency, accountability, and competition. A
minimalist role has been set aside for local government - it is to
respond to demand but is to leave the satisfying of that demand to
other agencies. Moreover, in areas where market provision is felt
not to operate smoothly such as welfare and social service
provision, the answer is to open these services up to charitable or
voluntary organisations. All this may lead to the conclusion that
four consecutive Conservative administrations have swept away all
that went before. However, there is a question mark hanging over
the extent to which new right theories and prescriptions of change
have been implemented at the local level. There is a mixed bag of
evidence through which to sift.
Undoubtedly there are obvious examples of the impact and power of
privatization. For instance, the deregulation of public transport
and the introduction of the 'right to buy' scheme for council house
tenants. These initiatives serve as a good illustration of the
implementation of market or commercial ventures within traditional
areas of local public provision. There are also a number of measures
and policies which can be located within the broader shift to
introduce market mechanisms into local government, but without the
explicit drive of a pure market form. The introduction of local
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management of schools (LMS), the failed community charge, and
compulsory competitive tendering fall into this category.
The main aim of these measures has been to emphasize value for money
in public service delivery. However, their impact at local level is
not as great as rhetoric might suggest. Although there has been an
increase in private production and delivery of local services, many
local authority 'in-house' organisations have remained competitive.
This may be read as the successful implementation of an imported
competitive and efficient discourse. On the other hand, it may be
that attempts to change the production functions of local government
may not have worked out as anticipated (cf. Stoker, 1991;204).
Moreover, such measures may not necessarily lead to the creation of
a free competitive market. Rather, they may engender relationships
between 'favoured' suppliers and initiating agencies. In addition,
work may be carried out by companies and organisations which had
previously been employed for the same task (for example local
authority departments), whilst mechanisms might be developed that
facilitate the co-operation of local authorities and interests
groups, such as trade unions, over the introduction of compulsory
competitive tendering (Painter, 1990).
The 1980s have also been witness to the growth of non-elected local
agencies (Stoker, 1988). These have sought to develop models of
local service provision more akin to private sector practice than
those based on existing methods of local public provision. Urban
Development Corporations (UDCs) are an example of this new type of
32
agency. These new institutions of local governance are seen as
symbols of the change to a business oriented local government
system. Yet in practice there is often a close degree of involvement
between these organisations and elected local and central
government. Moreover, these bodies are not 'free' from public
subsidy. Indeed, their continued existence is dependent upon public
investment. Certainly, the relationships which have developed
between elected and non-elected local agencies represent more than
simply privatisation of local government, and are more complex than
the theoretical assumptions of market models of service provision
imply. Market theories have obviously influenced the manner in
which local government is being restructured. However, the impact
of market ideology is far from comprehensive - there are very few
local authorities which have been completely 'marketised'. The
market approach is not so much a model of what has happened, but an
interpretation based on what some would like to see happen. Indeed,
the growth of non-elected government and partnerships with a
significant input from business, the continued strength of central
government, and the resistance to change from within local
government, testify to the fallacy of arguments that stress the all
embracing nature of market models of local government.
CHANGE AND RESTRUCTURING: SOCIO-ECONOMIC INTERPRETATIONS
Interpretations which place the restructuring of local government
within the context of the impact of new right ideology or the
withering away of local government autonomy in the face of
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increasing centralisation of power, contain within them valuable
insights about developments in local government. However, although
New Right thinking has undoubtedly permeated Conservative policies,
its impact has not been as great or successful as its rhetoric would
have us believe. Similarly, although local authority autonomy has
been wittled away by successive measures from central government the
gloomy predictions of many commentators in the early 1980s that
local government was doomed have yet to come true. Local
authorities still remain important sources of local employment,
whilst some have pioneered new initiatives, such as the expansion of
their economic development role, the adoption of decentralisation
policies and devolved management structures, the implementation of
equal opportunity programmes, and the incorporation of 'green'
politics into their overall philosophy.
Interpretations that stress the process of centralisation, or those
based on new right or public choice theory are good at illustrating
what developments have occurred and identifying the general
direction of local government policy. However, they tell US little
about why change is occurring, its general nature, its degree or
extent. They offer interpretations of change in which the
restructuring of local government is seen as the outcome of
political control, political conflict and rational political debate.
Both interpretations give minimal input to social and economic
factors, and lack the dynamism offered by a socio-economic analysis.
Moreover, they also tend to be ahistorical in approach. 	 The
restructuring of local government is analysed in a context which
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disregards the historical contingency of the social and economic
forces which have worked to structure the contemporary climate
within which local authorities have to operate. In order to
appreciate this and begin to move towards a fuller understanding of
the process of local government restructuring, we need to locate
local transformation within a wider context of economic and social
structural change. Both neo-Marxist and neo-pluralist theory offer
explanations of how wider socio-economic change is translated into
an explanation of change at the local level. The former is
particulalrly concerned with the issue of the transition from
Fordism to post-Fordism, whilst the latter is directed towards an
explanatory framework which incorporates the notion of the movement
towards a more participatory role for non-government (particularly
private sector) interests in local government.
Local Government, Fordism and Post-Fordism
A number of writers have sought to use a post-Fordist framework in
their analysis of local level change (Hoggett, 1987; Geddes, 1988;
Stoker, 1989b; 1990). Principally, these analyses seek to place
local government within a series of economic and social
organisational changes which have occurred, and are occurring, since
the end of the second world war. The thesis is that we are in the
process of a transition from one set of production and consumption
norms to another - that is from Fordism to post-Fordism.
Fordist forms and sites of production, Fordist technology, Fordist
business organisation, Fordist consumption patterns, Fordist labour
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organisation, and the role of the state under Fordism, are all seen
as being under attack. Thus in terms of the form and sites of
commodity production, the mass production of consumer goods and the
industrial regions where they are produced are seen as being
challenged by the growth of small-batch production, demand-led
flexible manufacturing, and the rise of new industrial centres and
renewal of inner urban cores. Fordist assembly line techniques are
seen as giving way to robotics, computer aided design and
information technology. Corporate organisation is becoming less
hierarchical, less centralised, less concerned about planning the
virtues of scale in its management structures; and is becoming more
concerned about the role of small firms, about decentralisation and
sub-contracting, and about strategic and tactical central control.
Labour is no longer organised through the routinisation of work,
collective bargaining, and the trade unions, but is seen more in
terms of a distinction between 'core' and 'peripheral' workers; the
growth of local bargaining structures and weaker collective
bargaining and trade union powers. The mode of consumption is no
longer the mass consumption of standardised products supported
through credit and promoted through block advertising. Rather the
'differentiated' more demanding consumer is king, whose goods are
marketed through matching them to particular consumer 'lifestyle'
patterns (Stoker, 1990;243/249).
The state's role and activities are also seen as threatened. alder
Fordism the state assumes an extended role and intervenes to provide
and manage a host of collective goods such as housing, education,
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health care, and social security, in order to allow for social
reproduction, sustain the consumption norm and provide social
stability. Within the transition to a post -Fordist regime the role
of the state is seen as a managerial one - managing the social costs
of transition. However, although the existing role of the Fordist
state is challenged as a consequence of transition, the final model
of the post -Fordist state is unclear (Stoker, 1990;249).
Regulation Theory
According to the Fordist - post-Fordist paradigm the process of
transition is occurring because Fordism is in crisis. Inherent
within Fordism, it is claimed, are contradictory and destabilising
tendencies which have operated to bring about its demise. The
theoretical underpining of this interpretation originates from the
work of the Parisian Regulation School and the writings of Aglietta
(1979). The argument of the regulation theorists is that the
reproduction of capitalism is not inevitable because of
contradictions which reside within it. Rather, if reproduction is to
occur capitalism must in some way be regulated. For Aglietta the
way in which capitalism is reproduced and regulated is by the
development of 'structural forms'. These structural forms take the
shape of social institutions and social norms within capitalist
society.	 Their formation, the argument runs, is engendered by
crisis. However, their creation is not inevitable but is the
outcome of social struggle. Some of these forms fail to act as
reproductive or stabilising instruments. Others may regulate the
system for a while but falter later to the reassertion of the
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contradictions of capitalism, or the development of further
contradictions within the structural forms. Historically, Aglietta
argues, in order to stabilise capitalist accumulation and resolve
crisis, structural forms have acted together. However, he continues,
it is not inevitable that this will produce stable accumulation.
Rather the success or failure of the structural forms to regulate
and stabilise capitalism depends on how they interact (Aglietta,
1979).
The concept of the 'regime of accumulation' is used to identify a
set of relationships between production and consumption and occupies
a central place in the development of the theory of social
regulation. Two regimes are identified; a predominantly extensive
and a predominantly intensive regime of accumulation. Within the
former, accumulation is organised on the basis of the dominance of
absolute surplus value, in the latter it is organised on the basis
of the dominance of relative surplus value (Painter, 1990;3). These
two regimes correspond to two distinct historical phases. Extensive
accumulation is associated with a period of competitive regulation
between the 1850s and 1920s. Intensive accumulation on the other
hand was characteristic of the half century between the 1930s and
the 1970s. Under the extensive regime accumulation is considered as
developing primarily in the capital goods sector. In contrast,
under the intensive regime, termed Fordism, both production and
consumption are seen as integrated in such a way as to allow
simultaneous accumulation within both capital goods and wage goods
sectors.
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For the Regulationists the economic and social crisis of the inter
war period was a crisis of the extensive regime of accumulation.
Out of this crisis and consequent class struggle arose new
structural forms which proved successful in facilitating and
stabilising a different regime of accumulation. These new forms
included the institutionalisation of collective wage bargaining
which provided for a sustained demand, the development of a welfare
and social security system as a mechanism to retain, for sections of
the working-class, a level of consumer purchasing power in periods
of economic and social hardship, the growth of monopolistic economic
structures, and the extension of state activity into the areas of
planning and fiscal policy. These structural forms allowed for a
change in the relationship between production and consumption and
the emergence of a new regime of accumulation based on mass
production and consumption. Very crudely, changes in the technology
of production transformed the labour process in the wage goods
sector. This process simultaneously resolved some of the
contradictions and overcame some of the limitations of the old
regime, paving the way to the mass production of standardised goods.
Once the effects of real wage rises that the productivity gains of
technological innovation could finance had set in, the process of
accumulation based on mass consumption began.
A particular regime of accumulation is then regulated by a
particular group of 'structural forms'. These structural forms are
the basis of any analysis of the capitalist state. However, as
Painter (1990;2) illustrates a tension exists in that although the
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state is considered an important component of regulation, its forms
and functions are not seen as the only source of regulation. In
order to ease this tension the notion of the 'mode of regulation' is
introduced. This refers to the way in which the structural forms
operate together to regulate a regime of accumulation. Thus while
the regime of accumulation is about how the process of capital
accumulation occurs, the mode of regulation is about how and why
historically those processes have been stabilised.
Local Government, Fordism and Crisis 
Painter (1990), in his analysis of regulation theory and local
government, argues that local government is part of both the regime
of Fordist accumulation and its mode of regulation. It is
associated with the former by being implicated in the crisis of
Fordist accumulation over the 1970s, and with the latter because it
is a site for the creation of new structural forms. He argues that
between the 1950s and 1970s local government came to play a key role
within the Fordist mode of regulation. Three areas of state activity
are identified as of particular importance: the local provision of
services whose production was unprofitable under Fordist
accumulation, but for which there existed a political demand; an
increase in the planning and regulatory activity of local
government; and local government as a site for the expression of
social democratic politics at the local level, as well as a site for
political conflict and the emergence of new structural forms in
periods of crisis. In addition, local government also represented
the Fordist mode of regulation by undertaking roles which where not
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specific to Fordist state activity, but were essential to Fordism.
For example collective bargaining structures were developed in the
public sector as well as the private sector and thus contributed to
the maintenance of consumption levels (Painter, 1990;6).
Within regulation theory local government is seen as a key feature
of the Fordist mode of regulation. Thus, the crisis of Fordism in
the 1970s and 1980s, is at the same time a crisis of local
government. Regulationists hold that Fordism went into crisis
because its mode of regulation was unable to cope with the
contradictions of the regime of accumulation. In essence public
services, an essential part of the maintenance of Fordism, became
'dysfunctional', threatening its continuation. The production of
services such as education, housing and the social services were
unsuitable to the mass production techniques of the Fordist regime,
proving too costly for private capital to produce. Yet as a
consequence of the post-war settlement there was a political and
social demand for these services to be met. Increasingly, under
Fordism these consumer services came to be socialised and provided
for by the state. However, as the demand and cost of provision of
these services grew they became a drain on the productivity of the
private sector because these state services were financed through
taxation.
The rising costs of consumer services, ill-suited to the principles
of Fordist production, acted as a constraint to the continuation of
the Fordist regime of accumulation. Within the mode of regulation
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this situation erupted in the crisis of public service provision of
the 1970s. In conjunction, diminishing returns were beginning to
set in within the 'mechanised' sectors of production as continual
productivity gains brought about an increase in 'task fragmentation'
(Aglietta, 1979;22).	 These two factors combined represent the
crisis of Fordism.	 It was both a crisis of the regime of
accumulation and a fiscal crisis of the state. Within local
government the relief of this crisis found expression in the
pressure to reduce local expenditure from the mid 1970s. This
attempt however, failed to relieve the pressure of crisis for it
represented an attack on the level of collective consumption goods.
Indeed the social and political demands for such goods had not
disappeared because Fordism was in crisis. The resolution of this
crisis, according to regulation theory, would require the creation
of new structural forms acting together in order to produce a stable
or new regime of accumulation.
A primary change would be a reduction in the state production of
consumption goods and an increase in their private production. This
would be made possible by the 'renewed possibilities of
accumulation' as a consequence of changes within the labour process.
This 'new' form of accumulation, 'neo-Fordism', is seen as a
mechanism through which intensive accumulation can continue rather
than by which another regime is created. These then are considered
the necessary conditions for the resolution of the Fordist crisis,
however, they are not sufficient ones. Transformation of the
structural forms, and particularly the reduction in the state's
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provision of consumption goods, can only occur if the leading power
blocks within the state are committed to change and have a
predisposition to engage in conflict that any implementation of
these changes will engender (Painter, 1990;10).
Local Government and Post-Fordism
The adoption of a transition framework in the analysis of local
level change has been principally found in the work of Hoggett
(1987), Geddes (1988), and Stoker (1989b; 1990). These writers have
adapted the regulation perspective and have sought to place their
analyses of local government within the context of economic and
social organisational changes which have occurred since 1945. Along
with the regulationists they accept the notion that the state will
act to regulate and stabilise the capitalist economy in times of
crisis, and that the crisis of the 1970s was a crisis of the Fordist
regime of accumulation and mode of regulation. Their thesis is that
we are in the process of a transition from one set of production and
consumption norms to another - that is from Fordism to post-
Fordism. Nore explicitly, that within the realm of local government
we are witnessing the emergence of a new mode of regulation
compatible with a post-Fordist regime of accumulation.
The analyses of Hoggett (1987) and Geddes (1988) were directed
towards studies of local authority service delivery and their
relationship with the local economy. Hoggett's interpretation of
the emergence of post-Fordism is predominantly a technological one -
a consequence of the rise of new information technologies with a
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subsequent set of new socio-institutional relationships. New
information technologies encourage the growth of decentralisation
within production and the end of the 'mental-manual' dichotomy
characteristic of Fordism. His analysis of local service delivery
is placed within the context of an analogy between the public
production of services and the private production of mass produced
goods under Fordist accumulation. He argues that both have been
produced on the basis of mass production principles; that local
professionals and local bureaucrats have operated as 'people
processors' on a service 'assembly line', producing standardised
services and emphasising economies of scale (Hoggett, 1987;223).
This system he suggests is fertile ground for the technological
changes he identifies, heralding the growth of new organisational
and managerial forms within local government more decentralised,
leaner and fitter and engendering a flexible and democratised public
provision (Hoggett, 1987;225).
There are, however, problems with this analysis when applied to
local government which question the extent to which the local public
production process is being restructured in the way Hoggett
suggests. First and foremost, the empirical evidence does not bear
the weight of analysis. Hoggett's claim that local public
production and labour processes are being restructured on post-
Fordist lines tends to ignore or play dawn the variety of those
processes as they operate on the ground. Many services at local
level are organised in such a way that they represent Fordist rather
than post-Fordist principles, if any at all. Second, the analysis
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is just too deterministic. Although it acknowledges that there will
be differences in the extent, nature and timing of the changes as
they affect local authorities, the transformation in local
government organisational and management structures appears
inevitable. Finally, the analogy used to advance Hoggett's argument
is fatally flawed. In many areas of local authority activity the
'people processors' are less important than Hoggett suggests. The
'people processors' are often by-passed by 'street level
bureaucrats' - those local authority employees who occupy a position
between their clients and their employers. This is particularly
apparent in areas such as education, housing and social services
where staff decisions are made which do not always square with
bureaucratic procedures.
Within the literature on post-Fordist local government, Hoggett's
account is rooted in an analysis which focuses on changes within the
labour process. However, there is a strand within the literature
which moves away from analyses of the production and labour process,
and discussions of technological change, towards consideration of
the changing role of local government within the context of a new
mode of regulation and the break-up of social democracy and the
Keynesian welfare state. This approach is best represented by
Stoker (1989b; 1990) whose view of the Fordist/post-Fordist paradigm
involves an analysis of the relationship between the political,
economic and social processes associated with transition. It
highlights the link between national government and local government
in managing change.
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The restructuring of local government in the United Kingdom is for
Stoker not an automatic response to socio-economic change. Rather
it is,
part of the Thatcher government's response to these
processes. The aim is to create a local government
compatible with the flexible economic structure, two
-tier welfare system and enterprise culture which in
the Thatcherite vision constitutes the key to a success-
ful future. (Stoker, 1989h;159).
The reference to a 'ThatCherite vision' illustrates the notion of
different paths of transition within Stoker's analysis. This point
is raised by Stoker to counteract the criticism (which he accepts),
that transition theory is inadequate as a 'catch-all' description of
the process of economic, social and political change in post-war
Western democracies. There is, he argues, a need to take into
account national political and economic variations which have
engendered differences in the process of change, which is more
subtle and complex than the general paradigm suggests (Stoker,
1990;248/249).
Privatisation and the growth in 'new public management' are two
trends seen by Stoker as emerging features of a post-Fordist local
government in Britain (Stoker, 1990;254). The increased role for
the private sector and the introduction of a set of management
doctrines which emphasise customer care, performance measurement and
decentralised structures are considered to have materialised in
local government in the form of competitive tendering, and the
decentralistion of service delivery and management organisation.
The changes are not in themselves a direct result of the transition
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from Fordism. Instead, they represent successive Conservative
governments' responses to the transition from one regime of
accumulation to another (Stoker, 1989b;157/159).
In terms of its economic role the most notable characteristic of a
post-Fordist local government is seen as the shaping of public
production in line with the private sector. This change is
expressed in terms of cost economies and allowing private capital
into the market place of service provision. A major facilitator of
this process has been the introduction of new technology. This has
offered the possibility of transforming previously labour intensive
services by shedding labour, reducing aggregate costs and making
productivity gains possible (Stoker, 1990;255). However,
technological innovation has not been the only force for change.
Many local authority services are non-information based, for example
refuse collection and catering. Indeed, it is these services that
have been first in forging an enterprise spirit in local
authorities and making local service production and delivery more
attractive to the private sector (Stoker, 1990;255). Similarly, a
whole range of private management and consultancy based
organisations have encroached upon local authority activity in areas
such as leisure, recreation, training and planning. Moreover, non-
elected government institutions such as Urban Development
Corporations and Training and Enterprise Councils have been set up
to act as local catalyst organisations to attract private sector
investment and encourage private sector initiative (Stoker,
1990;256).
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The restructuring of local public production and management is also
connected with the restructuring of consumption patterns and the
provision of social consumption goods (Stoker, 1989b;161). For a
post-Fordist local government the pressure is for local authorities
to mirror the private sector and to target markets, and respond to
the 'differentiated' consumer. Stoker highlights the Audit
Commission's acknowledgement of this pressure with its stress that
it was essential that local authorities genuinely, 'understood
customers, rather than simply to assume what their needs ought to
be' (Audit Commission, 1988, quoted in Stoker, 1989;163).
Stoker's analysis seeks, therefore, to identify the changing role of
British local government within the context of the development of a
new mode of regulation and the dismantling of the social democratic
principles underpinning the Keynesian welfare state. His
conceptualisation of the post-Fordist paradigm involves an analysis
of the relationships between the political, economic and social
processes associated with transition. The changes he identifies
within local government, such as the rise of new technology, the
marketisation of public services, the search for flexible labour
markets, the growth of the differentiated consumer, and the
introduction of non-elected local government organisations, are seen
to be associated with the transition from Fordism. However, as
Stoker clearly acknowledges, they are not in themselves a direct
result of that process.	 Rather, they represent the political
responses of successive Conservative governments in their attempt
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to manage the transition from a Fordist to a post -Fordist regime of
accumulation (Stoker, 1989b;159).
The whole concept of transition theory has been criticised on the
grounds that it is an inadequate theorisation of economic change.
These criticisms have surrounded a questioning of the mechanisms of
Fordist accumulation, the nature of its crisis and the logic of any
new regime which may take its place (Clarke, 1988; Sayer, 1990). In
addition critics have pointed out that it also lacks an adequate
theorisation of the state and politics, and is weak as a description
of post-war change within western industrial democracies. National
variations illustrate a more complicated picture of change than the
one transition theory paints. However, Stoker's use of the concept
is based on the assumption that, 'there is sufficient empirical
evidence to support the claim that the paradigm captures significant
elements in those processes of change'. Moreover, he sees the
concept in ideal-type terms which he claims allows for the creation
of generalisations and the ordering and simplifying of economic and
social complexity and the illustration of the key features and
characteristics of change. This ideal-type construction involves a
reformulation of the concept of a post-Fordist local government
within the context of a three tiered level of analysis: a macro
level, a meso level, and a micro level (Stoker, 1990;249).
At the macro level one would be concerned with the derivation of
propositions about the nature of change. Within the economic arena
this would mean analysis of the process of de-industrialisation,
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disaggregating it from the concept of post-Fordism, and new types of
economic activity. Within the social sphere attention would be paid
to analyses of market versus non-market provision of services as
well as their organisation and management. Within the political
arena issues of major concern would be the development of new
political interests, institutions, representations and coalitions
within local government structures (Stoker, 1990;250).
At the level of meso analysis the task would be to analyse how
change identified at the macro level is translated into practice,
particularly across nations. To explain how change varies between
countries Stoker employs the notion of 'filters' - key elements
which shape the processes of change. For an analysis of local
government the most important filters are the institutional
organisation of economic and political activity; particular
historical and cultural values which inform a national system; and
the political structures and programmes that dominate (Stoker,
1990;250). To supplement the meso level, a third, micro level could
be utilised to focus on individual and group action in order to
explain haw change is received, promoted, or resisted (Stoker,
1990;251).
Stoker's own analysis of local government and post-Fordism can be
read in this way. At the macro level he has identified Changes in
the local production process, new technological innovations and
marketisation of service delivery, and the growth of new
institutional forms and relationships as a consequence. At the meso
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level he claims that the agenda of change is being imposed on local
government in a highly politicised environment where the approach is
to facilitate change within the context of a business oriented,
enterprise and privatised culture, and that 'new management
thinking' is an increasing factor in the pursuit of local economic
regeneration and public sector thinking. One filter for these ideas
he suggests has been the Audit Commission, whose focus on economy
and efficiency has gradually been widened to encompass a remit of
public management in general. In turn, these ideas have been
received, reconstructed, and regurgitated by the growing number of
management consultancies and local government training and study
centres, thus gaining a foothold for new wave management thinking
and production techniques within the mileu of local government
policy entrepreneurs.
All this aside, there are still significant problems for
interpreting local government within the context of the transition
from Fordism to post-Fordism. One is the elusive nature of Fordist
local government. Many critics have argued that the organisation of
local government has been more complicated than Fordist analysis of
functionalism, uniformity and hierarchy would suggest (Cochrane,
1991). Writers such as Stewart (1983) illustrated the diversity and
lack of uniformity in local authority service production and
delivery. In addition, competing departmental and professional
interests and ideologies have often worked against the production of
standardised services, procedures and regulations.
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The concept is on safer ground when it focuses on the welfare state
as a component of the Fordist mode of regulation. Being a
cornerstone of the state it is not difficult to understand why a
crisis of Fordism would weaken local government. However, even here
we would be talking in specifically British terms, recognising that
welfare provision under Fordism has varied between nations.
Moreover, many post-Fordist features predate their supposed
implementation, this is particularly true of the USA. It is also
possible that a lack rather than an abundance of specialisation and
flexibility will occur as a consequence of formal contracts. Even
in a post-Fordist world there is no guarantee that local authorities
will have greater control over suppliers of services. When in
competition with each other to attract suppliers, local authorities
may not be able to shape the level of demand and quality of product
or services from their suppliers to the same degree that some large
retail organisations are capable of.
A final criticism rests in the argument that it is possible to
acknowledge many of the changes identified within a transition
framework without being convinced that they have taken place as part
of the emergence of post-Fordism (Cochrane, 1991). It is the
implied determinism associated with placing local government within
the context of a theory of structural change that is the cost of the
analysis. Yet if structural changes within the UK are the product
of a particular political ideology and its strategy for the renewal
of accumulation, the process is open to political conflict. If
change is open to political conflict, then a change of political
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masters could result in a change in the strategy of accumulation and
thus a different post -Fordism.
LOCAL ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE RESTRUCTURING PROCESS: A SIGNPOST TO
SUBSEQUENT ANALYSIS
For all the diversity of the post-Fordist view of local government
change there is a tendency to focus on elected local government in
the context of a new competitive environment. However, any
framework constructed on the electoral and democratic elements of
local government is likely to miss change in the significant
political interests within the state system at the local level
(Cochrane, 1991). Analyses of the restructuring of local government
have to illustrate how local political arrangements and
relationships have changed over time. Dearlove (1979) in his
analysis of local government noted that there was little in the way
of formal channels of communication between those with economic
power, those with social status, and those with political control
over local government. This was not to say that informal methods of
communication did not exist, but that local political power and
economic power were not necessarily analogous.
It is not difficult to see the 1980s and early 1990s as a period
when such links and relationships have been strengthened, formalised
and become more visible. A key issue that has arisen as a
consequence of the increased political importance for business in
the direct involvement of economic restructuring and training is the
emergence of institutionalised measures for public and private
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sector co-operation. This process is part of the wider
restructuring of local government with its focus on public servivce
delivery, greater flexibily and responsiveness to local demands, and
the reorganisation of local authority structures.
Business involvement in local affairs has undoubtedly changed in
practice and mode of operation under successive national
Conservative administrations. Traditionally business involvement at
the local level has been seen as limited in its nature and extent.
Business leaders have been reluctant to enter the field of public
politics; few national corporations have shown commitment to
particular localities - with few headquarters or large area offices
locally based. In addition, Chambers of Commerce have tended to
concern themselves with issues of rate levels and local authority
bureaucracy in planning matters, rather than become involved in
major political debate about the shape and direction of the local
economy. Yet throughout the 1980s a more participatory business
orientation has began to develop within the local political arena.
This change is not just in terms of business as a supplier or market
for local government, or even as a model of favoured organisation,
but as an active contributor to the local policy making process.
The propagation of business involvement in the local political
process has been crafted both by central and local government and by
initiatives from the private sector. There are two basic variations
on the same theme. The first may be loosely termed the top down
variant.	 The characteristic form here is the imposition of
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agencies, quangos, and institutions from central government into
particular local policy areas. Urban Development Corporations in
the field of economic regeneration and property development, and
Training and Enterprise Councils, Compacts and City Technology
Colleges in the field of education and training, are the prime
examples of an attempt to increase private sector involvement in
local economic affairs.
In contrast, the second variant may be termed bottom-up. Here the
general characteristic is the development of locally based
organisations which draw from the resources of the local private
sector as well as the local public sector. In the latter 1980s,
'partnership' arrangements between the public and the private
sector, in the shape of formal political structures and
collaborative economic and social regeneration schemes and
programmes, have emerged in many British cities (see chapter three).
Despite the fact that local authorities have sought a substantial
role in the development of formal public-private forums, the main
feature is the growth in the degree to which local business leaders
have been drawn into these arenas of economic policy making. It is
to an examination of three 'middle range' perspectives for analysing
these specific developments in the sphere of local economic policy
and regeneration, set within the wider context of local government
change outlined in this chapter, that we will now turn.
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CHAPTER TWO
PERSPECTINTS ON BUSINESS — TOWN HAIL MATIONS: LOCAL CORPORATISM, 
GROWTH COALITIONS AND URBAN REGIMES 
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, the business community has been seen to play only a
minor part in city politics, or at most, to underplay any role it
might have played. Few business leaders have entered the arena of
public politics and few national companies have committed themselves
to the economic, social, and political life of their localities.
Local business organisations have tended to concern themselves with
'the rates' issue or individual planning issues rather than entering
debates about the strategic planning of the local economy. Indeed,
one of the apparent features of the local political landscape has
been the lack of formal channels of communication between those with
political control and those with economic power (et Saunders, 1979).
This does not mean that informal mechanisms did not exist, rather
that economic power and political control were not necessarily
analogous. Over the 1980s and in the early 1990s there has been an
attempt to fashion a more participatory business culture where the
links between the public and the private sectors have become
institutionalised and more visible.
This chapter considers three perspectives on the emergence of new
relationships between the public and the private sectors.
Structurally, the chapter is divided into three sections. The first
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discusses the potential for using a corporatist mode of analysis for
explaining state-business relations. 	 Specifically, it involves
discussing a spatial form of corporatism - local corporatism - and
its utility as a form of analysis. The second section examines the
concept of growth coalitions as developed by Molotch (1976) in his
attempt to explain the urban development process in US cities in the
1970s. The general model is described, followed by a consideration
of how it can be used in the context of British political economy.
The section then details some growth coalition types that have been
identified in Britain.
Finally, the chapter outlines how the concepts of local corporatism
and growth coalition can be 'synthesised' into a third perspective -
that of urban regime (Stone, 1989). It argues that the concept of
urban regime allows us to utilise elements of the previous
conceptual frameworks, but avoids some of their short-comings. The
chapter concludes by suggesting that the regime approach is acutely
tuned for analysing the 'informal arrangements' which are
fundamentally part of the alliances between the public and private
sectors in Britain's cities. Adopting a framework which can account
for the informality inherent in these relationships is imperative
because they are becoming an ever important locus of decision-making
activity.
CORPORATISM AND URBAN ECONOMIC REGENERATION
Towards a Spatial Form of Corporatism
To gauge the extent of relationship change between the public and
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private sectors within the local political system, it is necessary
to measure not only the degree to which business has become a
supplier of local services, but also the degree to which it has
become an active contributor to policy making. To this extent one
major issue has arisen as a consequence of the increased political
importance of business in the direct involvement of economic
restructuring and training: the degree to which new forms of local
political organisation can be considered corporatist (Cawson, 1985a;
Saunders, 1985; King, 1985). These commentators argued not that a
'local corporatism' existed as such, but that changes in government
urban policy in the the early 1980s could pave the way for new
political forms at the local level that might result in corporatist
policy-making.
Traditionally, corporatist literature has concentrated on a macro
and meso level in its analysis of state/interest organisation
relations (Schmitter and Lehmbruch, 1979; Lehmbruch & Schmitter,
1982; Cawson, 1985b). As such, it has tended to analyse 'function'
rather than 'locality'. Corporatist theory as developed by British
academics has predominantly adopted a two-tier conceptual framework,
based on the concept of 'dual polity' (Cawson and Saunders, 1983).
Within this approach there is a clearly defined sphere of politics
and policy-making concerned with production, in which class
interests negotiate policies with state agencies. Equally, there is
a sphere of consumption where interests reflect consumption
categories. These interests, not reducible to class, compete with
each other to exert influence over state policies. There is thus a
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functional division within the state where production polices are
determined at the central level and consumption policies determined,
in the main, at the local level. Corporatist politics has thus been
seen as a politics of the centre, whereas competitive political
processes are more apparent at the local level (Cawson & Saunders,
1983).
Over the 1980s, as a consequence of political and ideological
response to structural economic change, the issues of 'local
production' and intervention in the local economy grew and became
salient features of the local political scene. These changes opened
a debate within academic literature about the extent to which
concern with production issues at the local level heralded a
movement towards corporatism at the local level. The question was,
if new forms of state intervention were being developed was there a
paradigm shift towards the locality? For example what was the local
role of sub-central forms of state activity such as Urban
Development Corporations, or partnerships between local government
and local private sector organisations. It was argued that
functional interests may not 'peak' at the local level, but state
intervention in the local economy, of whatever form, may engender
corporatist forms of policy-making.
Cawson (1985a) in particular argued that local economic intervention
since 1977 could be conceptualised in terms of ideal typical modes
of state intervention. He argued that over the 1980s market
oriented policies such as enterprise zones grew as elements within
5 9
local economic initiatives. At the same time bureaucratic forms
such as the 'inner city partnership' authorities, set up under the
auspices of the 1977 White paper (HMSO, Cmnd.6845), continued to
operate, although in a diluted form. Additionally, corporatist
initiatives such as Urban Development Corporations have emerged,
designed to engender collaboration between sub-central state
agencies and organised interest groups (Cawson, 1985a;141).
For Cawson, the significant feature of urban policy was the
introduction of a combination of corporatist and market forms of
state intervention, coupled with a reduction in public expenditure
and contraction of public responsibilities. In essence this was
because the market mode proved difficult to implement at the local
level. The result was the introduction of corporatist forms of
intervention that were 'particularly noteworthy given the
associations between the local level and consumption provision
discussed...in the context of the dual politics thesis which
suggests that local corporatism is an unlikely combination of
territorial and functional bases of political organisation' (Cawson,
1985a;136).
In line with the analysis of Moore and Booth (1986a) it is useful to
view corporatism as a middle range theory 'which seeks not to define
political and economic orders, but to understand their component
elements' (Moore and Booth, 1986a;27). This approach has already
been adopted by those interested in furthering the meso-corporatist
debate (Cawsan, 1985b). In the same vein, it should be the task of
60
any local corporatist analytic framework. However, in turning to
the issue of locality rather than function, local corporatism is
dimensionally differentiated from either macro or meso levels of
analysis. A local corporatist framework implies an analysis which
relates discussion of policy and economic sectors with the influence
of space. It is this spatial dimension that marks local corporatism
apart from other modes of corporatist analysis. This spatial aspect
brings to prominence the issue of place in contributing to the
formulation of relations between the state and organised interests
territorially. Clearly, the significance of place will depend on a
number of variables: political, ideological, institutional, and the
structure of the local economy (Moore & Booth, 1986a; 27/28). The
particular mix of these variables will give rise to different policy
outcomes, but what can be said is that such variables 'may lead to
different groups coming together to act in concert to defend
economic interests. This can result in very different policy
outcomes to those which would result from decisions taken by the
market or the central state' (Moore and Booth, 1986a;27).
These variables, which form part of any analysis of local
corporatism, are the constituent elements of a local political
economy. Thus, we are linking corporatist analysis to territorial
outcomes within a local political economy context. Within this
context certain questions guide the direction of the analysis: how
significant is decision-making at the local level; what lies within
the discretion of local institutions and networks, and what are the
limits to that discretion; how important are the political and
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organisational arrangements of the state and organised interests as
locations of decision-making; and what are the outcomes of those
patterns of organisation and government in terms of the allocation
of resources and economic benefits?
Aspects of Local Corporatism
If we are to identify new political forms within British cities as
corporatist, we need to have a clear definition or understanding of
what such arrangements might look like. Thus, we need to be aware
of not identifying just any relationship between state forms and
economic groups as corporatist. One of the clearest definitions is
offered by Crouch and Dore (1990b). Although there is nothing
spatial about their definition it does illustrate what any
corporatist arrangement worth the name should entail:
An institutionalised pattern which involves an
explicit or implicit bargain (or recurring bargain)
between some organ of government and private
interest groups.., one element in the bargain being
that the groups receive certain institutionalised
or ad hoc benefits in return for guarantees by the
groups' representatives that their members will
behave in certain ways considered to be in the public
interests. (Crouch and Dore, 1990b;3).
The key elements of this conceptualisation are the notion of a
bargain, and the existence of exercised discipline over group
members. We must not lose sight of the fact that it is the
institutional arrangements developed between sub-central state
agencies and the private sector that we are attempting to identify
as corporatist. Clearly then, for any new institution to be
corporatist it must have mechanisms that allow it to make use of the
representatives of the interests involved. As Crouch and Dore argue
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it is the institution that may be corporatist not the interests
represented (p.22). Such institutional arrangements imply both
bargaining between the state and interest groups, and the
implementation of policy through the groups. These interest groups
not only advance their own members' interests but also enforce on
their membership compliance on agreements reached with the state and
other groups in the public interests.
This has a number of implications for local or urban corporatism.
Firstly, that for any new form of political organisation to be
considered corporatist it has to have the power to mandate its
membership to do things - in other words to constrain and sanction.
This applies to both state agencies and private interests.
Secondly, that sub-central state agencies must have the capacity to
deliver on bargained polices. Thirdly, that the representatives of
organised interests can ensure that their members consent to and
support agreed policies. Fourthly, that there is a common interest
that supersedes individual group interests. This common interest
should consist of the following points: any wider interest is
recognised to be long term; the stages necessary to achieve common
interest are identified; and there is a recognition that the 'free
rider' option does not exist and 'one's own' co-operation is
necessary to achieve any benefit. Finally, as Cawson has argued, we
must be able to identify reciprocal policy relationships between the
partners in these new political forms, and we need to make an
assessment of the extent to which any delegated implementation of
policy is accompanied by influence over policy formation such
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'...that the two processes are empirically inseparable' (Cawson,
1985a;132).
A problem for the
	 concept of local corporatism is its
appropriateness to relationships which are mainly between local
government and business. One central question is what does
government gain from business by corporatist arrangements? With
government-labour relations the question is not so difficult to
answer. The state can achieve a degree of compliance by organised
labour over particular issues, through the ability of a union
leadership to mandate its members, more easily than is possible to
achieve with the leadership of business associations. As King
(1983b;113) suggests: 'The apparent greater degree of influence
exercised by business in public policy, in comparison with that
exercised by unions, is achieved without capitalist organisations
effectively controlling members in the manner of labour unions'.
The implication is that the intermediary role played by unions is
not likely to be played by business organisations. Thus, do
business-state relations conform to corporatism? The answer to this
question, depends to a great extent on how tightly the concept of
corporatism is defined. As King (1983b) suggests, some theorists'
definitions are highly circumscribed, where corporatism would always
have to include organised labour. In contrast, others such as
Cawson (1985b) have moved away from tripartite analysis to forms of
corporatism based on state-industry relations which may not involve
peak associations of capital and labour. Similarly, forms of micro-
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corporatism (Cawson, 1989) where negotiations occur between the
state and individual firms, and at the level of the local state and
industry through planning agreements, would tend to indicate that
tripartite analysis is not the only road to travel. Hernes and
Selvik (1981) in their analysis of corporatism at the local level
couch their definition of corporatism in terms of an increased
interaction between public-private agencies.
King's (1983b; 1985) analysis is perhaps the most useful way of
focussing on the relations between local capitalist associations and
local government. King identifies two related processes within this
context:
(a) the extent to which groups are recognised and
invited to assume a role in policy formulation
and implementation by government, including the
possible provision of resources, and implications
for the regulation of internal relations between
an organisation's leaders and ordinary members;
and (b) the extent, level and consequences of
concerted action with other economic actors,
especially labour associations, including
involvement in formal tripartite or similar
bodies. (King, 1983b;113).
This definition appears to offer a less restrictive framework in
which to conceptualise corporatism. The problem is however, that
the concept arguably loses theoretical specificity for potential
empirical adaptability, in that it merely describes an
organisational strategy undertaken by the state. As Flynn (1983)
argues 'the distinction between intention and outcome is also very
important in determining the existence or extent of corporatism'
(Flynn, 1983;104). This returns US to Cawson's point concerning the
reciprocity of policy relationships where delegated implementation
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of policy to interest groups has to be accompanied by influence over
policy formulation (Cawson, 1985a;132).
Assessing the Utility of the Concept 
At first glance new political forms in Britain's cities in the
latter half of the 1980s and early 1990s appear to offer some
evidence of corporatist politics. That is, there seems to be a
functional representation of a number of groups at the local level
in formal consultation with local elected government. However, we
have to consider exactly what may be local about any new
arrangements where policy-making assumes the form of a collaboration
between sub-central state agencies and local organised interest and
groups. A number of points can be raised which question the use of
the term local and its application to forms of partnership for
economic regeneration.
Firstly, the extent to which non-local actors participate in these
new working relationships. Within any partnership there may be
participants that have a local dimension, such as community
organisations,the Chamber of Commerce, Chamber of Trade, and the
local authority. However, even in these 'locally' developed
partnerships the partners tend to range more widely than this.
Partnerships have been forged between local authorities and national
organisations such as Business in the Community and The Phoenix
Initiative, national construction companies, and local organisations
with a national base. Moreover, central government in the form of
the regional offices of the Department of Environment and Department
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of Trade and Industry have been involved in a representative
capacity in a number of partnership committees and organisations.
The second question concerns the availability of finance. Although
the potential exists within many partnerships to raise investment
locally, the cost of many projects is often financially beyond the
reach of the partnership. Thus, the source of investment has to
extend beyond the financial capacity of local actors and draw on a
pool of non-local investors. Contributions are dependent on central
government subsidy, private money (through the attraction of a
financially powerful partner), or a combination of the two.
Thirdly, we should question the extent to which decisions within
collaborative organisations are really made locally. Local
authorities are heavily constrained by legislation with regard to
their activity in partnerships, economic development and
participation in companies. As such their decisions will inevitably
be coloured by what they think they can do by law. Additionally,
the local representatives of national companies and organisations
will have to take into account their corporate policy before
committing themselves to particular projects or strategies. These
decision-making constraints may have little to do with local
considerations but they will have important ramifications for the
outcomes of projects and strategies. Finally, the impact of
partnership policies will have more than simply a local effect. The
outcome of a particular project on its immediate environment may be
easy to gauge, but the effects on a neighbouring area are less easy
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to forecast. If a grand strategy is to be developed then it has to
move beyond a localist orientation and relate to wider changes in
the economic and social structure. The original conception may be
localist but the outcome is invariably-not.
These few points are enough to illustrate that both local and non-
local impluses intersect in any given combination of public-private
sector co-operation. The existence of non-local actors, non-local
finance, the constraints on local decision making, and the variation
in territorial impact of collaborative ventures, indicate that the
spatial and institutional framework of partnerships can be wider
than the limits of a local authority area, and may preclude a sole
reliance on local interests. Sub-central state agencies, central
and local government, private sector organisations, and community
groups operate within a policy-making system, but none are
necessarily confined to a specific territorial base.
Cawson, (1985a) although positing the emergence of local
corporatism, was pessimistic in his conclusions about the potential
for locally based interests to adopt corporatist politics. In his
view a local corporatist analysis implies the existence of more
independence within the local political economy than he considers
possible:
Economic decline and mounting political pressure to
alleviate its consequences, coupled with a policy of
privatisation and perhaps the growth of a contract
model of local service provision, may in time lead to
a marked change in the role of the local state. But
such a change is unlikely to be towards a greater
autonomy, and the kinds of corporatist interventions
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that may reshape the local political economy will
be determined outside the reach of local political
organisation. (Cawson, 1985a;147).
According to this interpretation the phenomenon being studied is
corporatism at the local level rather than local corporatism, where
national interests are represented and local interests are
incorporated. This is because 'the local dimension is the target of
intervention rather than the basis for the organisation of the
participating parties' (Cawson, 1985a;144). However, if it is
accepted (not withstanding the caveats outlined above), that a
degree of policy autonomy and discretion can be exercised by
political interests within particular localities, then the point
Cawson makes is merely a semantic one. Indeed, recent work by Cooke
(1989) and Harloe et al (1990) argue that the executant character of
local government in Britain, with the resources and discretion which
that brings, asserts the significance of party control for local
policy-making together with the ability of interest groups to
influence policy (Pickvance, 1990;11). Both studies examine
different localities' responses to economic and social change since
1945, and demonstrate that despite global processes of economic and
social restructuring, such general trends do not 'fully explain what
happens in particular places' (Pickvance, 1990;1). Indeed, they
illustrate the importance of locality and place as a basis for
locally specific forms of organisation within a political economy
context.
The emergence of public-private partnerships for economic
regeneration in many British cities are one form of response to de-
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industrialisation and urban economic change. Clearly, they are
potential sites for local organisation based around corporatist
modes of decision-making, with the functional representation of
different groups within a locality becoming manifest through
specific organisational and institutional mechanisms. Within such a
framework local government occupies a central position as a mediator
of different interests. However, within the present urban policy
climate it will act out this role within a context which explicitly
recognises the enhanced role of business interests. In accordance
with Cochrane (1991) we are perhaps now in a position to suggest
that although a potential for local corporatism exists, with some of
its patterns more clearly defined, it is still 'premature to suggest
that it has become the dominant model of urban politics' (Cochrane,
1991;298).
GROWTH COALITIONS AND URBAN ECONOMIC REGENERATION
The concept of a 'growth coalition' was first developed by Molotch
(1976) in his analysis of urban economic development in the USA.
This work argued that growth, defined in terms of increases in the
labour force; a rising level of retail, wholesale and financial
activity; and more intensive land development together with higher
population density, was the dominant issue for those who held
economic and political power in American cities (Mblotdh, 1976;310).
Molotch argued that virtually all US cities were dominated by an
elite:
whose members have business or professional interests
that are linked to local development or growth. These
elites use public authority and private power as a means
to stimulate economic development and thus enhance their
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awn local business interests. They turn their cities, as
active, dynamic units, into instruments for accomplishing
the growth goals that will enhance their fortunes. The city
becomes, for all intents and purposes, a "growth machine".
(Molotch, 1988;25)
In Mblotch's conception, land is the critical and dynamic factor
around which a coalition is organised, with at its core land-based
business interests. However, they are not the only elements which
constitute this network of elites. Rather, the network extends to
include others whose fortunes are not directly tied to land-use but
are linked to the economic prosperity of their localities: the local
financial institutions; the local media; the legal profession;
accountants; and the construction industry. Additionally, members
of the coalition are drawn from local institutions such as higher
educational establishments and social service organisations. As
Molotch argues, these institutions 'may come to support the growth
goal, either to increase patronage or to curry favour from the
elites who give money and serve on their boards of directors'
(Molotch, 1988;27). Although these actors may have no direct
interest in the spatial pattern of growth pursued by the coalition
in general, they nevertheless play an important legitimating role by
condoning a particular form of development. As such, the coalition
can become identified with the community at large.
The thesis suggests only a minor role for business interests, which,
although they may operate locally, have a wider spatial ability to
generate returns on their investments. Mblotch cites companies such
as McDonalds and General Motors who whilst supporting the agenda of
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the growth coalition and its ideology of growth, have little
interest in the intensification of the local economy for its own
sake (Molotch, 1976;317, 1988;27): 'Their indirect interest is
perhaps in the existence of the growth ideology rather than growth
itself. It is that ideology which makes them revered people in the
area...' (p.317).
The growth coalition also places pressure on government both central
and local (in the American case federal government, state government
and city government), to aid its agenda for development. At the
central or federal level pressures are placed in support of
productive infrastructural improvements within a coalition's own
patch. At the local level, the expectation is that government will
undertake active promotion of the area and pursue polices and
strategies for development favourable to business and local
capitalist interests. In this way, growth coalitions have a large
constituency to call upon in support of their development agenda
(Mblotch, 1988;28).
?blotch argues that such growth elites have a level of discretion to
carry out their development objectives (p.29). However, this
discretion is operationalised within a given set of constraints.
The constraints which affect the growth elites' strategies and
implementation of their development agendas include the following:
geographical features; the level of unity amongst civic leaders; the
patterns of investment by non-local corporate capital; the quality
of local political leadership; and the existence of urban social
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movements. 2 These constraints give rise to the specific actions and
strategies adopted by growth elites in their attempts to overcome
the barriers (the constraints) to their development programmes.
Such action in turn is what gives rise to differences between local
growth machines.
For Nolotch the constraints he identifies add up to the 'partial
determinants' of the urban political system. How constraints
operate locally is what determines the shape and content of the
coalitions' modus operandi. He argues that growth elites adjust to
the various constraints as 'best they can', composing a growth
strategy that 'fits the circumstances'. As such, this makes growth
elites the 'most dynamic, active and deliberate force in shaping
local land use and the local policy agenda' (1988;40/41). However,
the interaction of this group with the constraints they are faced
with limits their discretion. It is this interaction which
determines the strategies and, eventually, the shape of cities.
Nblotch asserts that these constraints affect growth coalitions in
various ways and impact differentially to produce locally specific
responses and forms of development. His primary concern is to
stress this differential of impact by prioritising the salience of
some constraints over others. For instance, the constraint of a
lack of civic leadership, or of poor political ability amongst a
city's political leaders, or the weakness of urban social movements
to challenge the coalition ideology, are all considered to be
'minor constraints' on the ability of the coalition to shape the
local development agenda. In contrast, the patterns of investment of
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cosmopolitan capital are seen to have more 'actual significance' on
structuring the strategies of growth elites (1988;42). This
prioritisation is ordered on Molotch's belief in the structural
hegemony of cosmopolitan capital over locality. By this, Molotch
means the extent to which international capital's drive for profit
accumulation alters the economic structure within which local
capital makes its decisions. However, he argues that within any
locality it is the growth elites who are hegemonic:
In both ideological and structural terms, their
dominance over the development process is felt
across a wide array of political, economic, and
cultural institutions...this deep and broad
permeation of locality allows growth elites to
prepare the ground for capital, thus coupling
local agendas with national and international
systems of production. (Mblotch, 1988;42).
Qualifying the Thesis 
The concept of growth coalitions has come to occupy a more prominent
role in the the analysis of urban policy in Britain's cities (Lloyd
& Newlands, 1988; Cooke, 1988; Harding, 1990). Its growing
prominence as a method of analysis reflects the directional output
of urban policy initiatives in Britain over the whole of the 1980s,
but particularly since the mid-1980s. A plethora of policy
initiatives have emanated from central government departments
directed towards tackling the problems of urban economic and social
decline. Much of this policy, although ad hoc, uncoordinated, and
pragmatic, has consistently sought to embrace the private sector,
attempting to 'lever-in' private sector money through the incentive
of public funds, and offer a quasi-managerial role to the private
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sector in the solution of urban problems (Hambleton, 1988; Lawless,
1989).
The result has been a growth in local public-private networks which
have utilised available resources to promulgate their development
agendas. In addition to the general thrust of the Government's
urban policy, the growth of 'development alliances' has been
achieved by central government's curtailment of local government's
financial and statutory resources. This in turn has further reduced
local government's ability to act independently of the preferences
of local interest organisations (Harding, 1990;92196). In the
climate of the mid-1980s where urban economic and social
regeneration was concomitant with public-private co-operation, the
result was a 'trade-off' of local government's autonomy against the
potential economic rewards of its allying with local or national
interests. To quote Harding at some length on this point:
A combined strategy of reducing vertical autonomy and
building local unelected agency capacity has...from the
mid-1980s, significantly altered the prospect for local
alliances in the latter part of the decade. Thereafter
the growth coalition model...began to a greater extent
to suit the interests of each party. Weakened local
authorities would achieve a voice within the local re-
development vehicle...greater political legitimacy, and
potentially larger discretionary resources. The private
sector would receive a range of public subsidies in cash
and in kind, and central government would achieve broad
compliance with its overall market strategy... (1990;96)
In such a policy climate the issue of business participation in
urban regeneration initiatives assumes an increased importance.
Hence the utilisation of the concept of growth coalitions as a
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method for analysing businesses activity in urban policy, and the
development and operation of such 'selective alliances'.
Nevertheless, in using the concept it is important to remember that
it was devised to analyse urban development processes in US cities
in the 1970s. It is a concept which can draw on a deep history and
culture of business-city government interaction, and which locates
Itself within and under a specific political system. Primarily, the
concept seeks to explain the longevity of an urban business class's
ability to influence the American urban political system. However,
it is situated within the context of a federal political structure
which is less centralised than the unitary system experienced in
Britain. Under a federal system, irrespective of the challenges to
local government that have occurred in Britain since 1979, city
government in the US has a greater degree of autonomy than does
local government in Britain.3
A central problem then is the ethnocentricity of the concept, and
the time and place specific nature of its analysis. Stating this
however, does not deny its important contribution to our
understanding of business-local government relations and the urban
political process. Rather, it suggests a need to adapt the concept
for different experiences and then assess its analytic utility.
Thus, however useful the growth coalition concept may be for
analysing the processes of urban development and regeneration in the
USA, a degree of adaptation and qualification is necessary for it to
have any meaning in the context of British political economy.
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Lloyd and Newlands (1988;34135) identify three main areas where it
is possible to adapt the concept. The first adaptation revolves
around the necessity for land-based entrepreneurs to dominate the
coalition. Lloyd & Newlands challenge Nblotch's assumption that the
core of the coalition will always be land-based interests by arguing
that although all capitalist businesses have an interest in the way
land is used, most of them, including local capital, have a power
and wealth which is derived from market commodities other than land.
They suggest that Nblotch's assumption of the necessity for property
entrepreneurs to 'lead' is based on the 'specific institutional
arrangements which govern urban land use and development in the
United States' (p.34). This they attribute to North America's 'open'
land market which they contrast to the more regulated and controlled
planning system and land market in Britain. The result of this
challenge to the thesis is that business interests other than those
which are land-based can form the core of the coalition and dominate
its strategies and programmes of action.
The second area ripe for adaptation is seen to lie in Nblotch's
under-estimation of the role of non-local capital and its
disinterest in local growth. Lloyd & Newlands's assertion is that
Molotch 'overstates the difference in interest in the growth
coalition between local businesses and the branches or subsidiaries
of companies based elsewhere' (p.34). They argue that most
subsidiaries and branches will make some proportion of their sales
locally, but that this will be particularly acute where branch
company executives' remuneration is dependent upon the extent of
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local sales. Additionally they argue, 'the social worth of branch
executives, in their own eyes and in the eyes of their peers, is
often defined in terms of the number of people one employs' (p.35).
The implication of their argument is that far from taking a
disinterested or limited interested in local growth, there may be a
fundamental requirement for subsidiaries to take an active interest
in the local economy both for their profitability as a subsidiary
(and the parent firm), and their social standing in the community.
Thus, local arms of multi-national capital may be firmly established
within the growth coalition.
The third adaptation involves reassessing the role of local
government. The assertion is that Molotdh offers a weak and passive
theory of local government involvement in the growth coalition - in
essence the 'hijacking' of local government by business interests.
Lloyd & Newlands argue that Molotch 'describes a situation in which
local government is co-opted by business interests to assist in the
promotion of local growth but does not explain the process by which
local government is drawn into the growth coalition, nor whether
this is indeed a necessary pre-condition of the coalition' (p.35).
In contrast to the simple hijacking theory offered by Molotch, Lloyd
& Newlands suggest a more complex relationship between local
government and business. Their argument is twofold: first that
local government may share the growth ideology of the coalition and
be an active partner, or it may not and face exclusion from the
coalition; secondly, that local government is constantly 'exposed'
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to interests (organised labour, residential associations, racial
groups etc) other than business, to which it may or may not respond.
The implication of adopting this argument is that the role of local
government in the process of coalition organisation is not simply a
zero sum equation of either supineness or active support. To be
sure, local authorities may take little or no action in a
particular coalition, or in contrast, they may actively seek to
legitimise its aims and objectives, but these are not their sole
options. Lloyd and Newlands's criticism of Molotch's theory of
local government alerts us to the oppositional potential to growth
coalitions that local government possesses, but perhaps more
significantly local government's ability to develop what in American
terminology are called 'progressive' coalitions with their concerns
with the social and redistributional aspects of local growth. But,
as Lloyd & Newlands point out, it also reinforces one of Molotch's
strongest claims, namely the key role of ideology in 'gaining
popular support for an economic system characterised by gross
inequalities in rewards' (p.35).
Some Types of Growth Coalition in Britain
In a country that has no real tradition of overt business
involvement in local affairs, it is still possible to offer
typologies of British growth coalitions. Most coalitions in Britain
appear to occupy a position on an axis between the points of a
public sector-led coalition and a private sector-led coalition. In
Britain, current research suggests that there is little evidence of
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private sector dominated growth coalitions of the kind which have
developed in some American cities (Cooke, 1988; Herding, 1990;
Cochrane, 1991). Rather, private sector interests are likely to be
key actors in any alliance, but they appear not (at least at the
moment) always to be the dominant partner. Cooke in particular
argues that 'to the extent that growth coalitions have a role to
play in the contemporary period... [Cooke thinks they do have a
role]...many will have to be dominated not by the business class but
by political and professional representatives not wholly ensnared by
the profit-motive' (Cooke, 1988;192).
Cooke's argument is that in contrast to the American experience,
growth coalitions in Britain have tended to be formed by local
Labour politicians and/or local professionals, in conjunction with
organised labour and local industry for whom 'social justice
criteria may be presumed to have been a major stimulus to action'
(p.195). On occasions such coalitions have involved the local
professional class led by key council officer personnel. Moreover,
in situations where indigenous political leadership was lacking
outside professionals were used to provide the catalyst to coalition
formation. 4
In his analysis, Cooke offers a threefold classification of his
'progressive' coalitions. First, a Labour Party led, trade union
coalition characteristic of politics in North East cities in the
1960s. Cooke suggests, 'Newcastle...proved itself perhaps Britain's
nearest example of a growth coalition in the American style with
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business, unions and local professionals organised into a strongly
local corporatist organisation' (p.194). Secondly, a coalition that
consisted of local union, local professional, and local petit
capitalist interests under the management of local Labour
politicians and senior council officers. This 'Party municipal
managerialism' was the characteristic form of politics in Swindon in
the 1970s. Thirdly, non-Party municipal managerialism, where the
source of growth is not so much party driven, but is a managerial
response to deindustrialisation. Such a managerial municipal
coalition could include senior council officials, the Chamber of
Commerce, and the local higher educational institutions (p.195).
Cooke's fear is that such examples of progressive coalitions will
face emasculation by attacks to local democracy and democratic
accountability by successive Conservative governments' urban policy
initiatives. However, he is not totally pessimistic about the
ability of local government to challenge the growth of private
sector intervention in urban planning, arguing that local
progressive coalitions offer an opportunity to remain 'a focus for
those whose interests in social justice are upper-most'. Moreover,
they can become 1 an important political base for social
mobilisation...cities and smaller localities are the obvious entity
around .which progressive coalitions can be formed' (p.198).
Clearly, the role of the local state envisaged in this analysis is
an active rather than passive one. Its role is to enable, in the
sense of performing, a strategic managerial function - private
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capital is not necessarily in a dominant position. Indeed, Cochrane
(1991) has argued that such developments are 'closer to neo-
corporatism, in which the local state still matters, rather than
neo-pluralism dominated by business' (Cochrane, 1991;297). This is
the implication of growth coalition experience in Britain where the
quasi-public role and involvement of the business community in urban
affairs is still not all pervasive. However, the increase of growth
coalitions does herald a changed role for the private sector in
helping to shape, in a more explicit manner than before, the broad
strokes of urban policy. As Meyer & Boyle argue (1990):
These new roles may be viewed either positively or
negatively, but they are inherent in the growth
machine. Private involvement with public efforts
may increase resources and permit co-ordination
of public and private injections of needed capital.
On the other hand, increased direct private involve-
ment may lead to the US pattern in which the agenda
for the local state is effectively captured by the
private sector, and unequal "partnership" evolves,
with the growth coalition really dictated to and
directed by private capital. (Meyer and Boyle, 1991;318).
SYNTHESISING LOCAL CORPORATISM AND GROWTH COALITIONS: TOWARDS URBAN
REGIMES
So far this chapter has discussed the concepts of local corporatism
and growth coalitions in relation to the emergence of new political
relationships between the local state and business in Britain's
cities. It has suggested that local corporatism offers a spatial
framework of analysis which seeks to explain forms of policy making
based around the organisation of functional interests within
territorially defined positions. Some of the concept's
Characteristics were discussed, and an assessment of its utility was
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made. The notion of growth coalitions has also been introduced,
drawing on the experience of urban development processes in the USA.
However, caution is required in attempting to replicate the concept
in the context of British political economy, since the
characteristics of economy, institutions, politics, and ideology are
not the same in each country. Thus, following the work of Lloyd &
Newlands (1988), some of the possible adaptations and qualifications
to the concept for use within the British context were outlined.
Additionally, types of growth coalitions as they appear to have
developed within particular localities in Britain have been
described.
Both 'local corporatism' and 'growth coalitions' are discrete
concepts, but their similarity lies in their attempt to provide
interesting ways for understanding state-business relations,
particularly partnerships for economic regeneration, as they are
developing in British cities. Local corporatism is perhaps best
described as a 'middle range' theory which attempts to offer
explanations for the policy outcomes of these new state-business
relationships. In contrast, the notion of growth coalitions appears
to be more of a description of the organisational arrangements of
such relations, rather than a full blown attempt to analyse the
politics and policy outcomes of them.
Informal Relationships and Urban Regimes 
One of the striking features of the new arrangements which are
beginning to emerge between the local state and business is their
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relative informality.
	
Many of the partnerships between local
government and business which are developing in British cities are
not set within formal organisational structures with
institutionalised decision-making, but on informal lines of
authority and decision-making based on inter-personal relationships,
tacit understanding and mutual co-operation. Although these
partnerships may have formal aims and objectives, often the manner
in which they seek to achieve these objectives is not formal. Such
informality in relationship structure poses particular problems for
local corporatist analysis with its attempt to explain the existence
of formal, highly structured, relationships and decision-making
processes. Clearly, if as suggested, it is the informality of
arrangements in state-business relations in British cities which is
a significant characteristic then a corporatist framework would
appear to be limited. The concept of growth coalition also offers
only partial explanations for informal relationships. Its analysis
tell us who is in the coalition, but little about how the coalition
was formed, or haw it makes decisions.
One way of reconciling these limitations with the issue of the
'Informality' of the arrangements developing between the
Institutions of the local state and business, is through the concept
of urban regime (Stone, 1989). As with growth coalitions it is a
concept imported from America, particularly devised to explain urban
conflicts arising from the social division of labour between state
and market (Jonas, 1992;282/283).
	 However, the concept is not
axiomatically place specific and has applicability to ,wider
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circumstances than American urban politcal economy. Of course,
cities are different economically, politically, culturally, and
institutionally, but the basic premise of regime theory holds for
all cities: there is an 'informal yet relatively stable group with
access to institutional resources that enable it to have a sustained
role in making governing decisions' (Stone, 1989;4). The
constituent elements of such a group vary from place to place but
will always include institutions of the state and private interests.
As such an urban regime is defined as:
the informal arrangements by 	 public bodies and
private interests function together in order to be able
to make and carry out governing decisions. (Stone, 1989;6).
Clearly, much of the regime's actions are seen to rest on informal
arrangements, tacit understanding and co-operation, but how is such
informality given coherence, and why is co-operation so attractive
an option? Stone suggests that a regime's coherence occurs because
it is purposive, created to achieve action (p.4). In this sense, to
be in a regime is empowering - more can be realised inside than
outside (p.5). As far as co-operation is concerned, Stone asserts
that this is a product of weak formal authority within cities. He
suggests that cities lack a 'conjoining structure of command', where
individual actors may have the power of command but in which there
Is little in the way of a mechanism to link or unite them. In such
a system, where co-ordination of action has only a weak potential
for articulation, informal arrangements for co-operation become more
significant. This informal process of co-ordination 'across
institutional boundaries', Stone refers to as civic co-operation.
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For Stone, the term coalition stresses that a regime 'involves
bringing together various elements of the community and the
different institutional capacities they control' (p.5), whilst
governance is through informal arrangements and 'is about how some
forms of co-ordination of effort prevail over others. It is about
mobilising efforts to cope and to adapt; it is not about absolute
control' (p.6).
Stone's assertions challenge traditional formulations of community
power. Specifically, they question those interpretations that
perceive power as a form of dominance and control, and which view
politics as the legitimation of forms of that control (Stone,
1989;222). A key point is that the social control paradigm has led
both pluralist and anti-pluralist anaylses to focus on the issue of
the presence or absence of hegemonic beliefs in explaining a lack of
resistance by the dominated to their dominators (the third face of
power debate). Stone contends that by following the social control
paradigm a host of critics have misunderstood 'the character of
power as it operates in modern socieites' (p.220). Be argues that
the model produces 'third face of power' explanations because of its
emphasis on the 'difficulty of maintaining a comprehensive system of
control' within its analysis - the cost of compliance issue. For
pluralist, it is the 'cost of compliance' that gives rise to
pluralism: for anti-pluralist, consent and legitimacy are
manipulated to reduce the costs of control. Thus, both agree that a
few rule, but equally, both disagree over the nature of compliance
to that rule (p.225). For pluralists, compliance by the many to the
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few implies a lack of any basis for resentment, for more critical
theorists a lack of conflict implies the existance and influence of
mediating forces (the third face of power), that ' bring about false
or fragmented consciousness' (p.225).
Stone's alternative model for understanding power, moving away from
arguments constructed around elite control of popular consciousness,
is based on the argument that society, in terms of its institutions
for governance, conceptions of the world, and the norms and values
that people use to make sense of their environment, is fragmented.
Society is held together by a 'loose network of institutional
arrangements' whose maintenance is a 'matter of struggle, with
contenders variously accommodating and resisting one another'
(p.227). In such a fragmented system, the issue is not about
comprehensive control, but about, 'how to bring enough cooperation
among disparate community elements to get things done - and to do so
in the absence of any overarching command structure or a unifying
system of thought' (p.227). Given this situation, co-operative
participants do not 'behave as if the underlying structure of the
situation is one of polarity between the few who dominate, and the
many who are dominated, but as if the capacity to govern is in
question' (p.228). The important questions here become who has
resources, how can co-operation be achieved, and where can a
foundation for that co-operation be placed? As Stone asserts, the
most attractive allies in this fragmented system are the organised,
the best resourced, and those who can engage in a system of co-
operation - in capitalist society such reqirements tend to be found
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mainly within the business or 'investor' class (p.229). In this
model, the analysis of power is not so much about who dominates who
and how domination is achieved, but about the development of a
capacity to act - as Stone says, 'power to, not power over'. The
important issue within urban regime theory is thus 'who can achieve
coordination of effort among a select few who are strategically
placed' (p.229).
The concept of urban regimes provides a novel way of conceptualising
the changes that are occurring in British cities in terms of the
relationship between local government and private interests,
particularly those of business. Through its approach to local
government and its various urban policy initiatives, central
government has sought to weaken the role of the state at the local
level. That this has on occasions resulted in a strengthened
position for new quasi-government institutions within cities, does
not detract from the fact that the ideological thrust of those
initiatives has been towards reducing the role of local state
institutions, and particularly local government. Unequivocally,
private interests, especially business interests, are being
encouraged to take a more participatory and active role in the
management of city life. In such an environment, formal authority,
that is authority vested in the elected control of state
institutions, does indeed become fragmentary, and imbued with weak
systems of control to ensure the co-operation and co-ordination of
sectional interests.
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Informal systems of co-operation have began to develop in British
cities in response to such fractured forms of authority. Local
state institutions and functional representatives of private
interests have begun to work together in alliances in which co-
operation and decision-making processes are fundamentally informal
in nature.	 Partnerships for urban economic regeneration are
potential sites for such informal arrangements. Partnerships
function on the basis of co-operation, mutual dependency and
consensus, the actions of which are opera tionalised in a largely
informal way (see chapter three). As such, we need a theoretical
perspective which takes account of this informality. Both the
concepts of local corporatism and growth coalitions offer insights
into how partnerships and state-business relations might operate,
but they also have difficulty in either analysing the informality of
the relationships or providing more than a description of an
organisational structure.
However, for the coalition perspective in particular, given the
qualifications and adaptations referred to, it provides a useful way
to articulate and describe the emergence of new organisational
arrangements between business interests and local state institutions
over the 1980s and into the 1990s. However, it does not offer a
completely satisfactory analysis of the politics and policy outcomes
of a coalition. This is especially relevant when the dominance of
business interests within the coalition is questioned, as has been
the case with studies of coalitions in Britain. The experience of
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British coalitions suggests that there is a far more complex process
of state-business relations operating than the original conception
allows for. What is required is an explanatory framework that
permits US to describe who may be in coalition, but which also
engages the questions of haw a coalition was formed, how it operates
and what are its outcomes?
The concept of urban regime goes some way to bridging this
explanatory gap by allowing UB to theorise the complexity of state-
business relations in a manner which takes account of two important
features of urban policy over the 1980s - the informality of
relationships in the field of urban policy and the fragmented nature
of authority within cities vis-a-vis the formulation and
implementation of polices for economic and social regeneration.
This conception appears to be particularly apt for analysing public-
private partnerships for regeneration. With its stress on
informality and repetition, regime theory illuminates the process of
policy-making that results as a consequence of collaboration. Such
co-operation and involvement is a consequence of a weakening of
formal authority in cities, where although individuals or
organisations may have power there is little in the way of a
mechanism to unite them. In such an environment where formal co-
ordinated action is weakly articulated informal co-operation becomes
more significant and attractive, and occurs across 'institutional
boundaries'. Indeed, informality is a feature of many partnerships
between the public and private sectors, developing their aims and
strategies through co-operation mutual dependency and consensus.
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The regime perspective allows us to determine not only who the
participants are, but how any alliance is established and how it is
maintained. Before proceeding to consider some of these questions
in relation to the specific example of the Sheffield, we need to
identify some of the key features of public-private partnerships for
economic regeneration. This is the task of the following chapter.
NOTES
1. This discription is taken from Nolotch (1976; 1988). The
concept is also described in detail in Logan and Molotch (1987).
2. For a fuller discussion of each constraint see Nolotch
(198;29/42).
3. For example, one critical difference lies in their relatives
abilities to raise levels of local taxation and improve the fiscal
base of a city.
4. There is little research on the form of growth coalitions in
Conservative controlled local authorities.
5. The concept of urban regime is fully described in Stone and
Sanders (1987), and Stone (1988; 3/12).
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CHAPTER THREE
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP AND URBAN ECONOMIC REGENERATION
INTRODUCTION
The concept of public - private partnership has come to occupy a
central place in the political economy of the redevelopment of
Britain's inner city and urban areas. Partnerships between the
public and private sectors are now commonplace as vehicles for the
development and implementation of strategies for local economic
regeneration (Harding, 1989a;1990). The notion of 'partnership'
should now be a critical feature of any analysis which seeks to
explain how the political and economic fortunes of British cities
have been shaped over the 1980s, and how they will be shaped into
and beyond the 1990s. Since the mid-1980s, there has been a steady
growth in the number of formal and informal organisations,
committees, bodies and forums which have an explicit collaborative
approach embedded in their structures. Such bodies have sprung up
in the fields of education and training, housing, and projects for
urban renewal. Some of these bodies have been locally inspired
organic' partnerships and have evolved through negotiations between
the local authority and the private sector, with an eventual arrival
at an apparently acceptable consensus between them over what the
problems of the local economy are. Others have been developed
centrally and 'parachuted' into particular localities in order to
engender a climate of collaboration between local authorities and
the private sector.
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If the physical evidence of partnership is widespread, so too is its
language. Politicians of all persuasions and levels talk in terms
of a 'partnership economy' and the need for co-operation and
programmes of joint action between the public and private sectors in
the reconstruction of local economies. Running parallel to the
political discourse is the professional discourse of civil servants
and local authority officers who are increasingly developing and
implementing strategies for local economic development that are
underpinned by the explicit encouragement of cooperative working
relationships between the local authority and local private sector
organisations. One analyst discussing the rise of urban
partnerships in the United States has said, 'Paying homage to
partnerships became de rigeur for public officials and aspiring
politicians' (Levine, 1989;13). This statement would not be out of
place if applied to the attitudes of British public officials and
politicians from the mid-1980s.
Although it may be possible to identify a common environment or
climate in which partnership bodies develop it should be evident
that there are different characteristics of local political economy
which influence the form and style of partnerships in particular
areas. The need therefore is to disaggregate the concept in order
to avoid an uncritical acceptance of the term and to unravel a
complex phenomenon which superficially appears to be easily
readable. Thus, we need to define our terms: we need to discuss the
historical context of partnership's development; we need to
distinguish between its different forms in the regeneration of local
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economies; and finally, we need to look at some of the political,
social, and economic consequences of the growth of partnerships.
AN HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR PARTNERSHIP
Brindley and Stoker (1988) offer a threefold classification of
partnership, arguing that since 1945 various forms of partnership
have characterised urban planning and development. For Brindley and
Stoker the origins of partnerships are rooted in the the post-war
planning system. Under this system local authorities were given two
key planning functions; the power to draw up development plans and
the power of development control. The purpose of the development
plan was to provide a broad picture of the development intentions
and expectations a local authority had for its area. They were
designed to identify the different uses of land within a given
locality and disentangle residential, industrial and commercial
development as well as allow for the reservation of land for public
use. These plans were intended to operate as points of reference
for the detailed control of development which lay in the hands of
the local authority.
However, this system failed to tackle the issue of land values ani
development, exposing a weakness at the heart of the system - while
development rights were nationalised the private sector retained the
right to betterment and the structure of a capitalist development
industry was never seriously challenged. In this manner, change in
the urban form has not been determined by the state but has been
realised through a combination of public and private interests with
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the state only indicating objectives to which resources might be
put. Thus, the two sectors became 'mutually dependent and their
relationship developed as a kind of partnership' (Brindley and
Stoker, 1988;3-4).
Brindley and Stoker argue that through indicative regulation of
private development private deals between land owners, developers
and the local authorities were struck. Certainly, the scope for any
local authority development activity was limited and remained in the
hands of the private sector. Although private developers often
needed the help of local authorities to assemble sites, provide the
infrastructure, and use compulsory purchase order (CPO) powers to
round up the mass of separate land ownership, the local authority
also needed the private developer to assemble and provide the
resources necessary to undertake development itself.
The second phase of partnership is characterised by urban decline,
recession and economic crisis. After 1974 Britain's cities began to
suffer as a consequence of economic and social restructuring. The
older and larger urban centres deindustrialised whilst smaller towns
and rural areas experienced periods of economic growth. The main
dynamic of this process was a change in economic activity and the
requirements of capital. The forms of partnership that developed as
a consequence of the 1947 planning machinery were ill-equipped to
cope with or stem this process of urban decline. Indeed, it is
asserted that 'the development plan system could identify needs and
propose land allocations, but it could not conjure private
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investment out of thin air' (Brindley and Stoker, 1988;4). Urban
economies suffered as manufacturing industry began to disappear,
private and public investment dried up, and redevelopment schemes
were run down or aborted. Public sector agencies could propose
schemes and programmes of redevelopment but the important question
was always one of finance. Levels of public investment fell,
particularly after 1976 and the IMF loan and consequent tightening
of monetary policy. Equally, private sector finance was difficult
to find as economic recession deepened and restricted the amounts of
capital available for private ventures into large scale development
and urban renewal projects. This lack of investment, both public
and private, highlighted the weakness of a planning system dependent
upon economic growth to underpin change, and a system which
effectively operated as the state regulation of private development
(Brindley and Stoker, 1988;4/5).
The third phase of partnership, since 1979, is seen as a response to
urban decline and the failures of the post war planning system.
Partnership in this period is characterised by the search for new
forms and types of relationship between the public and private
sector. Partnerships have developed between central and local
government, quasi government bodies and corporate organisations,
particularly construction companies and financial institutions.
Their form and type has ranged from a focus on the regeneration of
land and property and the preparation of infrastructure and sites,
such as UDCs, to specific industrial and commercial incentives like
Enterprise Zones and City Grants. However, despite differences in
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emphasis and detail 'they share in common a distinctive relationship
between the public and private sector. In essence, public sector
investment...is employed to bring about new private sector
investment which would not otherwise have taken place' (Brindley and
Stoker, 1998;5).
The distinction between different forms and phases of partnership
made by Brindley and Stoker is useful in that it illustrates that
the idea of partnership is not a new phenomenon. Clearly however,
there are different sorts of partnership operating at different
periods. The authors argue that those of the 1950s and 1960s were a
consequence of the failure of the post-war planning system to
overcome the problems of land values and development and a resultant
intermeshing of public and private sector agencies. In contrast,
the partnerships of the late 1980s and early 1990s are about a more
explicit move towards market oriented planning in which urban
renewal is set to conform with neo-Conservative values, the attempt
to role back the state, reduce levels of public sector investment,
and increase the policy making role of the private sector. All
forms of partnerships in the 1980s have developed in an environment
conducive to the private sector. The political, economic, and
social outcomes of partnership ventures will be conditioned by this
factor. However, that is not the same as saying that they will
necessarily be determined by it. Indeed, the outcomes of
partnerships may be open to a greater degree of contestation than
Brindley and Stoker acknowledge. This is an issue we will return to
later.
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RECASTING THE URBAN POLICY ENVIRONMENT
Partnerships have come to occupy such a prominent position on the
agenda of urban policy and regeneration because of a specific
political and ideological response to the de-industrialisation of
Britain's inner cities. Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s,
the Conservative government's urban policy, although ad hoc, unco-
ordinated, and pragmatic, has consistently sought to embrace the
private sector (Hambleton, 1988; Lawless, 1989). It has attempted
to lever-in private sector money through the incentive of public
funds, and offer a quasi-managerial role to the private sector in
the solution of urban problems.
By the end of the 1980s there were thirty five initiatives
administered either jointly, or independently, by five central
government departments, all of which sought to stimulate the
economic, social, or physical regeneration of the inner cities. For
example, the Department of Trade and Industry, which had
responsibility for the Enterprise Initiative and Regional Selective
Assistance; the Department of Environment, the Urban Programme, City
Challenge, City Grant, Urban Development Corporations and Enterprise
Zones; the Department of Employment, Compacts, Small Firms Service,
Enterprise Allowance Scheme, and Vision for Cities; the Home Office,
Section 11 grants and the Safer Cities campaign; and the Department
of Education and Science, City Technology Colleges, PICKUP and
REPLAN. Thus, each department had a particular policy remit with
regard to its slice of the urban policy cake.
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That these initiatives were designed to coincide with a political
perspective that emphasised policies for supply-side incentives and
market-based solutions to urban problems, reflected the extent to
which Conservative politics identified the fate of the inner cities
as politically important, and sought to impose upon them its own
form of remedial action. Throughout the 1980s, the Conservative's
'liberation' ideology found expression in the rhetoric of the 'inner
city debate', the parameters of which were structured by notions of
deregulation, 'incentification' (Hesletine, 1982) of the private
sector, and a consequent change in institutional framework for
tackling urban problems. It is the introduction of the concept of
partnership as a policy style within this debate, that has given
impetus to the development of a more specific role for the private
sector, and has drawn on the resources of the private sector, in the
formulation and implementation of policy.
The policy climate over the last ten years has created an
environment conducive to the inclusion of private sector finance and
skills in areas previously the responsibility of the public sector.
Indeed, particular policy styles and initiatives have been developed
to facilitate that process. It seems more appropriate then to
consider the rise of partnerships as an approach to tackling urban
problems within a policy environment created by more specific policy
measures of central government. The idea of partnership as an
approach to, or method of, dealing with particular urban problems is
important for two reasons. Firstly, partnerships as they developed
over the 1980s have been characterised by piece-meal evolution,
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rather than by formal design and implementation (Lawless, 1989).
Secondly, because conceptualising partnerships as an approach allows
US to begin to unpack the diversity and range of policy styles,
organisational formats, and relationships that underly the term, and
see the interplay of ideology, politics and economics which
structure those forms and relations. Indeed, although the term is
widely used it is also widely misunderstood, seen by some more as a
form of policy than as an approach within a particular policy
environment.
Law (1988) has argued that the concept of partnership is
inappropriate in three main areas: firstly, where the public sector
prepares the basic infrastructure and invites developers to acquire
sites; secondly, where the public sector collaborates with
individual property companies to develop particular sites; and
thirdly, where private companies that are involved in urban renewal
schemes seek financial support from the public sector. For him these
three areas of local activity do not constitute partnership or
partnership arrangements. These three areas broadly conform to
Brindley and Stoker's 1950 - 1960s phase of partnership, but are
rejected by Law as definitions of partnership because the focus of
his analysis is confined to partnerships as they have evolved over
the 1980s. Law restricts his conception of partnership both
temporally and functionally to 'where there is a clear partnership
or collaboration of the sectors at the local level, either in
preparing and executing a comprehensive scheme for an area or
working together in a particular topic area' (Law, 1988;447).
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One might argue that such a definition is too vague and adds little
to what Law apparently claims is not to be classified as
partnership. For example, what is meant by 'a clear partnership',
and what sectors at the local level is he talking about - private
enterprise (which), local authority, community groups? Perhaps
these criticism are a little too harsh given that within any
particular local circumstance it should be possible to identify the
main actors involved and the issue or issues around which the
partnership members have coalesced. Nevertheless, Law's definition
represents a restricted view of partnership, particularly of
partnership as an approach to the solution and management of urban
problems. Clearly any definition or understanding of partnership
which seeks to take into account the contingency of factors that
shape the partnership must go beyond identification of the actors
involved and the issues around which the partnership is based. Two
factors should be considered: firstly, the extent to which
partnerships act as a focal point or a mediator of change, (whether
political, economic, social or cultural); and secondly, the degree
to which the fusion of public and private interests address the
problems of socio - economic change through mechanisms specifically
designed to manage that process.
THE AMERICAN INFLUENCE
Throughout the 1980s successive Conservative governments drew
heavily on the urban policies of the USA. The origins of many of
the initiatives which have worked to create a policy climate
conducive to market-led regeneration strategies can be found in
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American responses to urban decline. Urban Regeneration Grant,
Urban Development Corporations, and the concept and utilisation of
public-private partnerships are quintessentially American imports.
The extent to which these initiatives and methods have been adopted
in Britain over the 1980s reflects the Conservatives ideological
preference for 'anti-state' pro-market approaches to the solution of
urban problems so characteristic of the American response to urban
decay. That these imports have become an integral part of British
urban policy makes it necessary for UB to have some understanding of
their American ancestry and how they have fared in the face of
similar problems of urban industrial decline.
The partnership approach adopted in US cities has a long and well
documented history (Fosler and Berger, 1982; Fainstein and
Fainstein, 1983; Davis, 1986; Logan & Nolotch, 1987; Squires, 1989).
Throughout the post-1945 period corporate involvement in urban
regeneration has lead to the development of a civic culture in which
business leadership has been an integral part of the success of
political leadership. In American cities corporate power and
leadership 'dynamism' has been a more overt and recognisably
acceptable force shaping public sector responses to the economic and
social problems of the inner cities than has been the case in
Britain. Indeed, business leadership has often been the fulcrum of
public - private partnership ventures. In cities such as
Pittsburgh, Boston and Chicago large corporations have assumed
prominent roles in directing the nature, pace and extent of local
change (see Squires ed, 1989).
102
Two distinct approaches are discernible in the American literature.
The first adopts an uncritical approach based on the assumption that
partnerships are beneficial to all the community and concentrates on
how partnerships were forged and what mechanisms have been employed
(Fosler and Berger, 1987). The second moves beyond this and adopts
a more critical stance analysing the impact of partnerships and
their role in deploying corporate influenced redevelopment policies
(Fainstein and Fainstein, 1983; Mbllenkopf, 1985; Logan & Molotch,
1987; Squires ed, 1989). This second body of literature has argued
that partnerships are simply 'corporations doing the planning while
the city government facilitates corporate planning using municipal
legal powers' (Levine, 1989;13). Other criticisms of partnerships
have concentrated on the loss of local democracy, the agenda setting
of the business elite, and the minimal impact that partnerships have
had on the fundamental economic problems of urban poverty and
unemployment.
Law (1988) in his review article on partnership in the United States
and Britain, has argued that on the evidence of much of the work on
American partnerships there is little in the way of an overall model
of the process or type of city in which partnerships are likely to
develop. Instead there are constantly evolving forms of partnership
and variations between cities. Again, partnerships are seen as an
approach to the solution of urban decline rather than as a specific
policy measure. The idea of variation and evolution in Law's
article fits well with Levine's analysis of the political economy of
American partnerships since 1945 (Levine, 1989).
	 Here, Levine
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examines the historical and theoretical context of partnerships,
analysing how and why they developed, the institutional mechanisms
deployed to implement their redevelopment policies, and their socio-
economic and political impact.
Levine's major theme is what he terms the constancy of the 'ideology
of privatism' - the structuring of private corporate interests in
mechanisms designed to influence the shape and form of the urban
environment. He argues that an ideology of privatistic growth
underlies urban public-private relations by identifying local
capital's need for policy co-ordination. For Levine, the state and
municipal government historically have 'functioned as the public arm
of urban capitalism', and provided subsidies and incentives to
encourage private investment (Levine, 1989;14). Moreover, although
city governments have taken on greater powers over the twentieth
century, the ideology of privatism has been the dominant force in
public-private relations. Within this general conceptual and
theoretical framework Levine categorises partnerships since 1945
into three distinct phases: 1945-1970; 1970-85; and post 1985.
These periods are characterised by a variation or extension on each
of the preceding phases, but are marked by their reliance on the
corporate business sector to implement their redevelopment
programmes and policies.
The period 1945-1970 is seen as a time of emerging formal
partnerships. Industrial decline, physical decay, and a shrinking
of the financial and resource base of cities are seen as the
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catalysts to partnership development. Partnerships in this period
were Characterised by four key features. Firstly, they were
governed by local corporate committees composed of a private sector
elite. These committees acted as an organisational forum for the
articulation and representation of the private sector views. The
main aim of these committees was the revitalisation of downtown
areas through a strong commitment and 'pro-active' approach to the
development of local policy initiatives and local investment. As
such they called for public involvement in the form of funding, the
use of municipal powers, and the coordination policy. However, the
public role was to facilitate, the committees retained overall
control of policy content and development. Examples of such
organisational forms include: the Dallas Citizens Council (1937);
the Allegheny Conference on Community Development 1947); the Great
Baltimore Council (1955); and the Chicago Central Area Committee
(1956).
Secondly, partnerships were stimulated by government finance of
urban renewal programmes. These programmes did not involve direct
public funding for urban renewal, rather they acted as the federal
underwriting of local partnerships. In this way incentives and
profit opportunities were offered to private developers to redevelop
blighted areas. Effectively state funding was used to 'lever-in'
private investment. Thus partnerships tended to become based and
targeted to where private money was available. Thirdly, new forms
of urban governance were created in the shape of autonomous
development authorities, for example the Pittsburgh 'Urban
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Redevelopment Authority. These bodies were armed with powers and
resources which were invariably directed at implementing the
redevelopment policies of the corporate elite. In effect they side-
stepped the formal channels of local government decision making.
The fourth feature reflects the interlinking of two factors; the
extent to which the public sector became involved in a dialogue with
the private sector about the growth of the city; and the recognition
by the private sector that although it developed policies for
regeneration it required public sector involvement to provide the
productive infrastructure necessary for those policies to work. The
crucial element necessary for making the link to work at the local
level is seen as the existence of pro-development mayors. Levine
argues, 'innovative mayors saw redevelopment as a way to overcome
(central city stagnation) and reap political benefits along the way'
(Levine, 1989;21). Indeed, the common denominator in all
partnerships was the concern, by both sectors, with urban decline
and a desire to create an environment conducive to economic growth -
the development of a 'pro-growth' coalition (Mollenkopf, 1985).
These are salient observations because they illustrate the
importance of politics as well as economics in the promotion of
partnerships.
The second phase of partnership between 1970-1985 is seen as a more
complex and sophisticated version of the arrangements developed in
the 1950s. They are set within the context of a changing economic
and political climate - the deindustrialisation and fiscal distress
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of the frostbelt; the growth of the sunbelt; and the politicisation
of the business community through the operation of a new
conservative political agenda. In the frostbelt cities,
partnerships were seen as essential to economic regeneration; in the
sunbelt cities they were seen as integral components of growth. In
consequence, more public resources and power were given to
partnerships in order to support private development and create a
climate conducive to the needs of corporate capital. Indeed,
partnerships were seen as a way of maintaining and strengthening an
entrepreneurial culture.
These second phase partnerships drew on earlier forms in three main
ways: firstly, financial inducements in urban policy initiatives,
such as the Urban Development Action Grant programme, allowed cities
to offer subsidies and incentives to attract private capital and
promote redevelopment. Secondly, the number of quasi-public
redevelopment authorities grew, along with the powers accorded to
them. They became key bodies in the regeneration of urban areas
able to assemble land, receive and administer grants, and offer
incentives to private developers. These organisations represented
the formalisation of the private control of municipal policy.
Thirdly, the period witnessed the maturing of public
entrepreneurialism as high profile pro-development Mayors began to
take an active part in partnership promotion and forged greater
links and connections with local corporate and development
interests.
	 Law (1988) has argued that such arrangements have
produced 'many' benefits for American cities in terms of corporate
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commitment to an area, and the development of corporate
responsibility through the donation of funds to public projects and
support of local voluntary and community groups. Levine is more
critical of the economic results of partnerships. For him the
outcome has been one of uneven development where redeveloped
downtowns are 'islands of renewal in seas of decay' (Levine,
1989;35).
Levine asserts that uneven development is a consequence of both the
content and process of partnerships. In terms of content he
suggests that the redevelopment of downtown areas is based on
advanced services and tourism, which are poor anchors of the local
economy because 'the income distribution in such economies tends to
be two tiered, with few occupational ladders and middle income jobs
bridging the tiers' (p.26). Such an approach takes little account
of the quality of jobs and the links between the needs of one sector
and needs of another. It relies on the trickle down of benefits
rather than the targeting of development. With regard to the
process uneven development has occurred because partnerships have
actively encouraged policies that favour private capital over the
interests of the majority of urban residents. Public policy has
actively encouraged and identified investment opportunities for
private developers. Quasi-public development agencies have operated
in a way which 'emphasized deal-making and profit opportunities,
rather than systematic planning of how best to deploy public
resources to create good jobs and meet pressing neighborhood needs'
(p.27).
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Although this form of partnership is seen as the dominant mode of
urban regeneration in American cities, Levine suggests that since
the mid-1980s new conceptions of partnership have begun to emerge
which 'hold the promise of focussing redevelopment priorities on the
needs of the truly disadvantaged' (p.29). New York, Baltimore and
Chicago are cited as examples where pressure from community groups
and the election of populist mayors running on political platforms
of community regeneration, have begun to develop renewal policies
based on public control and more equitable distribution of the
benefits of partnership. The following three trends are noted in
this process: firstly, the growth of strategic and democratic
planning of economic development which attempts to develop coherent
development plans rather than letting the market 'rip' and
incorporate wider access and participation in the planning process;
secondly, the development of linkage policies which involve the
negotiation of agreements and concessions between the public and the
private sector in redevelopment policies; and thirdly, the rise of
community economic development corporations which target their
renewal programmes on low-income areas. These corporations reject
the notion of the trickle down effect of traditional partnerships
and attempt to channel their actions towards areas neglected by the
market. However, their early achievements have been limited because
of their small resource base and their inability to move from small
individually based programmes towards a concern with wider strategic
planning (p.30). The conclusion to be drawn from these 'new'
approaches to partnership is that although constrained by national
and international market imperatives, and a political climate
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hostile to major public investment, it is possible for cities to
adopt policies which although they do not fully negate market
forces, seek to remedy some of their worst effects. In this way, it
may be possible for city governments to inject a greater degree of
social awareness in redevelopment proposals than has hitherto been
the case.
PARTNERSHIPS IN BRITAIN: ORGANISATION AND ISSUES 
The preceding sections have argued that public-private partnerships
are not a new phenomenon. Collaboration between the public and
private sector has a history which stretches back at least until
1945. Periods or phases of partnership have emerged characterised
by particular types of relationships and forms of organisation. The
partnerships of the late 1980s are one of these phases, and are a
political response to the economic decline of the 1970s within an
ideological and policy climate conducive to the imperatives of the
market and a greater degree of private sector involvement in policy-
making. However, although this is the context for the rise of
partnerships for economic regeneration, it does not necessarily
follow that the outcomes of collaborative arrangements are
predetermined. It may be the case, that they are open to a greater
degree of contestation than some commentators suggest. Also, it is
suggested that to speak in terms of a partnership policy is
inappropriate. Rather, partnerships should be seen as an approach
within the existing parameters of the urban policy environment - one
heavily influenced by the North American experience. However,
although it is possible to identify the context of partnership
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development such contextualising says little about the
organisational forms partnerships assume, and the issues around
which they coalesce. It is to a discussion of these issues that we
will now turn.
Public-private partnerships are arranged in a diversity of
organisational formats that have been been crafted by central and
local government, and by initiatives from the private sector - there
is no easy way to classify them. For instance initiatives which
appear to be private sector led (TECs and UDCs) may in fact have
been devised and act as adjuncts of central government departments.
Conversely, initiatives which have sprung from the private sector
may receive substantial support in terms of funding or advice from
either central or local goveLument. Clearly we need to be aware
that initiatives which aim to foster or work within a partnership
approach have input from more than one agency. This is not merely
the semantic point that partnerships have to involve more than one
partner, but that partnerships come in different forms. This
acknowledged, it is still possible to devise a crude classification
of the organisational forms of public-private interaction.
There are essentially two variations on the theme of public-private
sector partnership in urban policy. The first has emanated directly
from central government. The characteristic form here is the
'parachuting' of an development agency, quango, or institution of
central government into a particular locality. Urban Development
Corporations in the field of economic regeneration and property and
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land development, and Training and Enterprise Councils and Compacts
in the field of education and training, are the prime examples.
These initiatives have, at least in theory, sought to drag in
private sector individuals and finance into the process of
regeneration. In contrast, the second approach has revolved around
the construction of locally based organisations and initiatives that
draw on a range of institutions and individual actors. The parties
considered involve combinations of local authority members and
officers; representatives from business community organisations
(nationally and/or locally based); single businesses; development
companies (for example, Rosehaugh-Stanhope and Olympia and 'York);
trade unions; and, on occasions, voluntary and community
organisations. These partnerships have variously been established
to carry out specific physical development projects (for example,
Birmingham Heartlands), undertake promotional or marketing campaigns
(for example, Sheffield Partnerships limited), promote business and
enterprise growth (for example through business parks), or develop
long-term strategies for local economic regeneration (for example,
Aberdeen 2000 and Sheffield 2000). Irrespective of their
composition or aim however, partnerships generally seek to arrive at
an 'acceptable' consensus over what the particular problem, issue or
project that they are to tackle is, and how they should approach the
task once it has been identified.
In practice, the distinction between the 'imposed' and 'locally
inspired' forms of partnership is more blurred than has been
suggested. Centrally imposed modes of partnership can intermingle
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with locally based initiatives, whilst local partnerships are rarely
wholely composed of local individuals, organisations and resources.
This picture is further complicated by two additional factors.
First, within the second classification a distinction should be made
between initiatives and projects inspired from the political and
business elite, and those that are generated by, and based on, the
needs of the community. There is a significant question mark over
the degree to which the local community is represented or can find
articulation within these new partnership structures. Second,
matters are made complex by intermediate levels of corporate
involvement, such as Business in the Community, Business in the
Cities, and the Phoenix Initiative. Their advantage, or so it is
implied, is that they operate in a politically neutral space outside
of party politics (Bennett and Krebs, 1990;32).
Irrespective of whether partnerships are centrally imposed or
locally inspired there appears to be a consensus of principles
within partnership philosophy in the development and regeneration of
local economies. These can be characterised as a recognition of the
value of local initiatives; an awareness of the spatial causation
and partial solution to identified problems; and the need to develop
and 'enterprise culture' through business growth (Richardson, Moore
and Noon, 1989;79). In terms of policy implementation, these
principals have produced a number of responses from partnerships.
For example (depending on the type of partnership), it has involved
the rise of small business development policy, including the
provision of general physical infrastructure such as ,business
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developmentsites, and the creation of business support and
information services. It has also produced policies to improve the
image of particular places and boost both local and non-local
confidence in a locality's economy. Many partnerships have embarked
on a process of sectoral diversification of their local economies
through a movement away from a reliance on single sector industry,
towards service industries, new technology enterprise and tourism.
Another policy feature has been the creation of specific urban
renewal projects, which illustrates both a spatial approach to the
problems of urban decline and the need for focus or 'flagship'
projects as catalysts for local regeneration activity (Bianchini et
al, 1990). Finally, there has been a growth in policies designed to
enhance local employment and training opportunities in order to make
the labour force more competitive and a stronger local productive
asset (Richardson, Moore and Moon, 1989;79).
Clearly, it would be wrong to assume that all partnerships in the
field of economic development are identical. Partnerships developed
for specific development initiatives may have significantly
different aims, methods of operation, structures, and resources from
those that have been established to work on the image and promotion
of a particular place. Equally, although partnerships have a broad
remit to do something about the local economy, there will be
differences in emphasis in how they do that something. Indeed, the
format of a partnership will depend on a combination of factors
within the local economic, social and political mileu. Moreover,
the degree of interaction between partners will vary depending on
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the projects undertaken and the level of cohesion and consensus
around aims and objectives. The capacity of any partnership to
effect change will be dependent both on local as well as national
and international economic and political circumstances. Conditions
such as industrial structure, the effects of national policy, and
local culture, will interact with such factors as infrastructural
development, physical environment, and the ability of local
institutions to produce strategies designed to accommodate
structural economic and social transformation. In any particular
location emergent forms of co-operation will be influenced by the
inter-relation between these conditions, and the level of
involvement of local and non-local inputs (Harloe et al, eds, 1990).
CONCLUSION: THE POLITICS OF PARTNERSHIP 
Within the overall perspective of urban policy outlined above,
partnerships highlight an attempt to change the relationship between
the state and the private sector - a change predicated on urban
regeneration that conforms to neo-Conservative values of reducing
levels of public sector investment and an ideological dislike of,
and political frustration with, Labour controlled inner city local
authorities. These factors provided the context in which
partnerships for economic regeneration should be situated; moreover,
they illustrate the political and ideological nature of
partnerships. Politically, partnerships are about the management of
change in the face of widespread structural economic transformation.
On an ideological level, they represent an attempt to increase
private sector involvement in the formation and implementation of
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urban policy. What is important, is not just that partnerships have
an ideological as well as political dimension, but that these
dimensions converge within partnerships so that they become
indistinguishable from each other.
All partnerships can be seen as operating on two levels - structure
and process (Moore and Pierre, 1988). The structure is the
organisational entity of the partnership such as a committee, local
enterprise agency, or development company. In contrast, the process
refers to the development of formal and informal linkages and
networks between the individuals and organisations involved. Both
the structure and process may vary between partnerships, but some
combination of each is required for a partnership to be able to
formulate and implement its policy objectives. The necessity for
both an organisational structure and a developed network of contacts
leads towards the notion of the 'realisation' that no one partner
has the ability to achieve more on their own than they can in
collaboration. Mutual dependence in its turn implies the
recognition of the need for, and existence of, consensus, and
ultimately, partnerships need a level of consensus to be effective -
consensus around the identification of a problem, and consensus
around the ability to do something to remedy that problem. It is
the movement towards a state of mutual dependence, and the
development of a consensus approach to policy generation, that
obfuscates the political and ideological dimensions of partnerships.
In this way, partnerships can appear as the natural outcome of
unmediated events, rather than the product of political and
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ideological conflict and choice. Thus, there is a tendency to lose
sight of the fact that partnerships represent different things for
different partners. For the private sector, partnerships offer the
potential for a new engagement with the political, economic, and
social issues of the locality. For local authorities, partnerships
are potentially the externalisation of economic development in the
wake of falling resources and an erosion of powers. Once a
partnership has been formed there is a tendency for these issues to
be minimised within the agenda of the partnership, whilst all
efforts are directed towards areas where there is a degree of common
ground over the regeneration of the local economy. These efforts
tend to revolve around the issues of inward investment, physical
improvement, economic diversification, infrastructural provision,
image management, and employment and training. Hence, what is seen
to be of primary importance is what partnerships do, rather than how
they achieve particular outcomes, or act as mediators of economic
Change.
However, the construction of consensus within a partnership is never
straightforward, and so the potential exists for political and
ideological differences between partners to come to the fore.
Although the desires for common ground and mutual dependence are
strong forces within partnerships, the values and views that
partners hold are not necessarily equable. In other words, inputs
from partners will not always match-up. Underneath the agenda to do
something about the local economy may be a range of sub-agendas
which stand in marked contrast to each other. These could revolve
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around how partners define regeneration (Richardson, Moore and Moon,
1989). For example, whether regeneration is to be set within a
market or more socially redistributive context, and whether there is
to be a targeting of investment and policy, or a blanket approach;
additionally, what are the criteria the partnership adopts for
evaluating its impact, and what role is each partner to play?
Unequivocally, within any public-private partnership the potential
exists for a divergence between 'those who attach priority to
strengthening local economies and those whose priority is increasing
employment and income for disadvantaged urban residents' (Solesbury,
1987;18). In this way, partnerships are the site of potential
conflict as well as a site of consensus construction.
At their core, partnerships are little more than a political and
ideological response to economic change. Whether they are developed
locally or as a result of central government imposition, they are
the product of a climate conducive to an enhanced role for the
private sector and a reduced role for the public sector. The
political, economic and social outcomes of partnership ventures will
be influenced by this factor; however, this does not mean that they
will necessarily be determined by it. Partnerships may well
represent an attempt to produce a quasi-privatised form of urban
policy, but that outcome is by no means an inevitable one. What is
of equal importance in shaping the outcome is who has the power to
determine how consensus should be defined, and where and when any
compromise should be made. The politics of partnership is about how
the partners manage this process, seek to resolve their differences,
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and offer their strategies back to the community as consensus
policies for regeneration.
CHAPTER FOUR 
LOCAL ECONOMIC POLICY IN SHEFFIELD IN THE EARLY 1980s: 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 'RADICAL' APPROACH
INTRODUCTION
During the early 1980s local economic initiatives came to occupy a
central place in the policy programmes of a number of Labour
controlled local authorities. Initiatives such as local enterprise
boards, cooperative and community businesses, training and
technology resource centres, and departments of employment and/or
economic development were set up by 'radical' Labour authorities
such as the Greater London Council, West Midlands County Council,
Sheffield and Leeds City Councils, and Hackney and Haringey London
Borough Councils, in an attempt to strengthen their local economic
base and boost local employment.
The interventionist local economic strategies of left-wing local
authorities in the early 1980s has provoked considerable academic
and political writing regarding their aims and intentions (Boddy &
Fudge, 1984; Blunkett & Green, 1984; Alcock et al, 1984; Gyford,
1985; Cochrane, 1986; Mewson & Miller, 1986). The consensus view of
much of this work has been that these policies formed part of a
political programme designed to offer an alternative socialist
vision to that provided by the Keyensian social democracy of the
post 1945 political settlement; and act as a counter to the
emergence, from the right, of a similar challenge to that social
120
democratic consensus. As a precursor to the subsequent analysis of
Sheffield's partnership for economic regeneration, this Chapter
considers the general political and policy context which gave rise
to the 'alternative' economic approach adopted in the city in the
pre-partnership period. The analysis is derived from a synthesis of
secondary literature, and research interviews with local informants.
LOCAL ECONOMIC POLICIES: THE POLITICAL CONTEXT
In seeking to offer an alternative approach to both the consensus
politics of the post war decades and the challenge to that consensus
from the right, the local socialist political package simultaneously
sought to question two political agendas. Firstly, what it
perceived as the corporatist and bureaucratic structure of social
democracy in general, and the record of national Labour governments
in particular.
	 Secondly, the rise of an individualist and
authoritarian philosophy from the right, whose 'liberation
ideology' espoused the rhetoric of laissez-faire market
individualism, the weakening of state intervention, and cost cutting
in public expenditure and investment. In its place it offered a
political package that contained the rhetoric of decentralisation,
democratisation, community involvement, collective action, and the
restructuring of the welfare state to operate in favour of those it
served rather than for those who ran it.
Set within this political context the local economic initiatives of
'radical' Labour authorities provided one example of 'local
socialism' in practice. This radical economics sought to develop
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new forms of local organisations that would generate employment,
change the nature of work, and build on the skills of the local
populace. These new forms of organisation included: technology
networks; planning and enterprise agreements; the identification of
social needs; and the encouragement of cooperatives. In essence
they sought to widen the scope of local political action to cover
the production sphere as well as the consumption sphere (Gyford,
1985).
Such aims were counterposed to the economic development policies of
local authorities in the 1970s. In general, the policies of the
1970s emphasised industrial promotional activity, with the offer of
advisory and technical expertise and land for a corporate clientele.
This 'supportive' role for local authorities was seen for some to
produce a local economic policy that was 'property led, business and
market oriented and competitive, with economic development rather
than employment the primary focus...' (Boddy, 1984). Defined in
this way local economic policy in the 1970s was the outcome of
strategies which subordinated the creation of employment to the
servicing of special client groups. In contrast, the local economic
policies of 'radical' Labour authorities sought to challenge this
notion through strategies designed to overturn such 'mainstream'
approaches. Moreover, they were intended to be active rather than
reactive. Positive intervention was the aim with the local
authority seen as a significant employer, consumer and producer. It
was considered a legitimate economic actor in the local economy -
not only in the consumption sphere but also in the production
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sphere. Public control over capital was to be extended in an
attempt to alter the relationship between the public and the private
- restructuring for labour rather than capital (Geddes, 1988).
These local strategies were intended to form a set of initiatives
within a different political context to either the social democratic
consensus of the post-war years or the challenge to it from the
Right. A context that focused on the themes of decentralisation and
democratisation, community involvement and collective action, and
the restructuring of the welfare state. Within this broad context
local economic strategies occupied a significant place as totems of
'local socialism'. They were seen as theory in practice and as the
catalyst for change in, and extension to, the existing parameters
of local debate and action. In short, an attempt to provide an
alternative vision of society, '...a picture of an alternative way
of running the economy to meet social needs' (Bennington in Alcock
et al, 1984;84) - overall the encouragement of socially useful
production.
LOCAL ECONOMIC POLICIES: THE POLICY CONTEXT
Local economic strategies of radical Labour authorities can also be
seen within the narrower context of a response to post 1945 Labour
and Conservative governments' policy programmes and initiatives for
addressing change in the economic and social condition of urban
areas. From the 1960s successive national governments had adopted a
range of policy measures in response to the problems of
manufacturing decline, urban unemployment and population, loss,
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decaying urban infrastructure, poor physical conditions and the
'ghettoisation' of sections of the urban populace suffering from
multiple incidence of economic and social deprivation. By the late
1970s the policy response to the agglomeration of factors tagged
'the inner city problem', had come to be constructed in economic
terms. Explicit in the recommendations of the Labour government's
1977 White Paper, Policy For the Inner Cities (Cmnd 6845) was the
need for an approach to urban policy which recognised structural
transformation within the economy, with a focus on economic
intervention at the local level. The intention of future policy
was to strengthen inner city economies by obtaining a balance
between population and employment. An area based approach was to be
adopted with positive discrimination in favour of the inner cities -
action and policy, it was claimed, should and would be geared to
local circumstance.
The framework of this policy response was the creation of seven
inner city partnership areas and fifteen programme authorities (DoE,
1978) These were formed to establish a greater degree of co-
ordination between central and local government in the development
of economic 'programmes for action'. These partnership and
programme authorities were seen as the 'flagships' of the Labour
government's new approach and commitment to the regeneration of
urban areas. However, the rhetoric of this policy programme
outweighed the practice. Governmental claims about the need for
local authority accountability and sensitivity, the value of local
experience, and that local government was the 'natural' agent for
124
tackling urban regeneration, were undermined by the mechanics of
policy implementation. Inherent in the inner city partnership
structures was a centrally imposed regulatory system and overseeing
eye on local authority regeneration programmes. Central government
sought not only to encourage closer relations between itself, local
authorities and the private sector in regenerating urban areas, but
also to manage that relationship by imposing rigid forms of
monitoring and control (Parkinson and Wilks, 1986). Such action did
little to alleviate the reservation of some Labour controlled
councils about the centralist approach of the Labour government to
urban policy planning and implementation. Moreover, although by the
late 1970s structural factors had been identified as a generator of
urban decline, the degree to which the state would have to intervene
to effect change was beyond the political will of the incumbent
Labour government. Rather, their response was a diluted support for
the private sector and an emphasis on an improvement in the
managerial capacity of local authorities to develop their areas and
provide service delivery.
The underlying themes and analysis of the cause of urban problems as
presented in the 1977 White Paper were reaffirmed by the
Conservative government in 1981 (Heseltine, 1981). The approach was
couched in terms of 'recommitment', with the intention to foster the
impression of continuity with the White Paper's arrangements for the
inner cities. However, the streamlining of policy was clear enough
with steps taken to simplify the procedures of partnership and
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programme arrangements in order to encourage a greater degree of
efficiency in the handling of local economic development programmes.
Although it would be incorrect to suggest that there was no degree
of continuity in policy arrangements, under the Conservative
government in the early 1980s more salient policy developments were
to appear. Indeed, the 1980s witnessed an attempt to reorient the
philosophical underpinning of urban policy-making and implementation
with a shift of emphasis from collective to quasi-private forms of
agency as instruments of urban Change. The whole issue of urban
policy over the 1980s was not so much about questioning the need for
economic regeneration, but about the methods and responsibility for
achieving it. On an ideological level, this has revolved around the
role of intervention in local economic regeneration. First, this
has involved a decision to reduce public sector investment, with
resources allocation stretching over the long-term, to a system of
limited resource allocation, to areas or projects, in an attempt to
stimulate private sector investment. Secondly, it has meant an
attempt to transform the institutional forms for policy formulation
and implementation.
LOCAL SOCIALISM AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN SHEFFIELD
Economically, Sheffield has always been a city of steel and heavy
engineering (Foley and Lawless, 1985). For three quarters of the
twentieth century Sheffield's industrial structure was skewed
towards such manufacturing activity. In 1970 forty per cent of a
work force of some 300,000 were employed directly or indirectly in
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the steel and engineering industry, with much of this industrial
activity concentrated in the Lower Don Valley (LDV) - the heart-land
of Sheffield industry. Indeed, at its peak in the mid-1970s
employment in the Valley reached over 40,000 and was one of
Britain's most successful industrial locations. By 1988, in the
wake of the manufacturing recession of the late 1970s and early
1980s, only sixteen per cent of a total workforce of 242,160 were
still engaged in manufacturing, and the 40,000 employed in the LDV
had fallen to 18,000 (SCC, 1988, LDV Draft Local Plan). At its peak
in 1983-84 the umemployment rate in Sheffield stood at eighteen per
cent, five per cent above the national average. In 1978, the
unemployment rate had stood at four per cent, two per cent below the
national average.
Sheffield's industrial decline and the consequent rise in
unemployment was compounded by the fact that it was not well placed
with regard to other sectors of the economy. The proportion of the
labour force employed in the service sector was small in comparison
with other northern cities, and the growth in the business,
financial, and high technology industries had increased at a rate
below that of the national average. With the onset of decline in
manufacturing from the late 1970s Sheffield was poorly equipped to
weather the storm. By the mid-1980s a large chunk of Sheffield's
industrial base had gone, unemployment had risen, local control over
production had withered away, and the growing sectors of Sheffield's
economy were not keeping pace with their regional counterparts.
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Faced with such hard economic realities it is perhaps no wonder that
a considerable amount of political effort in Sheffield has been
devoted to tackling the consequences of industrial decline. Much
has been written about the radical economic policies of Sheffield's
City Council of the early 1980s (Alcock et al 1984; Bennington,
1986; Cochrane 1986, 1988a, 1988b; Lawless 1990; Seyd 1990; Mawson
& Miller 1986; Duncan & Goodwin, 1988). Many of these commentaries
set this economic radicalism within the context of 'local socialism'
and its wider set of political objectives (Alcock et al, 1984;
Bennington, 1986; Cochrane, 1986; Duncan & Goodwin, 1988). However,
in retrospect it is clear that the term 'local socialism' was always
more academic short-hand than empirical reality (Cochrane, 1988b).
At most, 'radical' local authorities adopted only one or two
policies or strategies and then became associated with them.
Sheffield is most strongly identified with economic intervention,
particularly the notion of public sector intervention in the sphere
of local production. The economic policies developed in Sheffield
in the early 1980s were both politically and economically inspired.
The political context was made explicit in Blunkett and Green's
Fabian pamphlet, Building from the Bottom:
In any regeneration of the economic and industrial
life of the country, local initiatives in themselves
will only play a small part. But they can make a wider
political impact; not only by committing people to new
kinds of work experience but winning them over to a
vision of a very different kind of society.
(Blunkett & Green, 1983;7)
Equally, economic policy was to be about how to cope with
industrial decline within the locality:
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What we were doing in the early '80s was a response
to the Thatcherite Government, a response to the
crisis in employmevt and the economy which was
occurring locally.'
Sheffield's economic policies were also a challenge to those pursued
by a paternalist and welfarist City Council throughout the 1960s and
1970s. These included having substantial land ownership; devising
programmes of industrial promotion and packages for financial
assistance; and institutionalising relations between the City
Council, local industrialists and trade unions. In contrast, the
economic policies of the early 1980s were centred on stemming the
rise of unemployment by resourcing campaigns against industrial
closure and rationalisation; promoting public sector employment; and
initiating and supporting projects for 'socially useful' production
(Bennington, 1986).
The source for these new economic initiatives was the Employment
Committee and its associated Department of Employment. The aim of
both the Committee and the EMployment Department was to co-ordinate
the City Council's responses to unemployment (SCC/DEED, The Economic
Strategy, undated). Initially, this response revolved around
providing short-term financial assistance to individual firms
suffering from the recession - the 'open door' policy. A section
was explicitly set up in the department to promote it as a source of
investment to the private sector. In essence, it was an extension
of the traditional aids to industry programme prevalent in the
1970s. This reflected both the Employment Committee's desire to be
seen to be acting quickly to deal with unemployment, and the fact
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that it was an approach with which a majority of the city
councillors could feel comfortable:
The most important thing the Labour Council
did when it decided to move into this area
- regeneration - they called it employment,
was to say they wanted to use section 137
powers. They said we've got £2,000,000 and we
want to put this completely into employment to
protect jobs...The councillors were much more
comfortable with this 'open door' handing money
out...it wasn't just the employers coming to see
them. The trade unions cottoned on to this...and
they would come and see their colleagues on the
Council (and say) 'can't you do something for
our gaffer, can't we go an rescue Viners, can't we
go and do this'? So the members found themselves
very comfortable because they actually thought they
were doing something, because it expressed,their
desire to do something about unemployment.'
Despite this 'open door' policy many of those working within the
Department of Employment acknowledged that their economic policies
could have only a marginal effect on the regeneration of the local
economy and the problem of unemployment:
The reality was that there was nothing the
Council could do in terms of loans and grants
and these types of deals to withstand the
economic draught out there. In gact, a lot of
this money went down the drain.'
In part, this reflected the understanding that in a capitalist world
economy, and with a national government intent on reducing the level
of public sector investment in the domestic economy, islands of
alternative economic policy could never provide the scale of
intervention that would be necessary to effect substantial change.
However, it also reflected the fact that the Department and the
initiatives which emerged from it were also explicitly political
acts designed to offer 'parables' or 'paradigms' for a socialist
economy (Alcock et al, 1984; Bennington, 1986). Indeed, the aim of
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the Department according to its first Director (or co-ordinator as
he was known) was 'to liberate the resources of the local state and
put them at the service of the working class movement, the women's
movement and community based movements' (Bennington in Alcock et al,
1984;83). In short, as well as intending to provide an economic
gain in itself (the reduction of unemployment), it was also an
attempt to offer an alternative vision of society, of running the
economy to meet social need - to encourage socially useful
production.
The 'open door' policy and an involvement with the private sector in
the form of direct investment which it represented, was replaced by
a format that introduced guidelines 'about viability which excluded
most of those seeking assistance' (Cochrane, 1988a;164). This
commitment to a larger-scale support for a smaller number of firms
was to be achieved through financial assistance, advice on product
development, marketing and public-sector purchasing. The major
beneficiaries of this approach were those initiatives which had
least access to mainstream sources of investment and advice, for
example co-operatives, and joint ventures with the private sector
that were considered to have a substantial impact on the local
economy (Mawson and Miller, 1986;173). Programmes of work were set
up to identify key areas of importance for the Department. These
included training; technology; labour market analysis; equal
opportunities; and the role of the public sector in fostering
economic development.
131
Public sector generation of economic growth came to occupy a
significant place within the local authority. The view was that in
a period of diminishing resources, the most effective way to use
what resources were available was to channel them into public
sector-led initiatives (SCC, 1984). Both the EMployment Committee
and Department believed that by using the resources which the City
Council had at its disposal, and not simply the initiatives of the
Employment Department,	 greater pressure or leverage could be
applied to the local economy. The argument was that the local
authority could no longer be solely concerned with consumption
issues - it now had to be directly, and across the authority,
involved in the production sphere:
People were recognising that the Council
had certain levers it could pull. It's a large
estate holder, it owns a lot of land, and it
can do deals on that. It's got powers to grant
and loan, and it's got technical skills of every
conceivable variety...It couldn't simply carry
on delivering mainly housing, education and
social services when people were losing qeir
jobs, and losing them in their thousands."
Certainly, the Council did have significant 'levers' it could pull.
For example, the Council was a major employer within the city, five
times larger than the largest private sector employer in the city,
and as such had a considerable impact on the labour market through
employment and recruitment practices. It had an annual budget of
over £200m, spending some £80m on purchases, of which approximately
£20m was spent locally. It had a significant impact on the local
construction industry through its capital and revenue spend on
housing and related building trade activity (Nawson and Miller,
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1986;173/174). The aim was to harness this potential economic lever
to all the activities of the Council in order to illustrate the role
the public sector could play in generating forms of economic
development which were not solely reliant on the private sector. In
general, this public sector role was defined in terms of local
authority employment. The creation of the Employment Programme
Committee in May 1983, with a remit to co-ordinate economic and
employment initiatives over the whole authority, formally
institutionalised this approach.
There was then, what can be termed a 'dual approach' to economic
policy in Sheffield in the early 1980s. Predominantly, the
Employment Department pursued project based initiatives which sought
to make small gains in economic terms, but which offered alternative
visions of economic development. At the same time, there was an
attempt, through the work of the Department and the work of the
Employment Programme Committee, to create a general commitment, at a
corporate level, to employment issues and alternative approaches to
economic regeneration. 	 This 'dual approach' to economic policy
worked in a symbiotic manner, with both aspects seeking to reinforce
each other. The result was a coupling of the Employment
Department's initiatives and its vision of alternative economic
development, with the defence of Council services (Mawson and
Miller, 1986;174). This was mainly seen in terms of the protection
of public sector employment, and promotion of exemplary project
based initiatives:
We developed the notion of exemplary projects.
Projects that could be done in the context of
133
a new initiative in the employment field, hoping
that the Council, as a whole, would take them on
board, particularly our Training and Education
Department. The ITEC had a positive recruitment
policy, fifty per cent women, fifty per cent
Black, which in those days was a real achievement,
because the Council as a whole wasn't achieving
that in its education special programmes. We were
hoping that these qxamples would act as a spur
to our colleagues.'
Clearly, much of the Department's work was devoted to defending
local authority employment, and developing and financing small
scale initiatives. A significant amount of the Department's work
was concerned with the provision of employment opportunities which
would not have occurred if left to the private sector. Indeed, the
Department's research and analysis was focused on minimising the
effects of industrial restructuring and employment loss in the local
community. This approach was not without its problems. The
rigidity of departmental and committee structures, and scepticism
about the work of the Employment Department by other service
departments and some of the more traditional officers, meant that
generating a corporate approach to employment and economic issues
was not easy to achieve.
Another difficulty was that within the Employment Department there
was very little in the way of a strategic overview of the work that
was being undertaken. Much of the work was project oriented, whilst
little was done in terms of developing sectoral or strategic
analyses for specific industries in the city. Although work was
undertaken in the area of special steels, retailing, and cultural
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industries, only the latter was to be implemented as a coherent
strategy for sectoral development:
The type of people who came in [to the Employment
Department] were dedicated to what they were doing.
They were good at project management, and they were
learning how to cut corners inside local government.
Some of the traditional officers saw this lot coming
and couldn't believe it, and they felt very threatened,
very suspicious...of people showing how different things
could be done using local government resources. So, there
was quite an interesting mix, but there wasn't all that
much of an understanding of it all from a strategic point
of view, binding it all together. It was a process of
actually getting things moving.0
By the mid-1980s, in the wake of continued local authority spending
cuts, a stagnant local economy and growing evidence of the limited
impact of its initiatives on employment creation, the Department
began to shift the focus of its operation. What began to emerge was
an realisation that the only way to make progress in developing
public sector projects was to lever in private sector finance,
because public sector funds were simply not available in the amounts
required to make the Department's initiatives wrk. 7 This shift in
emphasis was also a reflection of circumstances within the local
authority and wider political environment. In the early 1980s,
economic policies had a high political profile and were actively
supported by the city's Labour councillors. However, by the middle
of the decade other political priorities had emerged. The pressures
of rate-capping and the maintenance of more traditional service
departments became the dominant issues on the political agenda of
the Council (Blunkett and Jackson, 1987). Local economic policy,
particularly as it had developed in the early part of the decade,
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could no longer hold its position as the most salient political and
policy issue. Moreover, the limited impact of the Department's
initiatives on local unemployment levels did little to enhance its
image within the authority as a whole. Despite its establishment
within the local authority system by the middle of the decade, the
Department had always suffered from a degree of antagonism and
scepticism by more traditional departments, particularly those such
as Estates Surveyors and Planning and Design, who felt that they too
had claims on developing the local economy.8
By 1985, the task for the Department of Employment was to find a new
niche for itself within these changing political and economic
circumstances. It sought to do this by developing what its director
saw as a more strategic approach to its work. Fundamentally, this
meant combining the different strands of work that had been
initiated in the earlier period into a single approach for the
latter half a the decade:
What was significant about the post-1985 period was the
attempt to develop a strategic overview of what we were
doing. What typified the shift was a movement from a
project based approach to a more strategic approach. We
didn't ditch much...we shifted the emphasis of some
projects so there was a more coherent overall strategy.
But really, they fitted in well...it was a mixture of
moderating private sector opposition, and in doing so,
also recognising that they had some contributips to
make to some of the projects that were around.'
The mechanism designed to integrate the stands of the Department's
work into a what it called its 'strategic vision', and thereby seek
to shape the type and form of regeneration that occurred, was the
Sheffield Economic Regeneration Strategy (see chapter seven). This
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strategy symbolised the movement away from employment creating
projects to an emphasis on economic development and regeneration
activity, and legitimized the search for municipal enterprise within
the context of public-private collaboration. In the late 1980s, the
SERS in combination with a number of local plans and strategies, was
to provide the framework upon which a public-private partnership
approach to local economic policy was developed.
NOTES
1. Interview with Sheffield MP, Int. 8 CD 91090.
2. Interview with local authority officer, Int. 12 CD 8391.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE EMERGENCE OF PARTNERSHIP FOR ECOMMIC REGENERATION
IN SHEFFIELD, c1986 — 1991 
INTRODUCTION
Having outlined the development of Sheffield's radical approach to
economic regeneration in the early 1980s, this chapter provides a
narrative of the main events in the emergence of partnership as an
approach to local economic policy. The events in this section are
based on recollections gathered from interviews, and the
information available in council reports, minutes, and local
newspapers. All these sources are inevitably subjective to a
greater or lesser extent, and by ordering them in the sequence that
follows creates a further degree of subjective recollection. What
the chapter does is to create a narrative that incorporates the
'generally accepted' view of the history of the partnership in the
period 1986-1991. This 'popular' or generally accepted view is most
clearly epitomised by the following quotation:
It is now generally recognised that in the past
[1981-85] there was inadequate communication between
the private sector and the local authority and in
particular, an unwillingness to acknowledge each
other's objectives. In recent years [post 19861 the
private and public sectors have, however, begun to
recognise common ground and identify many opportun-
ities for joint action. This has led to a new mood of
optimism and a willingness to work together, and has
brought about the recent establishment of a number of
local organisations with the common objective of
actively promoting investment in Sheffield and thus
contributing to the City's regeneration.
(Hallamshire Investments, Prospectus p.9, 1989)
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This chapter provides an outline of the events which gave rise to
these 'local organisations' which have sought to 'promote
investment' in the city and 'contribute' to its regeneration. At
this stage of the thesis the account is restricted to 'partnership'
events, and the chapter does not provide a narrative of events
before, or outside, that remit. In general, the chapter is
descriptive, although it is inevitable that in writing or
constructing a narrative interpretive frameworks will develop, and
causal relationships will be implied. Nevertheless, it is important
to bear in mind that just because an event is included does not mean
that it is causally important or has any great significance. At
this stage of the thesis there is no explicit intention to preempt
subsequent interpretations of causality, of why the partnership
occurred, how it operates, or what its implications for local
political culture are. These issues will be addressed in later
chapters.
The point of departure of this account of partnership in Sheffield
is an arbitrary one. Narrative is inevitably a subjective
procedure. It could be argued that the events that punctuate, or
form, the narrative of partnership are more concrete than the ways
in which they are linked together, but even this is doubtful.
Indeed, the events that construct the narrative are 'concrete' or
significant only in the sense that they are thought to be so by
those involved in the partnership. Thus both the narrative of the
partnership and the events which form it are subjective.
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The begining of the narrative is the civic trip to Anshan in China.
This is justified by referring to the ways that several people
interviewed have perceived partnership as a narrative. This event
has been seen as an important precursor to the development of
partnership arrangements within the city. In constructing a
narrative of the partnership it does not matter if the Anshan event
was not as significant as some interviewees and commentary has
claimed. Why it is important is that it provides a short-hand
device for describing and making more explicit vague recollections
or comments by interviewees about how they began to set the
groundwork for the partnership. This is why it is a useful juncture
from which to construct the narrative. In constructing a 'popular'
account it makes sense to begin with a specific event which
interviewees have perceived as marking a change in 'business-Town
Hall' relations in Sheffield.
PARTNERSHIP - THE FIRST STEPS 
Popular account has it that in 1983 on a civic trip to Anshan in
China the Chief Executive of the Sheffield Chamber of Commerce and a
leading local politician began talking to each other about Sheffield
and its economic problems. Each found that although there were
areas where their views differed over how to remedy the ills of the
city's de-industrialisation and unemployment there were also areas
where their views coincided. Both agreed that the image of
Sheffield was poor and that their differences had to be put aside
for the sake of the economic revival of the city. They discovered
that a potential existed for for the establishment of a working
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relationship between them, and the construction of a new dialogue
between the City Council and the Chamber of Commerce.
For those actively engaged in the partnership this trip is seen as
an important point in the history of the collaborative working
arrangements between the public and private sectors in the city. It
is considered by some as the catalyst in bringing together
previously antagonistic parties and is heralded as the beginning of
the partnership.' Others see it as simply one of a series of events
that contributed to the development of the partnership between the
public and private sector. 2 Whatever view is held, the common
thread is that it was an event that provided an opportunity for
discussion where the civic elite could sound each other out about
the ways in which working together could help regenerate the local
economy, while away from the 'hot house' atmosphere of political
debate within the city:
I think the trip to China was an illustration of how
things began. If it hadn't have happened would partner-
ship still have happened? Well it probably would still
have happened, but it's an indication of where perhaps
for the first time people began to sit down and without
any set agenda discuss whether there wece ways in which
working together could actually assist.'
The Anshan trip has become a symbolic watershed in the recent
history of civic relations in Sheffield. Stories abound about
situations that gave rise to opportunities for individuals to meet
and talk about the city, and form new friendships; delays in
airports, politicians and businessmen sharing rooms, and agreements
being made on the Great Wall of China are just a few of the
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anecdotes which circulate amongst the partnership cognoscenti. The
extent to which these stories are true, or the significance of the
trip in general, does not matter. Its value to the partnership is
not to help those involved pinpoint the exact date and time of its
creation (although some might like to do this), rather it allows
them to construct a peg upon which to hang the diffuse concept of
'coming together' and the laying of foundations for the emergence of
new alliances. Thus for those involved in the partnership it is an
important stage in the development of Sheffield's recent political
past.
It is not difficult to understand why such a legend has grown up
about Sheffield. In a city that was known for its left-wing stance,
radical economic policies, and anti-Capitalist ethos in the early
1980s (Seyd, 1990), it is a subtle irony to write off an apparent
about-face in political strategy as the outcome of a holiday romance
that blossomed into marriage back home, despite the objections of
disapproving parents. The trip to Anshan certainly offered the
opportunity for discussion and provided an occasion where the civic
elite could sound each other out about the ways in Wbidh working
together might help regenerate the local economy, but it was not the
catalyst to partnership. Indeed, it would be mis-leading to
attribute the movement towards partnership in Sheffield to a meeting
of like minds, or as the result of a marriage that has transcended
the public-private divide in Sheffield's politics. What can be said
however, is that the trip is of value for what it represents to
those involved in the partnership.
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Another event which is seen to have led to the development of a more
accommodating atmosphere between the City Council and the local
business community was a series of meetings arranged by the Anglican
Church in Sheffield. 4
 The impetus for these gatherings originated
with the Vicar of Ranmoor, the Reverend Michael Jarrett. His
interest in bringing together various groups within the city had
evolved from work he had undertaken into urban poverty and
deprivation in Sheffield for the New York Theology Seminary and the
Urban Theology Unit in Sheffield. Out of this had emerged the
realisation that a major problem in the city was a lack of a 'place'
for people to meet and develop a dialogue about issues of economic
and social concern. The result was the establishment of a series of
meetings or forums aimed at bringing together sections of the civic
community into informal discussion groups.
The first meeting was held in the Ranmoor Parish Centre in April
1986 and included senior local politicians, businessmen, trades
union officials, and educationalists. These forums became a regular
event and acted as a focal point for a range of discussions between
the public and private sectors in the city. The meetings operated
as an arena for debate away from the Town Hall or private sector
settings. In an informal atmosphere, over dinner and in comfortable
and neutral surroundings, discussions could take place outside the
rigid structures of formal meetings or the hierarchies imposed by an
individual's status and standing within the community. Much of the
debate centred on the economic and social problems of the city, how
they could be remedied, what issues particularly concerned the
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individuals involved, and where areas of common territory between
the participants actually lay. As a leading member of the business
community at the time has recollected:
It was one of the first groups of its kind...people
meeting regularly to listen to invited speakers from
all sides of the debate and try to understand each
other better...People realisedthat the decline of
Sheffield had gone far enough.'
The Ranmoor 'Forums' however were not the only opportunities that
provided a space for 'interested' parties in the city to discuss the
issue of economic regeneration. In January 1986 the Chamber of
Commerce ran five one-day workshops on the theme of The Challenge 
and Privilege of Leadership. These workshops were designed to
attract the 'top people' in the city from business, local
government, education, trade unions, voluntary organisations, and
the Church (Field, 1989). The aim of the workshops was to enable
these 'leaders' to debate and establish how their leadership roles
within the city related to each other, and address the question of
what they should all be doing for the city and where it should go in
the future. From these workshops emerged two conclusions: first,
all the participants had a 'great pride' in the city, and that pride
was something that should be developed for the good of the city; and
secondly, although they all wanted to 'do more' none of them knew
what to do (Field, 1989).
Part of the way out of this seeming impasse was provided by the
impetus afforded by Industry Year.
	 This programme, which ran
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throughout 1986, was designed to enhance and heighten the country's
awareness of industry and business. Nationally, it was co-ordinated
by the Royal Society of Arts, in Sheffield the programme was
organised by the Chamber of Commerce. As far as the Chamber was
concerned Industry Year provided a useful vehicle to augment the
work that had evolved from their leadership seminars. It gave ample
opportunity for them to run events and hold meetings and dinners in
order to develop the new civic relationships that were beginning to
emerge in the city. Indeed, within the Chamber leadership, Industry
Year was clearly seen as a potential catalyst in forging new
alliances. The then President of the Chamber of Commerce
unequivocally saw it as a process that led to the break down of old
rivalries, turned 'adversaries into friends', and enabled the City
Council and the business community to begin to work together as a
team:
We ran more than six events every single day of the year,
and by the end of the year the Town Ball gave a reception
for the business world as well as for other people in the
city to celebrate the success of Industry Year...and what
that year did in my opinion...was to change people from
councillor Clive Betts to Clive, from councillor David
Blunkett to David, we became friends during that year.0
Perhaps the most significant Chamber initiative in Industry Year was
the establishment of its Image Working party (IWP). This was set up
in November 1986 under the guidance and chairmanship of Norman
Adsetts, then senior Vice President of the Chamber. Its brief was
to determine '...how best to attract inward investment to boost
Sheffield's declining economy' (ABCC, 1989;9). Initially, the NP
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consisted only of Chamber members, with no more than half a dozen
active participants. These tended to be younger businessmen, not
part of the traditional 'old guard' of Sheffield's steel and
engineering industrial community. At the first meeting the only
attendants were those Chamber members who had agreed to form the
group. Although invitations had been sent out to the City Council
to attend, their early reaction was one of caution. However, by the
time of the second meeting the City Council had decided to make
representation and was eventually to have three representatives on
the group. Although no invitations were sent out after the first
meeting the number of representatives grew from the original half a
dozen to approximately twenty over a short space of time. These
included the higher education establishments in the city, the
Cutlers' Company, the Chamber of Trade, trade unions, and the
Sheffield Industrial Mission.
Initially, the IWP spent much of its time airing the general
grievances and prejudices of those present. This resulted in the
rule that no one should be allowed to talk about negative things, in
particular arguments about the level of rates and the extent of
Council spending:
If we hadn't issued that rule we would have spent the
whole of the first few months talking about the level
of rates....I said look, I think we only make forward
If we settle down and list the good things about
Sheffield....I think it was fairly surprising to the
people sitting round the table that we actually lis4ed
about a dozen things that were good about the city.'
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However, simply listing the good things about Sheffield was not
enough. The negative image of the city more than outweighed any
positive points that could be made and so negated their value:
Anyone in the business community would have said that
one of the reasons why Sheffield wasn't going to attract
any investment, or one of the reasons why businesses were
not planning to grow in Sheffield, were even looking to
move outside the city, was that the image was bad, the
image was one of division, the image was one of an extremG
anti-business City Council, the image was one of decline.'
The move in the IWP then was to create a positive image for the
city. However, this raised a fundamental question which had to be
answered before any campaign of action could begin. This was, where
should the positive message be aimed - inside or outside the city?
As far as the chair of the IWP was concerned, it was a question that
could be easily answered. The argument was that for all Sheffield's
poor image outside the city, the prime concern had to be an
improvement of the image within the city. You had to look towards
yourself and improve your self-image before you could do anything
about changing the external perceptions of Sheffield. This was felt
to be particularly important because the first point of contact for
potential inward investors was considered to be the business
community within the city. 9 The task of the IWP then was to begin
to form an agenda for the reconstruction of the internal worth of
the city and aid the rebirth of 'civic pride'.
If the most important business initiative in 1986 was the
establishment of the Chamber of Commerce's IWP, perhaps the most
important City Council initiative which contributed to the setting
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up of a framework for collaborative working was the creation of an
officer working group to investigate the potential for the economic
regeneration of the city's 860 hectare industrial heartland, the
Lower Don Valley (LDV). Under the leadership of John Darwin, then
assistant director of the Department of Employment and Economic
Development, the brief of the working group was to analyse the
economic potential for development in the Valley, assess sources of
financial availability, and possible mechanisms for the
implementation of any regeneration programme. This officer group
began its investigation in July 1986 and reported its findings the
following September. The final report argued the need for a
flexible land-use pattern in the Valley and the need for a 'land
bank' to cater for potential industrial growth and changing land-use
patterns (SCC, 1986). Although it focused on the economic
development of the Lower Don, the report was extended to cover the
economic regeneration of the central area of the city as well. The
strategy was eventually developed as the Twin Valley programme
(DEED, 1987b), and further extended into a city-wide economic
development programme, the Sheffield Economic Regeneration Strategy
(SERS). The latter sought to: regenerate the city's economy as a
whole; ensure that Sheffield City Council influenced the type of
regeneration that occurred; create a balanced and diversified local
economy; and ensure that the benefits of economic regeneration were
spread throughout the community.
The importance of the LDV study does not lie in its acceptance of
land-use in the Valley for other than industrial development, indeed
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land uses other than for industrial activity had been envisaged in a
number of plans and policy initiatives concerned with the LDV since
1979 (SCC, 1983). Neither does it lie in the policies or strategy
itself, which was based on amalgamating a number of past programmes
and projects. Rather its importance lies in the extent to which
explicit reference was made to the need for actively incorporating
organisations other than the local authority in the revitalisation
of the Valley and implementation of the strategy. The thrust of the
argument was that any attempt to regenerate Sheffield's economy
would falter unless it was constructed around an inter-agency and
collaborative framework. As an initial step to such action the
study formally identified the potential partners necessary for the
development of a strategy for regeneration. These were to include
public and private sector bodies, trade unions, education and
research institutions, and the voluntary and community sectors.
Clearly, much of the debate between the public and private sector in
the city has concentrated on trying to find a level at which
everybody can agree and feel 'comfortable'. The most pertinent
comment on this approach was given by a past Chamber of Commerce
President when he said:
That those things we agree upon we will shout about
in public and those areas where we disagree will be
discussed in private behind closed doors (Field, 1989).
This statement acutely reflects the extent to which initiatives such
as the Ranmoor forums, the Chambers NP, and the City Councils'
plans for the Lower Don Valley, acted as 'feelers' for the
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production of a 'new' consensus in the city allowing common ground
to be found. Much of that common ground was occupied by a single
issue, one that has remained a focal point for both the City Council
and business community in all partnership deliberations.
Sheffield's partnership is not unique in the respect of requiring a
'big idea' upon which to construct its alliance. This 'big idea'
helps to draw the partnership together by defining a goal to which
all efforts are directed. It also tends to reinforce and
consolidate the partnership by creating and reproducing a
partnership doctrine or philosophy.
As with all partnerships constructed on alliances between public
officials and local capitalist organisations and individuals
Sheffield's 'big idea' involved 'doing something' about the local
economy. Certainly the partnership in Sheffield was predicated on
an assessment of a local economy in an impoverished state and a
realisation that a public-private partnership approach offered a
potential for improving the industrial and financial base of the
city. This was something that was agreed by both the City Council
and the local Chamber of Commerce. Both accepted that Sheffield's
economy was in a period of substantial structural economic change,
and although their analyses of haw Sheffield had got into that
situation may have differed, there was little disparity over the
fact that something had to be done to improve the situation. The
'big idea' of Sheffield's partnership was thus to regenerate the
industrial and commercial base of the city through developing a
'climate for growth' - a climate in which Sheffield's economic
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potential could be realised. From the standpoint of the mid-1980s
with the experiences of Sheffield's recent political and economic
history still fresh in the minds of both public and private sectors,
that 'big idea' was not difficult to conceive.
The initial drive of the 'first steps' phase of the partnership was
then directed towards the question of how an improvement in the
material base of the city could be secured. As a consequence a
number of 'action areas' were identified as essential components of
the strategy to regenerate the economy. These were: building
internal confidence; improving Sheffield's image: attracting inward
investment; and developing a long term plan for the economic
diversification and social regeneration of the city. These four
areas form the cornerstones of the partnership and stem from a
fusing of the priorities of the partners. Moreover, they dominate
partnership debate and as such form significant components of
partnership discourse within the city. Not only did they help
constitute the language of partnership they also framed the way in
which subsequent issues, projects and initiatives were discussed and
dealt with. Clearly, boosting internal morale and improving the
image of the city have particular implications for what sort of
project or initiative is undertaken, for instance placing a high
priority on marketing and promotional exercises. Similarly,
attempting to attract inward investment implies targeting scarce
resources to particular groups and areas, and has hidden assumptions
about how the benefits of investment should be distributed
throughout the community. How these issues appeared on the agenda
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and how they were maintained on it constitutes the politics of
partnership, and will be considered later in the thesis.
Given Sheffield's political image of a radical left-wing local
authority and the economic consequences of a declining single
industry city in the early 1980s, it was not surprising that image,
inward investment, and economic diversification were identified as
areas of concern within the fledgling partnership. That confronting
these issues was a prerequisite for economic regeneration was a
perception shared by both the City Council and the local business
community. The 'fall-out' of the vitriolic relationship that
developed between the City Council and the Chamber of Commerce
during 1980-83 led both sides to appreciate that neither's interests
(and some perception of Sheffield's interest) had been well served
by the affair. /itch of the public-private sector debate in the city
in these years was conducted openly through the local press. Both
sides squared up to each other, blamed the opposing side for the
industrial decline of the city, and argued about the 'rates issue'
or the level of Council expenditure. Irrespective of the merits of
each side's arguments, the 'slanging match' did little to endear
Sheffield to either a national government whose urban policy funding
regimes were increasingly becoming tied to cooperation with the
private sector, or those development interests looking for areas of
potential investment. As far as potential investors' external
perceptions of the city were concerned, Sheffield was a city in
decline.
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CONSOLIDATING THE PARTNERSHIP
By the end of 1986 it was recognised, particularly within the City
Council, that an injection of institutional capacity was necessary
in order to consolidate and progress the issues that were beginning
to develop within the emerging partnership. One expression of the
recognition of this was the establishment in December 1986 of the
Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee (SERC). This committee
brought together those organisations in the city who had taken part
in the earlier initiatives, and sat on the informal ad hoc
committees, into a formal consultative forum. In popular
partnership parlance it was seen as '...a sort of board of directors
for the city' (Field, 1989). The concept itself was formally
developed within the City Council's Department of Employment and
Economic Development, and originated from the Lower Don Valley
strategy. As the architect of the strategy within DEED remarked:
...back in mid '86 when I wrote the Lower Don Valley
economic strategy...what we did there was list all the
organisations with an interest in the economic regen-
eration of the city, and basically said they needed to
come together and start meeting regularly and talking
to each o0oler, and identify areas where they could work
together.'
In effect, the LDV strategy laid down the basic framework of the
regeneration committee within this document, identifying the
potential parties to be included (SCC, 1986). Additionally, it
advocated that at the very least a formal consultative body would be
required to oversee the process of regeneration, bring together the
activities of agencies involved, set objectives and terms of
reference, and review the regeneration strategy at regular intervals
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(SCC, 1986). The eventual committee that was formed was not too
dissimilar to that which Darwin had proposed. Given the parentage
and composition of the regeneration committee it is not surprising
that it continued the work of the earlier phase of the partnership.
Boosting the internal confidence of the city, improving its image,
the necessity to attract inward investment, and the need to develop
a long-term strategy for the economic and social regeneration of the
city, were all accepted as part of the regeneration agenda before
SERC was formed.
SERC's function was to develop and coordinate the city's attempts to
regenerate the city's economy with 'an eye to the long term economic
and social benefits for all the community' (Jackson, 1988a).
Structurally, it was to include all those with an 'interest' in the
well being of Sheffield's economic future. Very simply these
included the City Council; the business community; central
government departments or agencies; trade unions; higher education
institutions; and organised community groups (see chapters six,
eight and nine for a more detailed examination of its membership).
Over its life-span the level of representation to SERC from these
organisations has varied (see chapter nine). However, the actual
groups themselves have remained relatively stable in their
commitment to the committee.
	
In total there are approximately
twenty five representatives from these organisations on the
committee, plus a further five local authority officers - the City
Council hold the Chair, with a private sector representative , taking
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the Deputy Chair. Originally there was also a smaller executive
committee which comprised two representatives from each of four main
groups. This executive core met to arrange the agenda for SERC
meetings, discuss the long term direction and activities of the
committee, and deal with urgent matters. From June 1990 this
function was taken over by a SERC Secretariat, comprising
representatives of the Department of Employment and Economic
Development, the Chamber of Commerce, the Sheffield Training and
Enterprise Council, the Sheffield Development Corporation, and the
Department of the Environment. The committee is serviced by an
officer group which coordinates agendas, reports, and other
informational requirements.
Effectively, the regeneration committee works to coordinate the
various partnership initiatives that are undertaken in the city and
attempts to maintain '...a guiding influence to help minimise
duplication of effort and to ensure that all the initiatives
continue to work towards a common goal' (SERC, undated). In this
sense it is seen to act as a focal point for all the local
initiatives and provide an information exchange where ideas can be
developed and then disseminated into the wider community. However,
the committee has no mandatory powers over any other organisation,
either those involved in SERC itself or those involved in any other
partnership initiative. It cannot compel its members to reach any
agreements, nor can it enforce any agreements made within the
committee to be accepted in the wider membership of its individual
representatives. 	 Instead, it functions by claiming a 'moral
155
legitimacy' for itself because it is seen to speak for a wide
selection of interested parties, and so is considered representative
of the Partnership in Sheffield at large.11
Another peg in the process of the fo rmalisation of the partnership
was the formation of Sheffield Partnerships Limited (SPL) in March
1988. This company was set up jointly by the City Council and the
Chamber of Commerce to promote the city's interests and improve its
image. Sheffield Partnerships Limited represents the culmination of
the interest shown in improving public relations and recreating a
new image for the city by both the city council and the business
community. It is commonly asserted (mainly by those involved in the
partnership) that Sheffield Partnerships Limited was a direct
outcome of the Chamber's image initiative. Indeed, the thrust of
the Chamber's working party was directed towards improving the
internal confidence in Sheffield, then widening that out in an
ambassadorial fashion to improve Sheffield's image externally, and
to that extent SPL was a formal extension of the IWP (see chapter
six for a discussion of the compostion of its directors).
However, to concentrate solely on that link fails to appreciate
developments taking place within the City Council itself. Much of
the debate about the image and promotion of the city undertaken in
the IWP was mirrored within the Council. It was not only the
business community that recognised the need for, and importance of,
improved public relations. At member and officer level it was
acknowledged that the image of the city was poor, both within the
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business world and with central government. As a consequence, in
early 1986 officers from a number of Council departments formed a
'Promotions Working Party' with the aim of developing a more
coordinated approach to industrial provision and making the
promotion of industrial sites and assistance complement other
promotional campaigns within the city. The conclusions of this
working party, together with a report prepared by the management
team in the Publicity Department, argued that a primary concern was
the identification of potential markets for promotional activity,
moreover, that the City Council should create a single and strong
and positive image for the city, and attempt to establish a positive
image for itself. One of the consequences of this was the
establishment of the Sheffield Development Office in February 1987.
Essentially, this was a Council information service for potential
investors. It was to be a 'one stop shop' for developers with 'a
single point of contact and action for industrial and commercial
development enquiries (SDO, undated). In attempting to provide
information on available industrial and commercial property, provide
advice on the sources of aid, give an indication of the development
climate in the city, and help promote development opportunities in
general, it formed an integral part of the City Council's renewal
strategy and new found partnership with the private sector.
Another factor contributing towards the heightened promotional
culture was the establishment and initial work of the regeneration
committee. Charged with overseeing the development of collaborative
work between the public and private sector in the regeneration of
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the local economy, one of SERC's primary objectives was to
'facilitate the promotion of Sheffield as a location of industrial,
office and service sector activity (SERC mins, 23.1.87). In
attempting to make Sheffield a more attractive prospect for
potential investors and developers it laid great stress on joint
presentations, and promotion through concepts such as Project 
Champion, City Ambassador and Flagship Projects. The latter of
these concepts was to play a central part in the final report of
SERC's commissioned study on the Lower Don Valley (SERC, 1987).
This report on the organisation and implementational options
available for regeneration initiatives within the Valley, advocated
a considerable amount of input into improving the valley's image,
both in physical and psychological terms. Indeed, the report
recommended the use of Flagship Projects as catalysts for image
enhancement and inward investment. In addition to this the City
Council and the Chamber of Commerce commissioned research into the
promotional campaigns of other cities, and the perception of
Sheffield's image by firms considered as potential targets for
future relocation. The results of this research served to reinforce
their belief in the need for a more coordinated approach to
promoting the city and the importance of first constructing a
positive self-image.
Throughout 1986 and 1987 these developments provided the impetus to
producing an image strategy for the city. Both within the City
Council and the Chamber of Commerce the salience of image and
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promotion became accepted as crucial factors in the regeneration of
Sheffield's economy. The discussions between the City Council and
the Chamber, particularly within the IWP, helped reinforce the
notion that any external campaign would lose its momentum unless it
was underpinned by a commitment from within the city to reconstruct
internalised perceptions. With this accepted a joint promotional
campaign was set in train, one that was designed to change both the
internal and external image of the city. As such the whole
promotional process was a two-stage affair.
The first stage, dubbed Sheffield - Partnership in Action, was
launched in September 1987. This stage of the campaign lasted for
approximately six months and was directed primarily towards a
Sheffield audience. Essentially, its aim was to bring an awareness
of the 'spirit' of partnership to the business community and local
populace, and inform them of what the partnership intended to do.
It sought to do this by concentrating on a number of themes such as,
public-private commitment to economic development; fostering an
entrepreneurial climate within the city; and portraying Sheffield as
a centre of excellence and as a attractive place in which to live
and invest (SCC/DEED, 1987). The whole weight of the local media
was brought to bear on the preparation of the launch at The Star
Business-Industry Exhibition. Adverts were placed in the press,
prominent politicians and local businessmen appeared on local radio,
and a 'good news' sheet (later to become Success in Sheffield the
regular promotional voice of the partnership) was published to
supply positive news and images about the city. The use of the
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local media and the establishment of a partnership publication was
clearly seen as critical in bringing the message to the wider
community:
We had a press that was (previously) really only
printing negative things, good news stories, good
things that were happening, good aspects of the city
were not really being featured ywhere. So maybe we
should do something about that."
By early 1988, while the campaign was still in its first phase, both
the City Council and the Chamber of Commerce had arrived at the
conclusion that the long term aims of the campaign would be better
served by establishing a formal company to organise the promotional
side of the partnership. Moreover, it would also add a degree of
institutional certainty to the partnership by creating a legally
binding relationship between the partners. The rationale for the
company was threefold. First, it would be an independent commercial
body set up to specifically promote industry and commerce within the
city. Secondly, because of its commercial status it was considered
that it would make for more effective administration and management.
Thirdly, it was felt that as a consequence it would be more
attractive to the private sector, and as such would attract greater
levels of private sector funding (SCC/DEED, 1987c). The company
(Sheffield Partnerships Limited) was eventually set up in March 1988
using a dormant City Council shelf company, New Leisure Limited.
Initial composition of the company was such that it had a board of
seven directors, three from the City Council, three from the Chamber
of Commerce and one 'independent' representative, funding was to be
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50:50 between the City Council and the Chamber. The Chair was held
by Norman Adsetts, one of the Chamber directors and previous chair
of the Chamber's IWP. (see chapter six for a more detailed
discussion of the composition of the company).
The next stage of the promotional campaign, from mid-1988, was
designed to widen the scope of the partnership message by targeting
external organisations and individuals, and build on the work that
had been undertaken to improve the internal image of the city. The
extension of the campaign was most publicly expressed in two events.
The first was an Industrial Society conference on 'Partnership' at
the Adelphi Hotel, Liverpool in March 1988. This conference was an
extension of the Sheffield Chamber of Commerce's Leadership and
Privilege workshops which they had organised in 1986, and a similar
event, in Liverpool, that had taken place in the same year. Under
the banner of Action '88 (part of the Industrial Society's inner
cities initiative) the conference brought together leaders from the
public and private sectors from a number of British cities with the
intention of helping them work through how they could work together
as a 'city team', and lay the foundations for new partnerships and
working arrangements (Action '88, 1988). The delegation or 'city
team' from Sheffield, which consisted of City Council members and
officers, MPs, local business people, educationalists, the Church of
England, and the media, was actively engaged in presenting its
approach to partnership and took a lead role in the workshops.
Within the conference's working groups the Sheffield 'city team' was
able to promote itself as an innovator in the sphere of public-
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private partnership and present the existence of its new found
cooperation to other cities.
The second event was a major reception at the Mansion House in the
City of London in May 1988 hosted by the City Council, the Cutlers
Company and the Chamber of Commerce. Termed Sheffield Goes To
London, the purpose of this event was slightly different to that of
the Industrial Society conference. Essentially, the Industrial
Society conference had provided Sheffield with an opportunity to
debate with other cities the partnership strategies that each might
employ and how they should approach the issue of urban regeneration.
For instance, how imaginative could the partnership be; how could
partnerships be used to present the city to visitors and potential
investors; and how could common concerns be translated into
practical commitment? Moreover, although the Sheffield 'city team'
had occupied a prominent position in the debate, the conference was
not specifically Sheffield oriented. In contrast, the Mansion House
presentation was solely about promoting Sheffield's image and the
targeting of a specific market. In essence, it was an industrial
investment and marketing exercise designed to 'sell' Sheffield, and
its partnership approach, to the City of London. The whole affair
sought, in ambassadorial fashion, to bring an awareness of the
partnership to a wider (specifically private sector) audience and
promote the city as a location for industrial and financial
investment (Field, 1989).
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As well as the setting up of SPL and the associated promotional
campaign another initiative was developed which sought to profit
from the 'new found' confidence within the city. Coupled with the
promotional exercises the city had to be seen to be doing something
'practical' and specifically private sector oriented if Sheffield's
image was to undergo further improvement amongst potential national
and international investors. The establishment of Hallamshire
Investments, a local investment company, was felt by those within
the partnership to provide that opportunity. As Hallamshire
Investments the company formally came into existence in August 1988
as a limited liability public but unlisted company. However, in
practice it had been operational, albeit in another name, since the
previous February (Hallamshire Investments, Prospectus, 1989).
This 'home-grown' financial institution was designed to encourage
and develop local economic initiative and enterprise. It had
several main objectives: to identify, manage and take a stake in
investment projects within Sheffield; to introduce potential
investors and developers to the region; to promote an opportunity
for 'Sheffield citizens' to invest in their city; and to undertake
this work on a partnership basis (Hallamshire Investments,
Prospectus, 1989). These objectives were to be realised through the
acquisition of property and its eventual development, with a minor
role to be played by taking an equity stake in local companies,
particularly in the manufacturing and service industries. The
company itself is composed of 'leading' figures form the public and
private sectors in the city. In total there are eighteen directors
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on the board which has overall responsibility for the investment
policies of the company. There is also a management committee of
eight (which also has representatives from the business community
and the City Council on it) and this has responsibility for the
authorisation of the company's policies. The day-to-day decisions
are taken by two executive directors, the chief executive and the
finance director. (see chapter six for an examination of the
directorial composition of the company).
Initial finance for the company was raised at a dinner held at the
Cutlers Ball in March 1988. This function, hosted by Sir Charles
Villiers, Chairman of British Steel Corporation (Industry), and
attended by public and private representatives from within the city,
was directed towards potential local investors and designed to
provide the company with seedcorn finance. By the end of the
evening approximately £200,000 had been raised with guarantees of
financial commitment provided amongst others by British Steel, the
City Council, Cantors PLC, Sheffield Forgemasters, Sheffield
Insulation, and the University. This sum was used to establish the
managerial and secretarial appointments, and help pay for the
company's office. Mach of the company's early work was directed
towards drawing up a prospectus to attract share capital and
trawling the City of London for investment. An initial sum of
approximately £7 million share capital was raised, with a further
£1.5 million added amounting to £8.5 million by the end of the 1990
financial year. Investors include South Yorkshire Pensions
Authority, Derbyshire County Council, Westinghouse International
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Holdings Plc, Scottish Amicable Nominees Limited, and Pearl
Assurance Plc (Hallamshire Investments, 1991).
Hallamshire Investments formally emerged from recommendations made
in the Lower Don Valley report prepared for the regeneration
committee by Coopers and Lybrand, although informally the idea of a
development bank had been discussed by both the public and private
sectors in the city. 13 Building on this, one of the recommendations
of the Coopers and Lybrand strategy for the regeneration of the
valley was that some form of funding vehicle would be required to
provide finance as part of that strategy. The consultants' solution
was the establishment of a development bank (SRC, 1987). The
regeneration committee's response was twofold. First, it
commissioned Coopers and Lybrand to research the legislative
implications of the formation of a development bank, and secondly it
established a small working group to undertake the preparatory work
necessary for creating such a company. This group consisted of
three individuals: Hugh Sykes, the primary private sector architect
of the initiative and the first chairman of the company; Vernon
Smith, deputy chair of the regeneration committee and Chief
Executive of British Steel (Industry); and Malcolm Newman, the City
Treasurer.
Their initial report argued that the creation of a development bank
would help focus the Partnership in Action campaign on Sheffield as
a place to invest. The logic behind this was that the practical
example of a financial partnership would be taken aa serious
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evidence of a change in public-private relations by potential
investors. In the event the concept of a 'development bank' proved
problematic owing to the legislative restrictions and legal
implications involved in establishing a 'bank'. To overcome this
legal hurdle the 'investment bank' concept was remodelled into an
'investment company'. The process of setting up the company was
overseen by a steering group composed of public and private
representatives from SERC. Its objective, apart from making the
appointment of the chief executive and determining the operating
principles of the company, was to seek out financial commitments
from institutional sources and appoint the board of directors
'capable of providing confidence and potential investment for the
company' (SERC mins, 22.7.88). This was all to be set within the
partnership framework that was beginning to consolidate and take
shape by 1988. It was a point that the prospectus of the company
was to make forcefully:
The Directors of Ballamshire, comprising leading
members of the Sheffield community, have not only
wide industrial and commercial experience but also
associations with a number of these local (partner-
ship) organisations and public bodies. This will
enable the Company to draw on extensive resources of
relevant knowledge and expertise.
(Ballamshire Investments, Prospectus p.7, 1989)
Another area where the public and private sectors within the city
attempted to work together was in the preparation for the World
Student Games (WSG). Although ostensibly a City Council inspired
initiative much of the initial management and preparation of the
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Games occurred within a public-private partnership context. At much
the same time that the Chamber's TWP was operating and the
regeneration committee was in its early stages of formation, a
public-private WSG organising committee was formed to prepare for
Sheffield's bid to host the Games. Additionally, the delegation
that went to Zagreb to make Sheffield's bid and presentation for the
Games to the FISU Executive (Federation International du Sport
Uhiversitaire) included councillors and officers, and
representatives of the Chamber of Commerce and the higher education
institutions. Between November 1986 and July 1988 the preparation
and management of the Games remained within the hands of the
organising committee. Despite the continued insistence by the
organising committee that the Games were part of the overall
regeneration of the city no detailed work was carried out into the
economic impact of the Games on the city and how it could be
'exploited' to meet the social requirements and needs of the
community. Throughout its existence the priority of the organising
committee was given to the construction of the facilities and the
structure of the organisations required to run the event. The lack
of attention given to developing an economic analysis reflects the
fact that a key reason for the Games lay in their potential for
changing the image of the city (see chapters eight and nine).
The organising committee's intention had always been to develop the
Games facilities through the interaction of public and private
sector finance and expertise. However, restrictions in the power of
local authority borrowing capacity made direct intervention by the
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City Council problematic and limited their ability to raise finance.
Yet at a political level there was still a need for the local
authority to be involved in the development of Games policy and the
management of the Games facilities. The solution to this political
problem was the establishment of Sheffield Leisure and Recreation
Trust (SLRT) in March 1988. Sheffield Leisure and Recreation
Trust's role was to provide the facilities and manage their future
use, the finance of which was raised mainly through foreign bank
loans, and secured by City Council assets. The Trust's governors
included representatives from the private sector, local community
groups, and a Sheffield MP. Two operating subsidiaries of SLRT were
also established: Uhiversiade (GB) Ltd., and Sheffield for Health
Ltd. The former was set up solely to administer and raise finance
for the Games, whilst the latter was to be a permanent subsidiary of
SLRT charged with the task of developing and operating the new Games
facilities. Both these organisations were set up under the banner
of partnership and drew their directors from the private sector and
the wider community in the city. Uhiversiade (GB) Ltd. was seen to
be typical of the partnership approach that had developed in the
city over the previous two years. All of the six directors (three
from the City Council and three from the private sector) had been
involved in either some or all of the earlier partnership
initiatives. At the time, Uhiversiade (GB) Ltd. was heralded as the
icing on the cake of working relationships between the City Council
and the private sector, that had been set in train by initiatives
such as the Chamber of Commerce's TWP, the establishment of SERC,
and the associated promotional campaigns for the city.
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PARTNERSHIP: ACCOMMODATING CENTRAL GOVERNMENT POLICY
Throughout the period 1986-1988 the public and private sectors in
Sheffield began to develop a number of locally inspired partnership
initiatives. These initiatives sought to draw on locally based
organisations, institutions, and individual actors in an attempt to
construct a consensus over what the problems of the local economy
were and how they could be remedied. However, despite the growth of
this cross-sector activity, three central government initiatives
were thrust onto the partnership over the next three years - an
Urban Development Corporation (the SDC); a Training and Enterprise
Council (TEC); and an invitation to bid for City Challenge funding.
These initiatives reflected the Government's own form of remedial
action for the regeneration of the inner cities: stressing co-
operation between central government and the private sector, rather
than co-operation between local government and the private sector;
and reinforcing a feature of urban policy in the 1980s - the central
determination of what should constitute an urban regeneration
proposal.
The Introduction of the Sheffield Development Corporation 
The decision to establish a Development Corporation in the Lower Don
Valley rode roughshod over the work of the regeneration committee to
prepare a plan for the renewal of the city's industrial heartland.
SERC's LDV study had been commissioned to provide an 'independent'
assessment of the Valley's regeneration potential. The study argued
that the regeneration of the Valley should be achieved through a
combination of public and private sector finance focused around a
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number of 'flagship' projects. Moreover, it rejected the concept of
the Development Corporation on the grounds that boundary issues for
the area were unproblematic, in that the area under consideration
was within the control of one local authority, that Sheffield as a
local planning authority was very efficient, and that public-private
co-operation was already happening in the city. In its place the
report proposed a delivery mechanism (the Urban Regeneration
Project) where planning power and control remained with the local
authority, but which would have a board membership taken directly
from the constituent members of the existing partnership
arrangements in the city.
These conclusions clearly illustrated the need for public investment
in the Valley and the importance of working in partnership at a
local level. In essence, it was little more than a reworking and
updating of the Council's own Lower Don Valley Strategy (SCC, 1986).
As the architect of the Council's LDV strategy asserted:
...the strategy that it [Coopers and Lybrand]
proposed was basically the same one we proposed.
It was just that when we first took it to the
Government they said 'that's fine but that's your
strategy, we need an independent assessment of it'.
So Coopeu provided that, but it reinforced what
we said. '4
As far as the City Council was concerned, the sub-agenda for the
Coopers and Lybrand report was about repackaging, for central
government consumption, a locally inspired regeneration proposal in
a more palatable form. However, within the regional office of the
DoE, the necessity of an independent assessement was predicated on a
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view which stressed its usefulness in making a case for a
Development Corporation:
At the time the City Council did the LDV strategy,
the possibility of additional UDCs was being mooted
by Ministers. When the City Council produced that
study, I saw it as a means of getting the case brought
forward for a UDC based in the LDV. Hence, we set up
a specification fori pdependent consultants to prepare
a study of the LDV.JJ
In the event, the recommendations of the study were not implemented,
and a Development Corporation was announced for the Valley in March
1988 (Action For Cities, 1988). AS one DoE offical involved in the
process commented:
Coopers and Lybrand were coming up with all these ideas
of setting up a body which would have a constitution, may
have some executive responsibilities, but would have no
financial powers - they would remain with the City Council
or central government organisations...but in the region,
we saw it the study] as an opportunity to set up a UDC,
because the resource requirements were such that the local
authority could not possibly tackle that problem itself...4
could never have been delivered by the City Council alone."
For the private sector individuals involved in the partnership this
decision was accepted without too much concern. One of the leading
members of the business community summed up the business community's
reaction to the Coopers and Lybrand report and its dismissal by
central government in this way:
Let's invent a URP they (Coopers and Lybrand) said.
There wasn't a hope in hell that the Government would
accept that...So to suggest that as well as putting
money into Sheffield in order to regenerate the Don
Valley one should also rewrite the basic model for
regeneration, which was the UDC, I think was going
beyond what was practical politics. Nevertheless we
all of us argued from SERC for the URP model because
those were good arguments that Coopers and Lybrand
were putting forward. However, I suppose the business
community being pragmatic were very much inclined to
take the money and meet any requirements that were laid
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down on the basis that it was the money we needed and
we ' d mOie anything else work because that's how business
works."
Clearly, news of the Development Corporation was treated with
pragmatic acceptance by the private sector who did not see the
imposition of the UDC as an issue of political principle in the way
the City Council (specifically the ruling Labour Group) did. As far
as the City Council was concerned initial public pronouncements were
critical of the decision, which was seen as yet another attempt to
erode the power base of the local authority and weaken local
democratic accountability (PTPC mins, 15.3.88; EPC mins, 21.3.88; PC
mins, 23.3.88). However, within the leadership of the Labour Group
and senior officers in DEED and the Planning Department, the
attitude was one of a grudging acceptance of the Corporation on the
grounds of financial pragmatism and a hoped for political influence
over its operation:
You know, £50m really was very difficult to turn down
completely. And so the aim becaw oto try and shackle
the UDC a bit...bend it our way.'
This pragmatic philosophy was not universially accepted. Indeed,
within sections of the Labour Group and in the District Labour
Party, a counter-argument emerged which stressed non-co-operation
with the Development Corporation:
There were a number of people who would have petitioned
against it, and campaigned against it, and wimld have
boycotted it, and had nothing to do with it.1'
However, this argument held little appeal to the leadership of the
Group, primarily because it was perceived to be a politically naive
and destructive course of action:
We agreed to work with it [the SDC] because not to work
with it would have damaged the efforts of the city to
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try and attract industry...It would have put at risk
some new partnership ventures, and I think politically
we would have done ourselves damage because the public
of Sheffield would have seen us walking away from £ 50m. 20
In many respects, the decision taken by the Employment Programme
Committee, and endorsed by the Policy Committee, to petition against
the Development Corporation (SCC, EPC mins 23.5.88; PC mins 23.5.88)
was a political posture that had to be adopted. A Labour Council,
committed to notions of public accountability and the maintenance of
public sector control over planning powers, could not be seen to be
acquiescing to the introduction of a Development Corporation without
some degree of opposition. However, a restraining clause on the
decision to petition against the UDC (which stressed that it was to
be adopted as Council policy only if insufficient progress was made
in discussions between the City Council, the chair designate of the
Development Corporation - Hugh Sykes, and the Department of the
Environment), illustrates the extent to which this course of action
was about demonstrating disapproval of central government's urban
policy initiatives, rather than attempting to erect barriers between
the City Council and the Development Corporation. The following
comment by a leading private sector individual involved in the
negotiation process provides an insight into how those negotiations
were perceived by the partnership cognoscenti:
...by then (imposition of the UDC) a few individuals
had got to know each other quite well, and could
trust each other at least to talk...we all knew that
we wanted the Don Valley to be regenerated and then
what happened was the UDC was announced...We didn't
spend a lot of time as we might have done two or three
years earlier arguing about that, because by then we
knew the politicians well enough to understand why they
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had to be against it...We started talking about it and
we came up with a suggestion that if we could agree that
whatever the format of the UDC...the UDC would in fact
operate within a common vision of the city...irrespective
of what the UDC rules said we would add elements to the
way the UDC worked which would turn it into something
much closer to a partnership. On that basis it was
agrq0 that the Labour Group would not petition against
it."
This quote illustrates the extent to which the political leadership
of the Labour Group and private sector individuals within the city
were able to use pre-existing partnership mechanisms to avoid a
rupture of the partnership over the introduction of the Development
Corporation. Indeed, the informal and formal partnership
arrangements that had developed eased the negotiations between the
City Council, private sector, DoE and chair designate of the SDC.
Given that the participants in these negotiations were those
involved in establishing SERC, or had taken part in discussions and
meetings organised by the regeneration committee, it was perhaps not
surprising that an agreement was reached.
On the 4th July 1988, an agreement was signed between the City
Council and the Sheffield Development Corporation (SDC). This
document sought to tie the Council and the Development Corporation
together in the task of improving economic growth in the city. The
agreement, outside of the statutory code of conduct required by the
Department of the Environment, sought to provided a framework for
the two organisations to 'act as partners in promoting their agreed
objectives to increase economic activity and reduce unemployment in
the interests of and to the benefit of all the people of Sheffield'
(SCC/SDC agreement, 4.7.88;1).
	
It focused on a number of joint
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principles which included: the promotion of openness in the
operation of the SDC; the holding of regular monthly meetings
between the City Council and the SDC; the SDC to consult the Council
closely on the development of its corporate plan; coordinate and
undertake promotional activities through Sheffield Partnerships
Limited; and to involve a senior Council officer in the setting up
of the SDC (SCC/SDC agreement, 4.7.88). Other concessions were to
include the appointment of a community director within the
Corporation and the establishment of an agency agreement with the
City Council over development control work on planning applications
in the SDC's area. A board of ten was appointed in July 1988, and
apart from the Chair and Deputy Chair, included three councillors,
and five individuals from the local business community. All of
these had had some involvement in earlier partnership initiatives in
the city, and in retrospect, it is clear that the composition of the
board (in its initial membership) was heavily influenced by the
composition of the regeneration committee. (see chapter six for a
more detailed discussion).
From Training Council to Sheffield TEC 
In the same way that the introduction of the Development Corporation
by-passed the partnership arrangements devised for the Lower Don
Valley by SERC, so the introduction of the Sheffield Training and
Enterprise Council by-passed another SERC generated proposal - a
partnership-based training council. As one SERC representative
commented:
We were looking for some kind of operation on
regenerating training and employment in the city.
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We [SERC] decided that there was a need for a
Council, industry, unions forum. We had aaroposal
in place before the White Paper came out."
The regeneration committee's proposal was for an umbrella training
organisation (accountable to SERC) to co-ordinate the provision of
post-sixteen training, within the context of training as a key to
economic regeneration. Although there was some reservation within
the Labour Group about member representation on the training
council, and the need for any organisation to take full account of
equal opportunities in training, general approval was given to
SERC's initiative (EPC mins, 25.1.88; PC mins, 23.2.88). By Spring
1988, SERC had produced an outline plan for the training council
(SERC, 1988).
The aims of the training council were to encourage and enable
economic activity already based in the city to remain and develop;
to attract new investment to the city and encourage economic
diversification; to help maximise the benefits of regeneration for
local people through the provision of opportunities for developing
new skills; and to increase access to training for either personal
or community benefit outside strictly defined vocational sectors.
The training council was to comprise representatives from the the
City Council, Chamber of Commerce, University and Polytechnic, trade
unions, private training organisations, and organised community
groups with an interest in employment and training issues. These
organisations were to be allowed to operate within their own
constitutional and statutory requirements, but were to contribute
to, and be informed by, the work of the training council's co-
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ordinating and advisory role in planning the
	 city's overall
strategy for training and training provision (SERC, 1988).
With the publication of the Government's White Paper, EMployment for
the 1990s, in December 1988, and the announcement of the intention
to establish a network of local companies to deliver training and
enterprise strategies, SERC's proposal for training 	 became
redundant. Despite City Council criticisms of the Governments
intention for introducing training organisations with a two thirds
private sector dominance, a number of ad hoc meetings took place in
January 1989 between city councillors and members of the Chamber of
Commerce, to draw up a formula for a Sheffield based TEC (Field,
1990;58). A more formal series of Breakfast meetings were held by
the Chamber of Commerce, under the direction of Richard Field, and
were attended by city councillors and trade unionists. The outcome
of these meetings was the establishment of a TEC development team
headed by Richard Field, Bill Jordan of the City Council, and Martin
Frizelle regional officer of NSF. Their task was to develop the
training council project into a proposal for a TEC, but in line with
the operation of the partnership. This meant that a Sheffield based
TEC would have a membership not dominated by private sector
individuals. The proposal was for board representation to be split
fifty per cent private sector and fifty per cent City Council, trade
unions and community groups (SERC mina, 24.2.89). The proposal was
presented, to the Under Secretary of State for Employment in March
1989. As the trade union member of the TEC delegation commented:
Our proposal was for an equal split. We took a joint
delegation to the Minister and said look, we're an
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awful long way down this road already...we,Nant to
be able to implement the Sheffield system.'
Although the response of the Government was to refuse the
representational model outlined in the delegations proposal, a
degree of local license was allowed:
...the answer we got from the Minister was you can
change everything as long as you don't change the
numbers on the top am...how you deal with it under
there is up to you.'
The response of the City Council and trade unions was one of
disappointment that the development team's compromise had been
rejected by central government. However, this did not mean that
either the City Council or trade unions wanted to withdraw their
participation from the development team, and they continued their
input into the preparation of a bid for the TEC (SERC mins,
28.4.89).
	 This continued participation was made easier by two
factors. The first was the acknowledgement by private sector
representatives on the development team that the TEC's programme
should fit in with SERC's overall vision for the city (SERC mins,
26.5.89). The second, was the establishment of seventeen
principles for co-oerative working between the TEC, City Council,
trade unions, and community organisations, on general training and
equal opportunities policies (SERC mins, 28.7.89; Field, 1990;58).
The City Council also showed its continued participation in the work
of the TEC development team, by establishing an officer/member
corporate group to provide information to the Council about the TEC;
to represent the Council at TEC development board meetings; and to
support the City Council representatives on the eventual TEC board
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(EPC mins, 25.9.89). Between November 1989 and early 1990, an
initial consultation exercise was carried out, the main conclusions
of which stressed the need to produce mechanisms to ensure that
equal opportunities and social considerations were incorporated into
the TEC's programme of action (SERC mins, 2.3.90). A draft
corporate plan was published in June 1990, and in the following
October, a partnership recognised (if not partnership inspired)
Training and Enterprise Council went 'live'. (see chapter six for a
discussion of the composition of the TEC board).
City Challenge - Bidding for Regeneration
City Challenge was launched in Nay 1991 as a series of five year
comprehensive urban improvement programmes for key priority areas
within individual cities, based on precise action plans approved in
a competition between local authorities. Seventy five million
pounds was earmarked for the projects of successful first round City
Challenge bids launched in 1992/93, although this was later
increased to £82.5m. The programme was designed to attract private
sector investment, to provide added-value and to stimulate wealth
creation in cities, as well as create a climate both of
environmental quality and enterprise. The 'Challenge' bids were to
be made on a partnership basis:
We need a more ambitious and comprehensive approach.
We need to tackle areas on a sufficient scale to bring
confidence back to them, and to the city as a whole...
Local political leaders have a duty to lead, but they
do not have a monopoly of wisdom or ability. A parallel
response is required from private companies, academic
institutions, the TEC, other Government agencies, voluntary
organisations and local people...Local authorities will be
invited to enter into partnerships with their local
businesses and their community to draw together imaginative
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programmes for the regeneration of their areas.25
For the launch of the programme fifteen local authorities, of which
Sheffield was one, were invited to submit bids for schemes to be
implemented during 1992-97.
In Sheffield, the response to the announcement of City Challenge was
generally positive (PEDPC mins, 28.6.91), although there was
criticism of the initiative from the ex-chair of the regeneration
committee:
This notion of competition is totally the wrong way to
address urban policy and urban regeneration...picking
winners and losers only goes to emphasise how bogus the
whole exercise is. It's a presentation of economic policy
that's a diversion from the very real problems that South
Yorkshire has got...I think the way we've gone about
economic development in Sheffield has been right, we've
done it in a co-ordinated way. We don't really want any
Government, Labour or Conservative, to say now go in g2r
a little game and let's see who comes out the winner."
However, within the Council's Planning and Economic Development
Programme Committee, there was a clear acknowledgment that an
opportunity to bid for central government financial assistance, as
an aid to the implementation of aspects of their plans for the
regeneration of the city, should not be ignored (PEDPC mins,
28.6.91). Publicly, the feeling was that Sheffield's bid would be
successful:
We believe we shall get one of the bids through on
the basis of our record of partnership working and the
quality of the scheme we shall put up...We have a41the
partners who are necessary involved and committed.'
Following the announcement of the initiative a series of meetings
were established, involving organisations represented on SERC, to
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respond to the initiative and to develop a bid within the context of
Sheffield 2000 and its implementation programme, the Three Valleys
Initiative (Lower Don, Upper Don and Sheaf Valleys) (PEI)PC mins,
28.6.91). The City Challenge submission was to be based on the core
area of the Three Valleys Initiative embracing part of the city
centre, Kelham, Attercliffe and Wybourn. Projects were to include
the development of a centre for innovation and manufacturing; the
renewal of Attercliffe shopping centre; the provision of new housing
in Attercliffe and Kelham, with housing improvements in Wybourn; a
development agency providing specialist advice and marketing
services to local industry; the establishment of a national
environment centre in the city; the creation of a media and
exhibition centre; and the development of a national centre for
popular music (Sheffield City Challenge Bid, July 1991). These
activities were chosen because they were considered to consolidate
existing economic activities, have the capacity to aid the
diversification of the local economy, and attract new investment to
the city (Sheffield City Challenge Bid, July 1991;19).
In terms of management and organisation, the existing structures of
partnership were to be drawn on for inspiration:
Given the strength and experience of existing partner-
ship activities in Sheffield, it is neither necessary
nor desirable to create elaborate new structures. The
intention...is to build on this experience and improve
the capacity for implementation.
(Sheffield City Challenge Bid, July 1991;37)
A City Challenge Board would be established, whose representation
would be based on those organisation involved with SERC. The board
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would be a 'Committee of Council' with the majority of its members
co-opted from the private and non-profit sectors in the city. It
would therefore be similar in composition to SERC, although smaller,
but explicitly concerned with implementation. Below the board, an
implementation team drawn from individuals within the public sector,
private sector, educational institutions, Development Corporation,
TEC, trade unions and community organisations, would be established.
This team would be responsible for ensuring the realisation of the
City Challenge projects; identifying new project opportunities;
acting as brokers to establish new projects, which could be
undertaken by separate dedicated organisations; and the monitoring
of those projects (Sheffield City Challenge Bid, July 1991;38/39).
In the same way that the projects within the City Challenge
submission were re-workings of initiatives developed through SERC,
so the management structure echoed SERC's proposal for a
regeneration vehicle for the Lower Don Valley - the Urban
Regeneration Project. As a senior officer within DEED admitted:
'that proposal [URP] came out in City Challenge'. 28
 This link
between the URP and the proposed management structures for City
Challenge was also acknowledged within the DoE:
Some of the principles that were being examined in
the URP, in terms of organisation and general legal
	 ,fl
and financial powers, are relevant [in City Challenge].'
At the end of July 1991, the successful City Challenge bids were
announced - Sheffield's was not one of them. The reasons why the
bid failed are open to debate, but they range from the idea that
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the bid was too ambitious and dominated by the Council (HG), to the
notion that the city was still suffering from its radical left-wing
image of the early 1980s (ST. 2.8.91). Whatever the reasons, the
feeling in Sheffield was that plans for the regeneration of the city
had been set back, and that the work of the partnership (not of
weeks, but of years), had been snubbed (Clive Betts, interviewed on
BBC Radio Sheffield, 31.7.91; ST. 2.8.91). The response, although
with some dejection, was swift and typical of the city that claimed
to have 'invented the modern partnership principle' (ST. 2.8.91):
We've got the proposals, we've got an economic
strategy, we've got consultation...We are working
closely with the private sector...We still see
partnership working as the right way forward. We're
only sorry that the vernment doesn't want to join
in that partnership.
A NARRATIVE SUMMARY
This chapter has outlined the main features of the emergence of
partnership in Sheffield between 1986 and 1991 by examining the way
in which local public and private organisations sought to develop a
collaborative approach to local economic policy making. In summary,
there have been three main phases in the evolution of the
partnership: firstly, the initial period of attraction and alliance
formation; secondly, the consolidation of these alliances in more
formal settings; and thirdly, the imposition, and eventual
accommodation, of central government models of regeneration onto
Sheffield's local mechanisms.
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Within this general framework we can identify a number of more
specific characteristics that contributed to the development of the
partnership. For example, the first phase witnessed the creation of
neutral forums or arenas, such as the Ranmoor Forums, where the
local civic elite where able to identify the problems and key issues
of importance to the city. There also began to be an awareness of
what the main focus or issues for the partnership should be,
primarily these have been image management, inward investment, and
the development of a long-term strategy for regeneration. In the
second phase, we saw the continuation and development of these
issues in more formal partnership organisations, such as SERC, SPL
and Hallamshire Investments, which became key arenas of local public
and private sector representation. We also saw within SERC, and
indeed, SPL and Hallamshire Investments, the beginnings of an
analysis of how to tackle the issues of importance that had been
identified. This has continued into the third phase of partnership
development, where Sheffield's local initiatives have had to work
alongside those imposed by central government. More significantly
in this phase however, has been the emergence of a strategy to
pursue the goal of long-term economic regeneration - Sheffield 2000.
This latter aspect has largely been untouched in this account, but
it will be the focus of examination in subsequent chapters. Having
elaborated the narrative context of Sheffield's partnership then,
the following chapter will go on to consider the structure and
composition of the partnership and its institutions.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION OF PARTNER= FOR
BCONOKEC REGENERATION IN SHEFFIELD
INTRODUCTION
Chapter five offered an account of the rise of partnership for
economic regeneration, and how the public and private sectors in the
city began to co-operate and work together in the field of economic
policy. Reference was made to partnership's participants, but its
full compostion was not systematically outlined. The overall
objective of this chapter is to outline the composition of
partnership, and participation within it, both individually and
organisationally. At the outset, it should be stated that there is
no single organisational structure that characterises Sheffield's
partnership for economic regeneration. Rather, it consists of a
number
	
of	 partnership bodies, partnership committees and
partnership companies. Since 1986 these have included the
Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee; Sheffield Partnerships
Limited; Hallamshire Investments; Sheffield Leisure and Recreation
Trust; Universiade (GB) Ltd; the Hallam Group; Sheffield
Regeneration Ltd; Sheffield Science Park Ltd; Sheffield Industry
Business Technology Centre Ltd (SIBTEC); Sheffield Media and
Exhibition Centre Ltd; the Sheffield Education/Business Partnership;
Sheffield Training and Enterprise Council; and the Sheffield
Development Corporation.
187
In many respects, partnerships's bodies and committees operate
independently of each other with little in the way of formal
mechanisms or channels of communication. Because the partnership
lacks a clear conjoining structure, it is difficult to represent
diagrammatically. A view residing within DEED conceptualises
partnership in terms of the overlapping of various interests, which
can be represented visually through the concept of a Venn diagram:
I suppose the simplest definition...is the
Venn diagram...up until about '85, '86...you
take the two circles as being the interests
of two different groupings, particularly the
public sector - private sector, much of what
happened tended to focus on the areas outside
the overlap. And what happened was a gradual
agreement...that it would be more productive
for the agencies and for Sheffield to focus
more on what was in the overlap, and to
concentrate on finding areas where we could
work together...Extending that then to mean
more than just two circles but several circles
...[there was]...a partnership bqtween all the
agencies interested in the city.1
This conceptualisation of partnership illustrates the merging of the
various agencies within the city (see Table 1), however it says
little about how they are inter-related in organisational or
individual terms, or how such inter-relations were formed. Perhaps
the most appropriate way of conceptualising the partnership is by
considering it as a loose web-like network of organisational and
individual interests working in co-operation, but without an overall
chain of command. In other words, amongst the myriad of agencies
and actors operating under the banner of partnership no one agency
or individual has overall control over any other organisation or
individual.
	 The main partnership body, SERC, may act as an
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TABLE (1) BOISTITUTIONAL ACTORS WITHIN SHEFFIELD'S PARTNERSHIP FOR
EGONOMIG REGENERATION
SCC	 BUSINESS	 CEKTRAL GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS
Members	 Chamber of Commerce Dept. of Environemnt
Officers	 Chamber of Trade	 Dept. of Trade & Industry
British Steel (Ind)
Cutlers Company
HE	 TRADE UNIONS	 SOCIAL/COMMUNITY
_
University Sheffield Trades
	 Voluntary Sector Consultative
Council	 Forum
Polytechnic Associated	 Sheffield Council For Racial
Engineering Union	 Equality
Manufacturing,
Science & Finance
Union
Confederation of Shipbuilding and
Engineering Unions
SUB-CENTRAL COPT/AGENCIES 
Sheffield Development Corporation
Sheffield Training & Enterprise Council
English Estates
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institutional focal point for the partnership, and as a politically
recognised space in which partners can discuss issues they consider
relevant to the regeneration of the city, but it has no legal powers
which allow it to determine members' actions. It has no power to
mandate its constituent members to acquiesce to a particular course
of action which does not have common agreement.
Other partnership organisations such as Sheffield Partnerships
Limited and Hallamshire Investments operate as independent companies
responsible only to their board of directors and shareholders, not
(in theory) to the partnership at large. Additionally, (again in
theory), agencies such as the SDC and the TEC, are more directly
responsible to central government than they are to the partnership.
Their powers of decision-making are inscribed in legislation and
relate more to national urban policy than they do to partnership
arrangements in Sheffield. That organisations such as SPL,
Hallamshire Investments, the SDC and the TEC choose to act in
concert with others in the partnership, such as the City Council and
the Chamber of Commerce and work through SERC, is more a reflection
of the inter-personal networks which have developed and the
membership composition of all these organisations than it is a
reflection of the organisational structure of the partnership.
The inter-personal relationships that exist within the partnership
have evolved over a period stretching back to the mid-1980s. Chapter
five argued that much of the early phase of the partnership was
characterised by informal, but repeated, interaction between local
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politicians, local authority officers, members of the business
community, and individuals from what may be termed the intellectual
or professional 'elite' within the city, coming together to discuss
how to tackle Sheffield's economic and social problems. It also
suggested that one of the features of these interactions was the
dismantling of the political and ideological barriers erected
between the City Council and the private sector in the early part
of the decade. Certainly, in the early 1980s the City Council and
the business community were offering different interpretations of
the causes, consequences and remedies for Sheffield's industrial
decline. The intention now is to make explicit the fact that this
informal interaction was a process that worked to establish a
network of public and private actors in the city, and which
coalesced around the issue of regeneration.
INFORMAL NETWORKS FOR REGENERATION
The Ranmoor Forums provided a space for interaction where those
parties interested in the revitalisation of Sheffield's economy
could meet and discuss their views and discover the ideas of others.
As one senior business figure suggested:
These were supper parties, a bit of a muck around,
maybe a theme speaker...and I think these were
extremely good. He [the Vicar of Ranmoor] got his
Bishop involved, David Blunkett and the City Council
people, prominent business people. I actually t
that was quite a pivotal step in stopping the war.
A key feature of these meetings was that they allowed the city's
leading local politicians and members of the business community to
meet regularly outside a politically sensitive arena or public
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place, and begin to establish what areas of common ground existed
for them to work on. In essence, the beginnings of an understanding
arose around how to tackle the issue of regeneration. This process
was described in the following way:
[discussions were] usually about Motherhood...
you know non-controversial subjects...then you
suddenly realise that your deeply held beliefs
of what you want in the future are actually
quite similar to the guy [sic] you believed was
divided from you. So although those Motherhood
subjects can be derided, in fact if you really
mean them and get to the,nub of things they're
actually very important.'
The Ranmoor meetings are not the only examples of the development of
a series of exchanges between the public and private sectors which
led to the creation of a network of inter-connected individuals and
organisations concerned with the issue of the regeneration of the
city. The Chamber of Commerce's activities also worked to establish
a regeneration centred network. Chamber initiatives such as its
workshops on The Challenge and Privilege of Leadership in early 1986
sought to bring together the business community, local government,
education institutions, trade unions and the Anglican Church to
enable them to discover how they related to each other in their
concern for the regeneration of the city. As with the Ranmoor
meetings, such an occasion provided further impetus to the
establishment of common ground and potentially common goals for
economic regeneration. Similarly, the Chamber's Image Working Party
was a forum in which the public and private sectors could determine
an approach to improving people's perceptions of Sheffield in an
attempt to boost the level of inward investment in the city.
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Overarching this activity, the year long industry campaign in 1986
allowed the Chamber to support networking initiatives by running
civic events and dinners in order to enhance the new relationships
which were beginning to emerge. According to the then President of
the Chamber of Commerce:
...the sort of things we set up were a meeting
once a month with the City Council at the Cutlers'
Hall. Eight O'Clock every first Monday of the Month
to find out what the latest exciting thing in Sheffield
is, we have many of these meetings."
As far as he was concerned, it was this pattern of interaction
throughout 1986 which, 'changed people from councillor Clive Betts
to Clive, from councillor David Blunkett to David, we became friends
during that year'.5
Many of the meetings between public and private actors in this
initial phase of the partnership were of a public, if informal kind.
However, they were public only in the sense that they were not kept
secret, not in the sense of being open to the general public.
Nearly all the respondents interviewed in the course of the
research, revealed that they had engaged in private meetings with
members of the emerging partnership, or if they had not, suggested
that such meetings had taken place. The importance of private
meetings was alluded to by Richard Field, in his lecture to the
Royal Society of Arts (Field, 1989) where he suggested that areas of
agreement between partners were made public, whilst areas which
produced disagreement were 'discussed in private behind closed
doors'. This is a telling comment on the emergent partnership, for
it states quite openly, if perhaps inadvertently, that private
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meetings were important parts of the decision-making process in the
city, particularly when it came to those issues upon which it was
difficult to reach a consensus. It is of course impossible to fully
comprehend what went on in these meetings, but it would be difficult
to imagine that such contact was not significant, even if it only
added to the creation of a network of individuals and agencies
concerned with Sheffield's economic regeneration that was
simultaneously occurring through informal, but public, initiatives.
Indeed, many of those interviewed commented on the extent to which
such liaisons were influential in establishing good interpersonal
relationships, as well as augmenting the thrust of the more public
meetings in the city.
The following quotes, two from the public sector, one from the
private sector, and one from a trades union official should help
illustrate this point. They are not intended to be representative
of all private meetings and links, but do highlight the extent to
which they were seen to be important. First, the comments of a
leading city councillor of the time:
[in the early 1980s] we were intrigued by, concerned
about how we dealt with the private sector, but the
links, the personal links weren't there and we weren't
being pushed so much until later in the '80s to say you
must work with the private sector...It was later in the
'80s when they [central government] said you must work
with the private sector in the area of development...I
think it was at that time, the '87 election, when we
realised we were going to lose again. We said well we're
not going to have any money, we can't sit here and do
nothing. So we talked the issues over and we gradually
made relationships with the private sector, sort of Clive,
Howard and myself going out drinking with the likes of
Norman Adsetts and Richard Field. I mean, initially it
was on that level. 6
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This private link with two of the leading figures in the business
community formed one connection. It was supplemented by another
involving senior members of the academic institutions in the city:
The other area of course is the Polytechnic and the
University. They were involved through John Padley
and John Stoddard. There was another example, Clive
and I, and Howard, and Malcolm Newman, used to go and
play squash against Jack Hobbs and John Stoddart from
the Polytechnic, and you know talk issues over afterwards.
So those so;t of networks were quite important and took
it forward.'
Similarly, within the private sector, the importance of establishing
private contacts with 'like-minded' people over the issue of
regeneration is implicit in the following quote from a leading
business person who came to Sheffield in the mid-1980s:
I met this Sheffield that was very demoralised and
curiously I also met one or two newcomers who felt
the same way...the first people were from the Poly-
technic. That was my first realisation that as law
as Sheffield was there were people that wanted to
do something about it, could do something about it.
The first one was Jack Hobbs, who was the assistant
Principal at the Polytechnic...I must have met him
socially. I became a council member of the Chamber.
I joined the forum of the engineering federation...
That was a pretty good forum and a number of people
coming in each month to meet each other...[and]...
very soon I found myself on the Polytechnic board of
governors. After I met Jack I met John Stoddart and
they had both come to the area fairly recently. 8
Trades union links into the emerging regeneration network were also
alluded to:
The trade union movement and the Labour movement are
very close in this city. There are informal contacts
in the sense that people know each other...The senior
people inthe union movement and the Labour movement
would have very little trouble having a chat over a
pint to sort something out...The trade union movement
and the business community know each other, but going
out for a drink is a lot less common. Partnership has
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broken a few of those barriers down, and made ingormal
or off the record comment and discussion easier?
By the end of 1986, the groundwork for much of the partnership had
been laid with individual to individual contact and the repeated use
of informal meetings firmly establishing the main players and the
parameters in which they could operate. What began to emerge was a
network of partnership cognoscenti constructed around interlinking
individuals and organisations, with new partnership institutions
developing and linked by and through that cognoscenti, which was:
...the product of meeting after meeting, group after
group sitting down witeight or nine people actually
talking to each other."
FROM INFORMAL TO FORMAL NETWORKS 
The successful development of a fledgling network of public and
private sector individuals concerned with the issue of the
regeneration of the city can be guauged by the extent of
organisational and individual cross-memberships within the formal or
institutionalised outcomes of the initial phase of the partnership.
To illustrate such inter-connections we will examine the
compositions of five partnership institutions - SERC; Sheffield
Partnerships Limited; Hallamshire Investments; Sheffield Leisure and
Recreation Ttsuts; and Uhiversiade (GB) Ltd; one Business Leadership
Team (the Hallam Group), developed locally in conjunction with
Business in the Community; and two central government inspired
organisations, the Sheffield Development Corporation and the
Sheffield Training and Enterprise Council. These organisations have
196
been chosen because they represent the most high profile partnership
organisations, but also because they are a combination of locally
inspired and centrally imposed institutions. Given that these
institutions represent a combination of local and central impulses
(with potential for conflict between them), the extent to which it
can be shown that the composition of each organisation is similar
helps to illustrate the extent of institutional and individual
integration within the partnership.
Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee 
The Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee was set up in December
1986 in an attempt to consolidate the movements towards partnership
which had been developing in the preceding twelve to eighteen months
(see chapter five). Its function was to act as a forum in which
interested parties could formally exchange ideas and information in
a publicly acknowledged arena, and through which the emerging
partnership could be symbolically expressed. As one interviewee
related, jokingly but not unimportantly, about the emergence of
SERC:
You couldn't do everything on a night's drinking with
Richard Field and Norman Adsetts. It became the formal
public expression of the partnership, and indeed all
the early discussions took place in SERC. That's where
some of the moves towards links at officer level [began]
because officers are in on that, came on as well as
politicians. And some of the discussion that had gone
on in private then went on in SERC, and you were able
to get public comment bqck, Party comment, union comment,
private sector comment."
Initially, the committee included those groups which had previously
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articulated their concerns for the economic well-being of the city
in more informal, less public spaces: the City Council; the business
community (Chamber of Commerce and British Steel Industry); the
trade unions; and higher education institutions. Central government
was represented through the regional offices of the Department of
Environment and Department of Trade and Industry, and at 'arms
length' through the Manpower Services Commission and English Estates
(SERC mins, 19.12.86; 23.1.87).
Table (2) lists the particular organisations and individuals that
have sat on the committee and the representative capacity in which
they have appeared. The table reveals the extent to which the
committee is dominated by representatives from the City Council
(councillors and officers) and the local business community (mainly
the Chamber of Commerce). This is perhaps not surprising given that
SERC was a Council inspired initiative, and had as its initial
preoccupation the economic regeneration of the Lower Don Valley.
Similarly with the business community, those participating in SERC
were primarily those who had been involved in earlier less formal
meetings about the state of the city's economy. Trade union
representation on the committee, through the Trades Council, NSF and
Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions, was also based
on accepting the need for a partnership approach in countering the
decline of traditional employment opportunities in the city.
Indeed, the trade unions initial participation in SC was was
certainly supportive of the plan for the regeneration of the Lower
Don Valley:
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TABLE (2) SERC REPRESENTATIVES 1986 — 1991
SCC CoC DOE/ DTI SDC/TEC HE
H. Jackson N.Adsetts J.Ballard H.Sykes1 J.Stoddart
B. Jordan J.Hambidge2 H. Gallagher K.Beaumont3 J.Hobbs
N. Buckley P.Cornick H. Adamson P. Moss J.Padley
S. Jones B.Smith B.Vause S. Khan R.Handscombe
D.Skinner D. Lyon E.Shmule R.Field4
C. Betts B. Stokes K.Lussey J.Power 5
D.Blunkett P. Newman
N. Robinson P.Bolton2
SCC Officers
J.Darwin
D.Sequerra
C.Freeguard6
D.Child
lu	 I4Ps
M.Frizelle7 R.Caborn
K. Long11
B.Flannaryll
SOC/COM CHURCH 	 MISC
P.Bagshaw8 Can. M.West 9 J.Eerbyshirel°
S.Thakur12	P.Wilbourne1-0
13
N. Reynold
COT
S. Charles
R. Thompson
1. Has also represented the CoC; 2. CoC official; 3. Has also
represented the DoE; 4. Has also represented the CoC; 5. Chief
Executive, TEC; 6. Appointed SDC Planning Director, Summer 1988;
7. NSF; 8. VSCF/SCRE; 9. Sheffield Council of Churches; 10. English
Estates; 11. STC; 12. SCRE; 13. Training Agency.
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We needed to be involved in decisions about whether
the old industries were left to decline or whether
they were supported... Part of that meant finding
common ground with others, we had to join in and
build alliances. I don't qink we had any alternative
to working on this stage.
Because SERC was the first formal partnership organisation within
the city, it has acted as a magnet in attracting a wide
constituency. It has been an organisation to which everybody with
an interest in the regeneration of the city either wished to belong
or considered it necessary to belong, in order to be seen to be
contributing to the regeneration debate. However, as the remit and
sphere of operation of SERC has changed over time, new members have
been brought onto the committee, for instance voluntary and
community organisations (SERC mins, 26.11.87; 7.12.87), and
representatives from the local police and health authorities (SERC,
promotional leaflet, undated). Additionally, the need to belong to
the committee has not remained as important for all participants in
the partnership. However, in the first two years of its existence
most 'interested' parties wanted to belong to it, or be recognised
by it. (see chapters eight and nine for a discussion of these
issues). Despite such organisational and individual changes in
membership and participation, the broad membership of SERC has
remained relatively stable. As such, it provides the best location
from which to begin to identify the extent to which particular
individuals and organisations within the city were participating in
other partnership institutions - that is, the extent of personal
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and organisational cross-membership within the networks of
partnership.
Sheffield Partnerships Limited
Sheffield Partnerships Limited, set up in March 1988 to organise the
promotional aspects of the partnership, (see chapter five) has a
membership which acutely reflects its own parentage and the make-up
of the regeneration committee. Table (3) lists the compositional
structure of the board of directors and their institutional
affiliation. The table highlights the extent to which SPL has been
dominated by city councillors and members of the business community
affiliated to the Chamber of Commerce. Councillors such as Helen
Jackson, Bill Jordan and Mike Buckley have all been SPL directors,
but they have also all been prominent members of the regeneration
committee, indeed Helen Jackson was its Chair. Similarly, business
community SPL directors such as Norman Adsetts, Vernon Smith,
Rowland Walker and Peter Newman also participated SERC's
deliberations either as representatives of the Chamber of Commerce
or British Steel (Industry), as in the case of Vernon Smith.
There was then a significant degree of overlap between SERC and SPL
both in terms of institutions and individuals. In part, this is
because the origins of SPL can be traced back to the Chamber of
Commerce's Image Working Party, whose task had been to tackle the
problems of Sheffield's poor image and dearth of private sector
investment.	 Indeed, Norman Adsetts, the Chair of the working
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TARTY: (3) SPL BOARD of DIRECTORS 1988 — 1991
SCC CoC SW INDEPENDENT
H. Jackson N.Adsetts H.Sykes M.Cornerl
J.Jamison J.M.Smithies G.Kendall2 B.Smith3
D.Heslop J.Hambidge4 P.Jagger5
B.Jordan D.Nice V.Smith6
N. Buckley R.Walker
P.Horton P. Newman
1. Editor, The Sheffield Star.
2. SDC Chief Execurtive post Garlick Inquiry.
3. Chief Executive, SENTA.
4. CoC official.
5. Regional TUC official.
6. Chief Executive, British Steel (Industry) Ltd.
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party, who had been instrumental in setting it up, took-up the
position of Chair of the SPL board. However, the overlap was also a
consequence of the formalisation of the Image Working Party within
SERC, and the City Council's own efforts to address the problem of
image. The company was an extension of these activities designed,
as it was, to act as an independent industrial and commercial public
relations agency using public and private expertise to revitalise
the internal and external perceptions of the city.
Initially, the company was composed of a board of seven directors -
three public sector, three private sector and one independent
representative - with funding split equally between the City Council
and the Chamber of Commerce. However, in 1989 the articles of
association of the company were changed to allow for an increase in
the number of directors in order to accommodate the newly installed
Development Corporation. The most significant feature here was that
by changing the rules of what had become Sheffield's most outwardly
visible sign of partnership, SPL was able to incorporate a key
player both individually and institutionally. One consequence of
this was a change in the funding mechanism of the company.
Gradually, the Development Corporation began to finance more and
more of the company's activities, and in so doing it began to
dictate the pattern of promotional work that SPL undertook. (see
chapter nine). Additionally, by accepting Hugh Sykes, the Chair of
the Development Corporation, onto the board (he had also been
admitted into the regeneration committee) further formal connections
were established.
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Hallamshire Investments 
In the case of Hallamshire Investments the inter-connections are
equally visible. The company was formed in August 1988 as a
financial institution designed to encourage and develop local
economic initiative and enterprise (see chapter five).
	 It was
established on a partnership basis under the auspices of public and
private sector individuals in the city.
	
Table (4) lists the
directors of the company and their institutional background.
The striking feature about this table is the number of private
sector individuals on the board. This is perhaps not surprising,
given that the company was a private sector driven initiative
designed to illustrate the business community's specific efforts to
regenerate the city. What also emerges is the extent to which the
particular individuals within the private sector are beginning to
appear repeatedly within partnership organisations. For example,
Norman Adsetts was a director of Hallamshire Investments as well as
the Chair of SPL, and a Chamber of Commerce representative on SERC.
Vernon Smith and Rowland Walker, both directors of Hallamshire
Investments, were also board members of SPL as well as holding
representative positions on the regeneration committee, with Vernon
Smith being its deputy chair.	 Similarly, Hugh Sykes, the
'architect' of Hallamshire Investments, was also a Chamber of
Commerce representative on SERC, and by the time the company became
operational was installed as the Chair of the Development
Corporation - a link which was to prove troublesome and raise
serious questions about conflicts of interest over Sykes' role as
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TABLE (4) HAILAMSHIRE INVESTMENTS LIMITED
SCC	 BUSINESS	 HE
C.Betts	 R.Fieldl	 J.Padley
S.Jones	 H.Sykes2
M.Newman3	N.Adsetts
R.Walker
V. Smith
N.Jeffery
M. Jelly
D.Stone
P.Wright
P.M.Wright
J.F.Hewson
D.S.Cammerman
D.Firth4
G.Shepard5
M.D.Rees
MISCELLANEOUS 
D.Simpson6	J.Hattersley7
1. Also TEC Chair.
2. Also SDC Chair
3. Sheffield City Council Treasurer.
4. Finance Director.
5. Chief Executive.
6. AEU.
7. South Yorkshire Pensions Fund.
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Chair of both organisations (see chapter nine for a detailed
discussion of this).
From the public sector the directors included Clive Betts, leader of
the City Council, Steve Jones 13, chair of the Education Programme
Committee, and Malcolm Newman, City Treasurer. Betts, as leader of
the Council, had been active within debates on SERC and many of the
informal meetings between public and private sector in the early
stages of the partnership. Malcolm Newman had also been
instrumental in setting up Hallamshire Investments, working with
Hugh Sykes and Vernon Smith to undertake the preparatory work
necessary to develop the company. In the event, Hallamshire
Investments was set up under the auspices of a steering group
composed of public and private sector representatives from SERC,
some of which such as Sykes, Smith, Adsetts, Newman and Betts were
to become its directors.
Sheffield Leisure and Recreation Trust 
The membership compositions of Sheffield Leisure and Recreation
Trust (SLRT) and its subsidiary, Uhiversiade GB Ltd also illustrate
the extent to which particular public and private sector individuals
were repeatedly becoming aligned in partnership organisations.
Briefly, SLRT was set up in March 1988 to manage the future use of,
and provide the facilities for, the World Student Games. Its
origins lay in the work of a public-private Games organising
committee which operated between 1986-1988. SLRT had developed as a
consequence of a political necessity to have the City Council more
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MPs
R.Caborn
TABLE (5) SREFFIELD LEISURE & RECREATTION TRUST — GOVERNORS
BUSINESS
	 TRADE UNIONS 
B.Stokes
	
P.Jagger (Regional TUC)
R.Field
B.E.Smith
R.Walker
B. Sykes
TABLE (6) UNIVERSIADE GB LTD — DIRECTORS
SOC	 BUSINESS
C.Betts	 B.Stokes
P.Price	 N.Adsetts
J.Barton	 D.Lyon
Alternate:	 Alternate: 
H.Knight
	 J.Hambidgel
S.Jones	 R.Walker
V.Nicholson
1. CoC official.
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overtly in control of the organisational process (see chapters five
and nine). The Trust was managed by governors from the City
Council, local business community, regional TUC, and a Sheffield
MP.
By comparing Table (5) with the preceding ones the extent to which
we see a repetition of names, particularly from the private sector,
within this partnership body, becomes clear. Governors such as
Richard Field, Hugh Sykes, Rowland Walker, and Bev Stokes had all
held positions within other partnership organisations. Similarly,
SLRT's trades union governor - Paul Jagger, Yorkshire and Humberside
TUC regional officer - held this position, as well as being an
'independent' director of SPL, and was the TUC representative on the
regeneration committee. When we consider SLRT's operating
subsidiary, Universiade (GB) Ltd., familiar names also emerge (Table
6). From the private sector directors included: Norman Adsetts, Bev
Stokes, Rowland Walker and John Hambidge, whilst those from the
public sector included councillors Clive Betts, Steve Jones and
Howard Knight. What is apparent is that in terms of their
membership, both SLRT and Uhiversiade (GB) Ltd. were typical of
other partnership initiatives that began to emerge in the city
between 1986 and 1989.
The Hallam Group 
Another organisation which reflected the general pattern of
membership in Sheffield's partnership bodies was the Hallam Group.
Effectively, this was a regional Business Leadership Team (BLT) for
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the city set-up as part of Business in the Community's national
urban regeneration programme. The group was formed in November 1989
under the direction of Hugh Sykes and Richard Field, with a remit to
'support and co-ordinate' the city's regeneration projects. This it
sought to do by harnessing the 'skills and resources of Sheffield's
key players to tackle the challenges' that faced the city (Sykes,
quoted in the The Sheffield Telegraph, 1.12.89). Primarily, the
Group was a forum for discussing initiatives and projects with which
its members were involved:
You spend two minutes just giving your up-date on what,,
your project is, and at the end you have a discussion.'"
The Hallam Group included not only those businessmen already steeped
in the activites of the partnership such as Norman Adsetts, Richard
Field, Bev Stokes and Hugh Sykes, but also other business figures
such as Eddie Healy (the developer of Meadowhall) and John McGee
(the then Master Cutler) who were not involved in other partnership
initiatives. The Hallam Group also included senior figures from the
University (Chancellor and Vice-Chancellor) and Polytechnic
(Principal), and the chief executive and treasurer of the City
Council.
The Development Corporation and the Training and Enterprise Council 
One interesting feature of the membership compositions of
Sheffield's partnership organisations is that to a large extent the
boards of the Sheffield Development Corporation and the Training and
Enterprise Council were populated by Sheffield based individual and
institutional actors, particularly those already participating in
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TABLE (7) SDC BOARD MEKBERS 1988-1991 
SCC
	
BUSINESS	 HE	 TU	 soc/cam
H. Jackson
D. Skinner
N. Buckley
J.Fiore
D.Heslop
H. Sykes
N.Adsetts
R.Field
C. McNamee
R.Walker
P. Newman
G.Roberts
MISCELLANEOUS
Lord Miley
Lady Parks
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other initiatives. This merging of Sheffield based individuals and
institutions with centrally imposed mechanisms for tackling the
problems of urban regeneration avoided a potential rupturing of the
networks and interconnections which had developed in the city. This
merger can clearly be seen in initial board membership of the
Development Corporation detailed in Table (7). One sees the names
of Hugh Sykes (Chair), Norman Adsetts, Richard Field, Rowland
Walker, Peter Newman alongside those of councillors Helen Jackson of
Hugh Sykes (Chair), Norman Adsetts, Richard Field, Rowland Walker,
Peter Newman alongside those of councillors Helen Jackson and David
Skinner - all heavily involved in other partnership initiatives.
This was the result of an already established pattern of 	 -
private interaction in the city, which was capable of bringing its
influence to bear on the structure of the Development Corporation.
Such channels of interaction existed both at an informal level (see
above) and at a formal level through SERC. Indeed, the regeneration
comittee was the base from which directors of the SDC were drawn.
This was acknowledged within the regional office of the DoE:
SERC provided the nucleus of people for the UDC, SERC
was already there. There were a number of people already
involved in the regeneration process, so it was a natural
place for the Department to look for potential board
members. i5
The constitution of the board of the Training and Enterprise Council
is equally revealing about the extent to which the same individuals
were participating in public-private partnership activities in the
city. Table (8) lists the TEC's board membership and their
organisational affiliation. Again, what stands out is the extent to
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TABLE (8) TEC BOARD of DIRECTORS 1989 — 1991 
SCC	 BUSINESS	 HE
S.Jones	 R.Field	 J.Stodart	 M.Frizelle
B.Jordan	 H.Sykes
	 D.Simpson
D.Lyon
J.Powerl
M.Pupius2
P.Horsepool3
D.Liversage4
J.Morris5
D.Stone6
M.Perkins7
J.Hunt
1. TEC Chief Executive.
2. District Head Postmaster, Royal Mail.
3. Managing Director, Ackroyd and Abbott Plc.
4. Chief Executive, G W Thornton Holdings Plc.
5. Managing Director, Jan Morris and Associates.
6. Managing Director, Stocksbridge Engineering.
7. Investment Director, 31s Plc.
8. Senior Partner, Wake Smith and Co.
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which we see a repetition of names - Richard Field (Chair), Don
Lyon, Hugh Sykes from the private sector, and Steve Jones and Bill
Jordan from the City Council. The trade unions have also
participated in the TEC and have representation on its board of
directors. Again, however, we see that those who represented the
unions were already connected with the partnership, for example NSF
union official Mike Ftizelle was a representative on SERC, whilst
Derek Simpson of the AEU, was also a director of Hallamshire
Investments. Similarly, other TEC board directors were also
involved in other partnership activities - John Stoddart, Principal
of Sheffield City Polytechnic, was a member of SERC and David Stone,
Managing Director of Stocksbridge Engineering Steels, was a director
of Hallamshire Investments.
Within SERC there was discussion over the extent to which the TEC
could be established on a partnership basis, and whether the City
Council's initial hostility to increased private sector involvement
in training would jeopodise the TEC being integrated into the
partnership (see chapter five). In the event, the TEC was
established within the general framework of the partnership
(although more heavily weighted in favour of the private sector as a
consequence of central government dictate), and illustrates again
the extent to which existing partnership mechanisms were used to
incorporate these centrally imposed institutions within existing
structures. This is not to imply that the TEC, or indeed the SDC,
were introduced into the city without problems. Indeed, accounts
given elsewhere in this thesis have suggested otherwise. However,
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what should be stressed is the extent to which locally inspired
partnership arrangements which had been established, or were in the
process of being established, between 1986 and 1988, provided a
mechanism for accommodating what were, to the partnership,
potentially disruptive organisations.
CONCLUSION
The preceding analysis has outlined the structure of partnership in
Sheffield, and has illustrated the nature of representation on the
institutions of the partnership. Within the city there is a
partnership network populated by local individuals and organisations
built on specific institutions within which local organisations and
individuals meet repeatedly to discuss the regeneration of the city.
Tables (9 ) and (10) are an amalgam of the previous tables and
illustrate the extent of inter-linkage between institutions, by
listing those individuals who are connected to two or more of the
partnership organisations discussed above (Table 9), and the degree
of representation of locally based organisations in seven
institutions of partnership. They demonstrate that the points of
formal inter-connection within the partnership are multiplicitous,
channelled by, and through, the partnership nexus.
The City Council and the private sector (largely represented through
the Chamber of Commerce), are the predominant institutions with
representation in the network of partnership organisations. In
terms of councillors we see the names of Betts, Skinner, Jackson,
Jones, Buckley and Jordan. From the private sector we see the
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TABLE (9) INDIVIDUAL REPRESENTATION ON SEVEN PARTNERSHIP
ORGANISATIONS 
SERC SDC TEC SPL HI SLRT UNGB
SCC
Betts	 +	 +	 +
Buckley	 +	 +	 +
Jackson	 +	 +	 +
Jones	 +	 +	 +
Jordan	 +	 +	 +
Skinner	 +	 +
BUSINESS 
Adsetts	 +	 +	 +	 +	 +
Field	 +	 +	 +	 +	 +
HaMbidge +	 +
Lyon	 +	 +	 +
Newman	 +	 +	 +
Stokes
	
+	 +	 +
Stone
	
+	 +
Sykes	 +	 +	 +	 +	 +	 +
Welker	 +	 +	 +	 +	 +
HE
Padley
	
+	 +
Stoddart +	 +
TU
Jagger
	
+	 +	 +
Frizzell +	 +
Simpson
	
+	 +
NPs
Caborn
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TABLE (10)	 INSTITUTIONAL ITHIUMWEATION ON SEVEN PARTNERSHIP
ORGANISATIONS
SDC HI SLRT	 UNGBSERC SPL TEC
SCC + + + +1 +1 x +
CoC + + + +1 +1 + +
DOE/DTI + x x x x x x
SDC + + - - x x x
TEC + x - - x x x
TU + + + x + + x
HE + x + + + x x
CHURCH + x x x x x x
NT's + x x x x + x
soc/cam	 +	 x	 x	 x	 x	 x	 x
Key: + Has representation.
x No representation.
1. Representatives are there as individuals and not as
representatives of their parent organisations.
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repeated presence of people such as Norman Adsetts, Richard Field,
Bev Stokes, Hugh Sykes, Vernon Smith, Don Lyon, Rowland Walker and
Peter Newman. Similarly, the same representatives from the trade
unions (both local and regionally based officials) and higher
education institutions in the city are scattered throughout the
institutions of the partnership, with representation on at least two
of the institutions considered. What is also clear is that the
representation of cammunity and voluntary groups within the
partnership has been less encompassing. Indeed, although community
and voluntary groups have been accorded representation in the
partnership, their participation and linkage with other participants
is formalised largely through their incorporation into SERC, the
umbrella organisation of the partnership (see chapter eight).
Clearly, evidence of representation or participation within
partnership institutions has to be treated with some caution. It
enables us to identify who participates, and it allows us to
suggest that there are individuals in the city who appear repeatedly
throughout public-private deliberations. However, some individuals
have been important to the development and maintenance of the
partnership but do not appear repeatedly within its insitutions.
This is particuarly the case with senior Council officers such as
Dan Sequerra (director DEED), John Darwin (assistant
director/director DEED), Dave Child (officer DEED/SERC), Ran
Barrowclough (central policy unit), and Rod Jones (director
Department of Land and Planning. Moreover, stating who participates
tells us little about the extent to which those participants have
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been able to shape the regeneration agenda. Although membership of
organisations and the existence of institutional linkages are
important in furthering our understanding of local public-private
co-operation in Sheffield, it is within a framework of the politics
of the partnership, that we begin to understand the dynamics of
public-private interaction and the nature of local economic
regeneration policy which that interaction entails.
NOTES
1. Interview with local authority officer, Int. 5 CD 12990.
2. Interview with local businessman, Int. 7 CD 81090.
3.
4. Interview with local businessman, Int. 6 CD 21090.
5.
6. Interview with Labour city councillor, Int. 15 CD 1691.
7.
8. Interview with local businessman, Int. 7 CD 81090.
9. Interview with trade union official, Int. 27 CD 261092.
10. Interview with local businessman, Int. 1 CD 27690.
11. Interview with Labour city councillor, Int. 15 CD 1691.
12. Interview with trade union official, Int. 27 CD 261092.
13. Although a director of Hallamshire Investments, Councillor
Jones was never an 'active member' of the company. Letter to
author, 7th October 1992.
14. Interview with local businessman, Int. 6 CD 21090.
15. Interview with regional representative of the DoE, Int. 28 CD
261092.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
TOWARDS PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP AS A POLICY APPROACH: 
ECOMMIC REGENERATION POLICY IN SHEFFIELD SINCE 1985 
INTRODUCTION
Throughout the 1980s a combination of de-industrialisation and
successive urban policy initiatives facilitated the development of
public-private co-operation in economic development. Similarly,
restrictions on the financial base of local government and a reduced
local autonomy have helped reshape the urban policy environment.
Falling resources, capital controls, and local government
legislation have made local authorities more receptive to
collaborative working arrangements in the reconstruction of their
economies. Urban policy has consistently sought to increase
business involvement in the regeneration process and 'lever' in more
private sector investment (see chapter three). Unequivocally, the
national political response to the deindustrialisation of Britain's
manufacturing cities is the context in which local developments have
occurred. Local authorities in the inner cities and urban areas
have had to operate within a policy environment that has drawn them
into establishing more formal links with private sector
organisations. Sheffield, like many other industrial cities in the
mid-1980s sought to combat its economic problems through the
creation of political mechanisms designed to draw on the resources
of the private as well as the public sector.
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By the mid-1980s, Sheffield's radical economic policies had
apparently given way to a different form of economic policy - that
of partnership. A number of commentators (Cochrane, 1988a & b;
Fazey, 1989; Lawless, 1990; Lawless and Ramsden, 1990; Seyd, 1990)
have noted this apparent about-face in political direction
characterising the change in terms of 'radical intervention to
partnership' or 'radicalism to entrepreneurialism (Lawless, 1990;
Seyd, 1990). The general tenor of these commentaries is that in the
middle of the 1980s Sheffield's recent economic past was transformed
into a less radical, more traditional form of economic policy in
which co-operation between the public and the private sector in
regenerating the local economy was emphasised as much as the unitary
role of the public sector had been earlier in the decade. Bowevem,
conceptualising the Changes in Sheffield over the 1980s in terms of
'radical intervention to partnership' or 'radicalism to
entrepreneurialism' paints only part of the picture. Such accounts
(Fogarty and Christie, 1990; Lawless, 1990; Lawless & Ramsden,1990;
Seyd 1990), whilst acknowledging change, produce analyses that miss
the degree to which the realignment of economic policy was part of a
wider process of political and economic restructuring within the
local state - the transformation of a system of local government to
that of local governance involving a range of public and private
sector actors working in co-operation.
This chapter analyses the emergence of partnership as a policy
approach towards economic regeneration. By focussing on the nature
of economic policy in Sheffield since the mid-1980s, it examines the
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relationship of Sheffield's Labour Council to measures for policy
co-operation with the city's business community. The chapter
analyses the evolution of a partnership approach to policies for
economic regeneration within the City Council and Sheffield's
business community. It also considers how we may conceptualise
economic policy in this period. For instance, can we characterise
it in terms of a change from 'radical intervention' to
entrepreneurialism', or is there a greater degree of continuity
with the approach to economic policy pursued in the early 1980s than
such short-hand analytic phrases suggest?
LOCAL AUTHORITY ECONOMIC POLICY SINCE 1985: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY
Changes in political leadership are often seen as key mechanisms for
altering political ideologies. The emergence of a new leader for
Sheffield City Council's ruling Labour Group is one such event
identified as having been an important contributory element in the
development of more conciliatory relations between the City Council
and the local business community (Lawless, 1990). David Blunkett,
leader of the Council between 1980-1987, and the main exponent of
Sheffield's form of 'local socialism' and radical economic policies,
was elected to Parliament in May 1987. He was replaced as leader of
the Council by Clive Betts. Some commentators have seen this in
hindsight as a significant change, arguing that Betts 'proved to be
a pragmatic leader...of an authority that increasingly adopted
collaborative relationships with business' (Lawless, 1990;143).
Certainly, the media image of Clive Betts is one of a more
conciliatory and less conflictual leader than David Blunkett, and it
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is the case that under his leadership the Council has moved nearer
the private sector than was the case with the Blunkett
administration. If the change meant anything, it was that in the
view of the private sector, Betts was not so closely associated as
Blunkett with the public rows between City Council and business
community, and the antagonism between the Council and central
government over the issue of rate-capping.
However, it would be wrong to assume that a leadership change was a
prerequisite for a change in approach to economic policy. Indeed,
the move towards partnership as economic policy did not suddenly
begin with the arrival of a new leader in the Town Ball.
Conversely, the initial moves towards a reoriented economic policy
began under David Blunkett's leadership. For example, the most
significant institutional manifestation of this reorientation, the
Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee (SERC) was set up in
December 1986. The establishment of this committee reflected the
belief, particularly within the political leadership in the Labour
Group, that an institutional capacity had to be generated in order
to continue the fledgeling and informal partnership initiatives
which had been developing both inside and outside of the Council in
the city throughout 1986 (see Chapter five).
Just as the realignment of economic policy began under the Blunkett
administration, some of the key political positions within the
council were still occupied by the same people under both Blunkett's
and Betts's administrations.
	 Helen Jackson, who became chair of
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the Employment Programme Committee in 1983 (at the height of
Sheffield's economic radicalism), was still chair of that committee
until her resignation from the Council in 1991. Similarly, David
Skinner held the position of Chair of the Planning and
Transportation Programme Committee throughout most of the decade.
Both Jackson and Skinner occupied a position on the left of the
Party and were influential members of the ruling Labour Group. As
with the argument about the significance of the move from Blunkett
to Betts, it is difficult to countenance a change in personalities
in key political positions as a significant precursor to economic
partnership - mainly because there was so little change in the
personnel who occupied those positions. Change in the political
leadership had little effect on these key committee positions, ana
to view the movement towards partnership as simply the product of
different leaders' attitudes misrepresents the unfolding of that
process:
I think David [Blunketti has felt that Clive
[Betts] got a lot of the credit for things
that had been started under him. Or, that there
was this new realism and it was different under
Blunkett. I mean, it was not true at all. The
rate capping issue apart, there was no difference.
It was an evolution thr9ugh the circumstances,
not through the people.'
If change in political personalities is not as significant as some
commentators have suggested, how important was a change in one of
the key management positions within the Council - the appointment of
a new Director of the Employment Department? Lawless (1990)
comments: 'Other key changes in personnel occurred. The first head
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of the Employment Department left and was replaced by a less
ideological figure' (p.143). This statement is left standing
without any further explanation, getting us no nearer an evaluation
of the significance of the change. The implication is that this
'less ideological figure' ushered in a new approach to economic
policy, characterised by conciliation rather than conflict with the
private sector, because of his political outlook.
Unquestionably, John Bennington, the Department's first Director (or
co-ordinator) was overtly sceptical of the role that the private
sector had to play in regenerating the local economy and providing
employment opportunities. Bennington effectively built the
Department from scratch, setting the work programme and co-
ordinating its various initiatives. Steeped in the experiences of
the Community Development Projects, and the insights offered by the
theoretical framework of of the local state literature of the mid to
late 1970s, under his tutelage the Department became the bastion of
the City Council's radical policies. However, his successor, Dan
Sequerra, if not as theoretically motivated, was no less a figure of
the left. Prior to his appointment as Director of the Employment
Department in 1985, Sequerra had been Chair of the District Labour
Party, and deputy Chair between 1979-1983, as well as being on the
executive of the Sheffield Trades Council and a trades union
negotiator. His appointment was as equally controversial as
Bennington's and it was the subject of much debate in the local
press and criticism by local Conservative and Liberal-Democrat
opposition parties.
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It is difficult to square the move towards partnership in economic
policy with this change in personalities. However, the change was
important, not because Sequerra was less ideological or left-wing
than Bennington, but because it reflected a wider change that had
been taking place in the local authority's economic policy - that
the reliance on the public sector as an employment generator was
becoming increasingly more difficult to achieve. Recognition that
the Council's earlier strategy of promoting and defending public
sector employment was becoming ever less feasible was described as
follows:
The strategy of keeping up jobs and keeping
spending up, the Jobs Audit which was produced
inside the Employment Department was the key
theoretical lynch-pin...but having said all that
it was quite clear that in the middle 'Ws the
jobs situation in terms of new jobs being
created...the reality was that the private sector
was the vehicle for new jobs, and clearly at the
same time there was a need to do something about
replaciqg the enterprise that had gone down the
drain.
What Sequerra's appointment represents is not the introduction of
some less ideological figure, but the personification of a
repositioning of economic policy - the movement away from employment
related projects towards a strategic approach to economic
development. Within the political leadership of the Labour Group it
was recognised that there had to be a strategic approach to economic
development if jobs were to return. Safe-guarding employment on an
ad hoc project by project basis was not a realistic option, given
increased reductions in local government finance and the political
need to respond to the demands of the larger service departments
within the local authority.
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Similarly, the continued collapse of the economy made the re-
evaluation of the economic strategy a necessity, particularly the
notion that regeneration could be achieved by the public sector
alone. There was a realisation, both within the political
leadership and at senior officer level in the Department of
Employment, that the private sector would have to play a more
central role in the creation of employment and the regeneration of
the economic base of the city. It was also accepted that the scale
and structure of the steel and engineering industry of the 1970s
could never be recreated (SCC, 1986):
From the mid-1970s, when the losses in steel and
engineering started in any significant way, there
was a belief, probably in the private sector as
well as in the wider community, that eventually
they'd all come back. Only as firms shut down
and sold machinery off, then demolished factories,
did the realisation come that it wasn't going to
come back, and that something new had to be done
and created. That required some general commitment.
It wasn't going to happen by the Council saying
we're going to have this industry or that industry
in the city. It wasn't going to happen by the private
sector saying we welcome this firm or that firm. There
had to be some combination along with support from the
University, Polytechnic, and Trade Unions to achieve
it...something new needed to happen and if we didn't
have	 ting new happening then decline might become
permanent.
Unequivocally, one of the reasons why the political leadership in
Sheffield moved towards partnership was in order to put itself in a
position where its plans for economic development projects were
viewed neutrally (or at least considered) by central government. By
the middle of the 1980s, Sheffield City Council found itself in a
position where it was unable to get additional grants from central
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government because of the highly politicised nature of its recent
past. Any scheme or project put forward by the Council to a
government department found itself suffering from a 'Sheffield over-
lay':
I can remember the Science Park sat on Baker's
desk for three months. No problems from the
civil service, they agreed it was a perfectly
good project, but because it wa Sheffield, at
the time they wouldn't back it."'
The move towards partnership was not seen as putting a break on the
stance adopted in the first half of the decade. Rather, it was
viewed as an attempt to create a framework where opposition, both
internally and externally, could be muted and where the City
Council's economic and social policies could find expression in a
politically hostile climate. Indeed, the ruling Labour Group was
faced with a third term of Conservative Government, whose intentions
to further orientate itself towards the private sector and weaken
the role of local authorities were far from equivocal. This was a
real concern for the leading councillors within the Labour Group and
was a significant factor in the move to more conciliatory relations
between the Council and the business community. As one senior
counicllor of the time suggested:
It was about changing times more than anything
else. I think it was the '87 election, when we
realised that we were going to lose again. We
said, well we're not going to have any money, we
can't sit here and do nothing. So, we talked the
issues over and grapally made relationships with
the private sector.J
Similarly, another senior councillor commented:
It's been vey much 'no private sector involvement,
no cash'. It's been that pressure which has pushed
US in the partnership direction...That is fairly
pragmatic, it's a Tory government. They will listen
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a bit more to the Chamber of Commerce saying something
than they will to Sheffield City Council.'
The emergence of a political strategy that involved developing links
with the private sector was not without its critics. Criticism was
voiced within the Group at large and within the District Party. One
ex-councillor who stood outside of the leadership circle commented
on partnership in the following way:
Some people thought by gaining a closer relationship
with business, finding areas in economic policy you
could agree upon, and then from that position seek to
influence them on issues like equal opportunities,
trades union recognition, all the issues that are close
to the heart of most Labour councillors. But the price
was being less critical of the business c9mmunity. We
tried to compromise rather than confront.
The majority of this criticism was directed at the leadership of the
Group, and was couched in terms which stressed the leaderships's
ability to pressure the rump of the Group to accept the neccessity
of closer working arrangements between the Council and the private
sector:
The leadership gets away with a lot, because other
groups depend on them. Individual councillors disagree
with what's been happening, but they reach a point
where to speak out or to push against the decisions
compromises their own positions. So, they then get
into a calculation like, do you stay on the inside
and live to fight another day, or do you go down on
this issue and that's oyou out? Certainly, partnership
has brought that out.'
Even amongst those closest to the leader of the Group there was some
concern over the stance being taken towards economic policy.
However, the ability of Clive Betts to persuade those doubters
closest to him that this was the most politically realistic approach
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was a critical factor in facilitating the adoption of the
partnership strategy. As one Programme Committee chair commented:
I was as suspicious as anybody. I'd worked with Geoff
Green and John Bennington...we were very much commited
to the '83 manifesto. I was always sceptical of the
changes in many ways. I would give credit to Clive, I
needed Clive's clear sighted commitment to it...He was
able to say 'yes OK we're going to do this. There are
dangers and we've got to explain the dangers to the
Group and the Party, but we've got to do this'. Given
that we were going down that road I tried to say, OK
we're in partnership, this is the name of the game,
we've still got some of our manifesto aims at the back
of u§, but we're trying to achieve them in a different
way.'
The thrust of the argument begining to emerge was that the
interventionist policies of the early 1980s were no longer
appropriate for the political and economic circumstances of the mid-
1980s. However, by reorienting economic policy towards partnership
with the private sector the local authority could retain the
initiative in development matters, and pursue a strategy that
incorporated both economic growth and a social dimension (Jackson,
1988a). In essence, the Labour administration was entering into a
political settlement with the private sector in the city. Their part
in the settlement was to agree to enter into more harmonious
relations with the business community and engage them in some of the
discussions about the wider economic issues facing the city. The
price they wanted the private sector to pay for better relations was
to absorb some of the economic and social commitments that they
wished to realise, as well as generating increased levels of
investment. The task for the local authority was to maintain an
interest in employment and local economic development by pursuing
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policies that took account of equal opportunites, employment
training and quality, and which would retain some sembalance of
policies and projects developed in the earlier part of the decade
(Jackson, 1988a;3). Thus, reference to a more interventionist past
was used to legitimise the development of policies for a less
interventionist future. Indeed, speeches by Clive Betts at both the
Industrial Society Conference in Liverpool in March 1988, and at the
Cutlers' Feast in the same year, made explicit, at least at the
level of rhetoric, the City Council's commitment to the continuation
of an employment strategy that focused on equal opportunites and
training. As a leading local councillor of the time recollected:
Clive's first speech at the Cutlers' dinner was
superb...It made an incredible impact...he said
we know we've got things to learn from the private
sector, but we've got things we can contribute, and
challenge them on equal opportunities, on racq A on
women and so on. It created a heck of a stir.'"
By 1988, the partnership strategy had been fleshed out. The
leadership of the Labour Group was arguing that views of partnership
as either a 'sell-out' or a complete panacea to the city's economic
problems were equally mis-guided (Betts and Jackson, 1988).
Instead, it offered an explanation which bisected such oppositional
analyses. Its claim rested on conclusions drawn from two years of
partnership working in the city. Firstly, they suggested that
working in partnership had raised the level of debate on the
potential consequences of regeneration. Secondly, that experience
had shown that it was necessary for the Council to have a bottom
line on every issue considered within the partnership that had been
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discussed and agreed with trade unions, community and ethnic
organisations. Thirdly, that only by becoming more closely involved
with all sections of the local community was it possible to
negotiate with central government on important issues. Fourthly,
that as regeneration proposals became implemented projects, it was
necessary to maintain communication with sections of the community
other than business. Finally, it was asserted that a partnership
approach to economic regeneration required the gathering of
economic and social intelligence which could be used to revise
projects and polices and spawn new development and initiatives
(Betts and Jackson, 1988).
This analysis clearly relates the rise of partnership to the thrust
of central government's urban policy, stessing the weakened position
of the local authority in a hostile political environment. More
significantly, however, the analysis alludes to shifts in the
operation of politics and democratic representation at the local
level; particularly, the emergence of a politics of partnership that
focuses not on the question of who makes decisions, but on those
about what sort of decisions should be made, and how they are to be
formulated and implemented. The reorientation of economic policy in
the mid-1980s was a consequence of the emergence of these issues
within the sphere of local economic development. In the earlier
part of the decade, the response to these challenges to local
government took an ideological form which championed the public over
the private in economic development. By the middle of the 1980s the
response had shifted to take account of an approach tO local
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economic development in which local authorities were no longer seen
as the 'natural agencies' for formulating and implementing policy.
Thus interpreted, the realignment of economic policy was about the
local authority developing a strategy capable of operating within a
local political economy where local government was becoming local
governance, and democratic representation was ceding legitimacy to
functional representation in local economic policy-making.
Towards 'Strategy' in Economic Policy
The shift in economic policy can be seen in the change of emphasis
of the Department of EMployment. In the early 1980s much of its
work had been devoted to the defence of local authority employment,
and the development and resourcing of a number of small project-
based initiatives. A significant amount of this work was concerned
with the provision of employment opportunities which would not have
occurred if left to the private sector. Indeed, much of the
Department's research and analysis work was an attempt to minimise
the effects of industrial restructuring and employment loss in the
local community - the Department's work on the steel industry was in
this mould (SCC, 1984).
However, by the mid-1980s much of this rearguard action was being
remodelled into a more strategic approach which sought to generate
employment growth, not by defending public sector services or by
funding socially useful but marginal employment creating projects,
but by using the Department's resources to develop a small number of
key Council-led initiatives to act as catalysts for employment
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creation and the diversification of the local economy. Initiatives
such as the Science Park, the Audio Visual Enterprise Centre (AVEC),
the Technology Park, and the Cultural Industries Quarter were used
to highlight the type of developments that the council wanted to see
in the city. These were not socialist 'parables' or 'paradigms' for
an alternative society, rather they were practical development
initiatives (albeit public sector led), more attuned to private
capital and the market economy than were their predecessors.
Scientific, technological, and cultural industries became the focus
of the Department's project work from the mid-1980s and it sought to
use such initiatives to 'lever-in' finance from both the public
(central government) and private sectors.
Within the Department it was clearly understood that the only way to
make progress in developing public sector projects was to lever in
private sector finance, because public sector funds were simply not
available in the amounts required to make such initiatives work.
This was the legitimation for undertaking municipal enterprise
within the framework of public-private partnership. The task within
the Department (now renamed the Department of Employment and
Economic Development - DEED - reflecting the change in emphasis of
the Department's work) was to combine all the different strands of
work that had been initiated in the earlier period into a single
approach.
The key initiative which sought to link together the strands of the
Department's work into a strategic overview was the creation of an
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economic development strategy for the city - the Sheffield Economic
Regeneration Strategy (SERS). This initiative encapsulates the
attempt to intermesh the Department's work into an overall vision
for the city, and the extent to which the Council moved towards
trying to influence the type and form of regeneration which
developed, through partnership mechanisms. The Council's objectives
within this strategy were: to regenerate the city's economy and
ensure that the Council played a key role; to influence the type of
regeneration, and create a balanced and diversified economy; to
maximise the benefits of regeneration for the whole colmin.ity (in
terms of training, employment and social benefits); and to take
account of the Council's public sector developments and municipal
enterprise, and ensure that it became a major provider and enabler
in the locality (SCC/DEED, The Economic Strategy, p.4/5, undated).
The SERS was an integration of a number of DEED's programmes and
projects which it had developed since its inception with some new
approaches. Essentially, these were economic regeneration including
the development of land and buildings; business and technology
development; economic promotion and infrastructural improvement;
employment and social benefits including training; project
developments and research; and public sector development including
improvements in service delivery and competitiveness in public
sector enterprises. The SERB acted as a wider framework in which to
develop specific City Council initiatives on the back of
partnership. Initiatives such as the Science Park, the Technology
Park and the Cultural Industries Quarter were all components of the
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SERS, and all were developed on a partnership basis, utilising funds
form both public and private sector sources.
The development of the Cultural Industries Quarter offers a good
example of the reorientation in economic policy. The concept of a
new industrial sector in the city developed from work within the
Employment Department's public sector team in the early 1980s on the
potential for a municipally owned recording studio. Initially, the
idea was to construct a fully municipalised training centre with
some £1,000,000 of public sector investment. Premises were
acquired, and a plan was put together. However, when the scheme was
put to the Council during 1984-85 both the limitations on the
Council's ability to raise the finance, and members' reservations
about the economic and employment potential of the project, limited
funding to 00,000. The question then was, what was DEED to do with
the resources which had been made available?
We had the conclusion that we had a building
and 00,000 - what were we going to do? was
there a way of maintaining the elements of
this project, the things that need to be done?
And then the answer was yes, we can do one bit
of this from a municipal base and seek to use
our powers as landlords, as movers of resources,
as grant alders, to try and shift the rest of
the project by moving other people's money. So
we built the Red Tape studios, two studios well
provisioned. But for training purposes we went to
look for people either in the private sector or
in the voluntary sector who fitted the theme of
it. That was important, we had a strategy, a vision
of what we wanted to do in there. The vision tWre
was cultural industries, audio visual, cinema."
Through a combination of voluntary help, Arts council grants, urban
programme funding of some £400,000 (much of the area is within an
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Industrial/Commercial Improvement Area), finance from the British
Film Institute and Channel Four, the Audio Visual Enterprise Centre
(AVEC) was established. In total over £2,500,000 was invested in
this project, the majority of which was private sector generated.
By the end of the 1980s this complex contained recording and film
studios, graphic design companies, and a photographic gallery. The
intention was to build on this capacity and develop it further into
a fully fledged Cultural Industries Quarter, again using public-
private co-operation, with public funds as the leverage tool for
private sector investment. Clearly, the example of the development
of AVEC and the Cultural Industries Quarter illustrates how the
Council, on the back of partnership initiatives in economic policy,
sought to develop a new form of economic activity in the city.
A similar argument can be made about the City Council's plans for
the regeneration of the Lower Don Valley. In the early 1980s, the
Council's approach to the regeneration of the LDV were couched in
terms which stressed the primary role of the local authority in
effecting regeneration (SCC, An Employment and Environment Plan for
the Lower Don Valley, 1984). However, from the mid-1980s
regeneration in the form of direct intervention was replaced by an
approach which stressed inter-agency and the levering in of private
sector investment (SCC, 1986; 1987; SERC, 1987). The beginnings of
this change can be seen in a report presented to the City Council's
Lower Don Valley Panel in 1985 by the then city treasurer, Grenville
Folwell (SCC, 1985). Reviewing the employment and environmental
plan for the Lower Don Valley, the report commented that, despite a
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political commitment to the plan, there was a clear lack of
resources within the Council to secure the implementation of a
number of its initiatives. Without additional funding, the report
predicted a plan that would leave a legacy of half finished projects
and failed strategies. Moreover, the report called for a rethink of
the Council's political priorities for the development of the
Valley, specifically the need to recognise that additional sources
of finance would have to be found not only from central government,
but from the private sector. At member level, the report was met
with a degree of resignation, being described publicly by the Chair
of the Planning Committee as 'a mid-course correction' (Sheffield
Telegraph, 24.5.85). Members stressed that the difficulty had been
to enable Council departments to co-ordinate their work, and to
ensure that the respective Council committees budgeted adequately
for the work commitments of their departments. However,
irrespective of this internal focus, the realisation that public
sector finances alone would be insufficient to effect change in the
LDV was not lost on the Labour leadership. Despite commitments to
public sector intervention and regeneration, a new strategy was
devised, based on market initiatives and public-private sector
partnership.
The creation of an authority officer working group to investigate
the potential for the regeneration of the LDV in July 1986, marked
the most explicit reorientation of policy. Under the leadership of
John Darwin, then assistant director of DEED, the brief of the
working group was to analyse the economic potential for the
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development of the Valley, assess sources of financial availability
and the possible mechanisms for the implementation of any
regeneration programme. The final report of this group argued for a
flexible land-use pattern, and the need for a 'land bank' to cater
for potential industrial growth and changing land-use patterns (SCC,
1986). Within the regional office of the DoE, the Lower Don
Strategy was viewed in the following way:
Sheffield City Council were [sic] concerned with the needs
of the area, and ensuring that whatever resources where
made available could be harnessed and channelled into
that particular area. We were arguing at that time, in
terms of Urban Programme, that in order to make the case,
they had to have an overall strategy...The City Council's
aim was to identify the problem, quantify the r.qource
requirements, and make the case for assistance."
The importance of the LDV study does not lie in its acceptance of
land use in the LDV for other than industrial development, indeed
land use other than for industrial activity had been envisaged in a
number of earlier plans and policy initiatives (SCC, 1979;1984).
Neither does it lie in the policies, or the strategy itself, which
was simply an amalgam of a number of past programmes and projects.
Rather, its importance lies in the extent to which explicit
reference was made to the need for actively incorporating
organisations other than the local authority in the revitalisation
of the Valley. The thrust of the argument was that any attempt to
regenerate Sheffield's economy would falter unless it was
constructed within an inter-agency and collaborative framework. As
an initial step to such action the study formally identified the
potential partners necessary for the development of a regeneration
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strategy. These included public and private sector bodies, trade
unions, education and research institutions, and the voluntary and
community sectors. In effect, the working group study laid down the
framework of what was to become the formal institutional expression
of public-private co-operation in the city - the Sheffield Economic
Regeneration Committee, and built on earlier ad hoc and informal
articulations of partnership (see chapter five).
The initial preoccupation of the regeneration committee was the
regeneration of the LDV, and one of its first actions was the
commissioning of a study into the organisation and implementation
options for regeneration initiatives within the Valley (SERC, 1987).
SERC's report argued that the regeneration of the LDV should be
focused around a number of 'flagship projects' under the guidance of
a non-statutory delivery mechanism, the Urban Regeneration Project.
Within the agency, planning powers and controls would remain with
the local authority, but it would have a board membership taken
directly from the constituent members of the existing partnership
arrangements in the city. The report was commissioned as an
independent (non-City Council) assessment of the need for economic
regeneration in LDV. For the Council, the exercise was an attempt
to legitimise their own Lower Don Strategy by repackaging it in a
form which stressed the importance of working in partnership.
However, the Lower Don Strategy and SERC's independent report, both
aimed at making the case for additional sources of public funding
(primarily through Urban Programme), became part of the process
leading to the establishment of a UDC for the Valley.
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Arguably, the introduction of a Development Corporation into the LDV
represented a defeat for the Council's partnership policy for the
Valley's regeneration. Paradoxically however, the partnership
approach to economic policy in the LDV, which SERC's report
symbolised, was not lost completely with the introduction of the
Development Corporation (see chapter five). Despite public
criticism of the UDC by the ruling Labour Group, the existence of
channels of public-private co-operation that had begun to emerge in
the preceeding two years, facilitated the development of
negotiations between leading councillors, the DoE, the chair
designate of the UDC and various private sector individuals, about
the structure and operation of the Corporation. As a result, a
'partnership' agreement was signed between the Council and the SDC,
and the Council were able to nominate three representatives for the
Corporation's board of directors (see chapters five and six). The
agreement was essentially a framework for co-operation between the
two organisations:
The purpose of the agreement was to provide a frame-
work in which bot4 sides were required to take each
other seriously."
The agreement was a reflection of the institutionalisation of the
partnership channels that had already been developed in the city.
For the City Council the agreement offered the potential of drawing
in the SDC and its financial muscle into the wider partnership
framework set by themselves. Such linkages have produced a
relatively stable, if not always conflict free, relationship between
the two organisations. Much of the history of the relation 's between
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the City Council and Development Corporation since 1988 has been
about the struggles around linking the SDC's vision for the LDV into
a city wide strategic framework for regeneration. Indeed, although
there have been no major disagreements which have resulted in the
City Council withdrawing its co-operation and membership from the
SDC board, there have been areas of distinct disagreement between
them.
Perhaps the most significant in the period with which this research
is concerned, has been over the Development Corporation's planning
framework (SDC, 1989a). The planning framework outlined a strategy
to 'secure the regeneration of the LDV by providing a high quality
environment to attract high quality development served by a new
landscaped dual carriageway, a new city airport and a proposed
Supertram network' (SDC, 1989a;16). The strategy sought to provide
a new pattern of land-use where the 'needs of industry' were to be
'balanced against new commercial leisure, and tourism
developments...' (SDC, 1989a;19). Fundamentally, the strategy was
aimed at the service sector.
City Council criticisms of the strategy revolved around the
reduction of land for manufacturing activity (100 acres); increases
in the land for office development (which the SCC saw as prejudicing
their policy of attracting office development to the city centre);
the introduction of more retailing in the Valley; the 'unnecessary'
spine road through the Valley; and the Council claim that there was
little strategic need for housing in the Valley (Joint Report of ihe
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Director of Land and Planning and Director of DEED to PTPC 14.12.89
and EPC 18.12.89; Sheffield Star 16.12.89). As one critic of the SDC
commented '...as their policies are spelt out in practice, they are
seen more clearly to diverge from the economic strategy endorsed by
the City Council, SERC and Council policy generally' .14 Criticisms
also emerged from the local business community in the Valley over
the CPO programme required for the construction of the link road,
and from the trade unions on the level of retail and leisure
development outlined in the Corporation's planning framework.
Within the local authority disappointment with the planning
framework was such that officers within DEED and the Department of
Land and Planning were requested to produce an 'alternative
strategy'. However, following intensive debate between the SDC and
City Council a rapprochement was reached:
We acknowledge there may be potential disagreements
so we feel it better to thrash things out now in a
1Dspirit of co-operation.
There were three steps to this co-operation: firstly, City Council
and SDC officers were to work together on industrial land supply in
the Valley: secondly, both sets of officers would reflect on the
models of regeneration seen on a City Council and Development
Corporation study trip to West Germany, and consider how they might
apply to Sheffield; and thirdly, city councillors would define
social objectives that the SDC should take into consideration,
whilst the SDC would impress on the Council the needs of private
business (The Sheffield Star, 22.12.89). Following this activity
and discussions between the SDC, city Council, and local Valley
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business and community interests, changes were made to the planning
framework. In the final planning framework (SDC, 1991)
modifications had been made taking into account concerns over the
amount of land allocated to industry and the effects of the spine
road on local industry. Pressure form the City Council and local
Valley interests undoubtedly changed the appearance of the planning
framework, but change was also a consequence of a squeeze on SDC
finance owing to a lack of early progress on land sales, and the
rising costs of land reclamation and the original road building
scheme.
Clearly, despite areas of disagreement between the SDC and City
Council, negotiation, debate and agreements have taken place over
the future shape of the Valley. Many of the Corporation's
development proposals, particularly in its first two years of
operation, were simply repackaged City Council schemes. This has
resulted in some recrimination over who gets the credit for
regeneration, but largely antagonisms have tended to focus on each
organisation's differing time horizons and areas of responsibility,
rather than the type of development that the Corporation has
proposed. In general, the Development Corporation has adopted a
shot term strategy based on its own area of concern, whilst the City
Council has stressed a long run city—wide approach that incorporated
the development of the Valley into a cohesive plan for regeneration
(Kirkham, 1990; para.53).
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What has rankled most with the Council has been the political issue
of accountability and their loss of planning powers in the Valley.
For a local authority such as Sheffield, committed to public
accountability and control over local planning powers, the themes of
local accountability and the SDC's methods of operation have always
been the main source of political conflict. 16 Despite what were
considered to be 'quite friendly' working relationships with the
Council and 'useful' financial aid in promoting the city which added
'urgency and endorsement' to existing Council plans for the
Valley', the Council has not hesitated to hail the Development
Corporation as a 'vehicle through which an alarmingly increasing
number of key decisions for the spending of public money in the city
are being taken by the same few unaccountable businessmen'.17
However, it has continued to co-operate with the Development
Corporation because it realised that it was a body through which
government funds could be channelled to developments which could 'be
of benefit to the city ,.18
Change and Continuity? 
Thus far we have analysed the relationship of Sheffield's Labour
Council to the emergent partnership by focussing on the Council's
Changing approach to local economic policy from the mid-1980s. It
was suggested that the wider context for the emergence of
partnership was one structured by central government's urban policy
initiatives and the de-industrialisation of Britiain's inner cities.
In relation to Sheffield, it has been argued that the leadership of
the Labour Group justified closer working relationships with the
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business community on four main grounds. Firstly, to improve
relations with central governemnt in order to be more positively
treated in terms of receiving grants and funding; secondly, to mute
internal and external opposition to its projects for regeneration;
thirdly, to draw on the resources of the private sector in
developing regeneration projects; and fourthly, to retain some
involvement in the local economy, if in a less interventionist form
than was attempted in the early 1980s.
Explaining the economic policy of the mid to late 1980s and early
1990s in the terms described above illustrates the degree to which
continuity as well as change can be seen in Sheffield's economic
policy over the decade. Previous accounts of Sheffield's economic
approach in the late 1980s have tended to highlight the extent of
change, rather than tease out any sense in which a continuity might
exist between the two periods. Clearly, economic policy from the
mid-1980s was not public sector intervention in the local economy in
the sense that it was envisaged between 1981 and 1983. However, it
did represent a move to a more indirect form of intervention which
sought to retain a foot-hold on local management of the economy. In
a changed political and economic environment the reality was that
the methods developed in the early part of the decade were no longer
appropriate for saving and creating jobs and generating economic
growth. As one leading councillor of the time suggested:
To be doing the same thing in the wrong environment
is just crass. So that' part of it, part of the change.19
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THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY AND LOCAL ECONOMIC POLICY IN SHEFFIELD
The move towards partnership in Sheffield was not solely the
outcome of a repositioning of the City Council's economic policy.
It was also a consequence of specific actions within the business
community in the city. Indeed, Sheffield's business community was
as actively engaged in creating the new dialogue of partnership as
was the City Council. Clearly, the private sector is not a
homogenous block of companies or idustries, and does not necessarily
speak with one voice and articulate a unified approach to the issue
of economic regeneration. However, it is possible to isolate a
number of general elements to explain the participation of
Sheffield's business community in the arena of economic regeneration
policy. These include: the general thrust of urban policy and
business-led initiatives; the decline of the city's economy; the
desire to rebuild civic pride; and the emergence of the Chamber of
Commerce as a focal point for business activity in the partnership.
It is important to bear in mind that in practice these factors were
all interlinked. Moreover, that they acted in a contemporaneous way
and not in isolation.
A Climate for Corporate Participation
Throughout the 1980s local authorities had to contend with
restrictions placed on the utilisation of their economic development
powers by a national urban policy which consistently sought to
embrace the private sector and provide them with a managerial role
in the solution of urban problems (see chapter three). The
'incentification' (Hesletine, 1982) of the business community was
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perhaps most explicitly acknowledged in the Conservative
Government's re-launch of urban policy under the Action For Cities 
campaign where private sector involvement in urban regeneration was
given added impetus (HMSO, 1988). Under this approach the inner
cities were to be made places where 'businessmen want to invest'
(sic) (HMSO, 1988;3). The whole thrust of the Action For Cities 
campaign, heavily influenced by the experiences of business in urban
regeneration in American cities, was towards making the private
sector the dominant partner in any partnership arrangements.
Coupled with this thrust of urban policy is the development of
specific business-led initiatives. Some of these initiatives such
as Business in the Community, Business in the Cities and the
Phoenix Initiative have sought to promote general business
involvement in urban regeneration. Others, for example British
Urban Developments, the Per Cent Clubs, and the Foundation for
Education Business Partnerships have targeted specific activities or
developments within the inner cities and urban areas. Despite the
plethora of business-led initiatives and projects a common theme
exists - the promotion of corporate involvement and leadership in
public-private partnerships for urban economic regeneration (Jacobs,
1990).
At the national level the Confederation of British Industry (CBI)
also outlined its vision for the regeneration of cities. The CBI's
report Initiatives Beyond Charity (CBI, 1988), took a significant
step towards defining the role and position of businesses in local
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regeneration strategies. The report represents the first
publication of of the CBI's Task Force on Business and Urban
Regeneration set up in 1987. Its task was to 'identify what further
steps business should be taking to assist in the process of urban
regeneration' (CBI, 1988;7). This report asserted in a forthright
manner the key role of business in regenerating the local economy.
Four main conclusions were reached on the role of business in
regenerating Britain's cities. First, leadership and a common
vision were needed to break out of the cycle of economic and social
decline. This was to be achieved through the creation of local
teams under the direction of senior local business leaders.
Confidence and morale had to be raised both inside and outside of
the city, and this was seen as a crucial factor in encouraging
inward investment, stimulating development and restoring the pride
of the local community.
Secondly, the report argued that the solution to the consequences of
urban decline lay beyond charity. In other words, the resources
directed towards solving problems should originate from investment
decisions of companies 'taken on the basis of the commercial returns
available, not from a sense of charity' (CBI, 1988;9). The
implication was that companies should become involved in
regeneration initiatives through something approaching enlightened
self-interest. The third conclusion was that because Britain's
cities appeared to share common problems, programmes could be
developed which followed a similar process and could be applied to
most situations. This process was to be constructed around the
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development of 'flagship' projects, and creation of a 'critical
mass' or self-sustaining momentum for projects, all of which should
be integrated into an overall strategy for regeneration. Finally,
the report concluded that the business community should commit
itself to providing corporate leadership in programmes for urban
regeneration.
The Association of British Chambers of Commerce (ABCC) has similarly
offered its thoughts on the proper role of business in urban
regeneration initiaitves. In, A Tale of Four Cities (ABCC, 1989),
the regeneration experiences of the Chambers of Commerce in
Birmingham, Nottingham, Manchester and Sheffield were outlined,
along with a prescription for best local practice based on the
positive aspects of these four examples. The general thrust of the
document is towards highlighting the importance of local business
organisations in promoting and participating in regeneration
projects. However, it is worth repeating a number of specific
points because they represent both a localist business orientation
to regeneration, and because they have a resonance with the
experience of business involvement in Sheffield.
The first point to note is that the document states that the impetus
and responsibility for urban regenation initiaitves should come from
a local base, and that the 'parachuting' in of outside initiatives
is inappropriate. Secondly, it argues that national bodies such as
the ABCC, should adopt a facilitating and an enabling role for their
local counterparts. Moreover, they should provide 'a forum for
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discussion and the exchange of experiences' and where possible link
projects to 'potential sources of finance'. Thirdly, the report
stresses that local managers of national or multi-national
enterprises 'should be given responsibility for business involvement
in projects to develop their local communities'. Fourthly, it
emphasises the need to work in partnership with local authorities
and the counter-productive nature of central governemnt policy
intiaitves that have sought to exclude local governemnt form the
regeneration process. Fifth and finally, the document urges that
urban regenation and investment should be seen in terms which
incorporate employment training, promoting enterprise and generating
cive pride, as well as focusing on property development and physical
regeneration (ABCC, 1989;28-29).
Both the CBI and ABCC reports offer illuminating insights into the
perceived role of business in the formulation and implementation of
urban economic and social regeneration policy. The import of much
of it is the assertion that business is the agency with the capacity
and ability to solve and tackle urban problems in a systematic and
professional way. In this sense, public-private partnerships are
seen as vehicles for regeneration that should be 'closely integrated
with the business community's efforts' in tackling the problems of
urban decline (CBI, 1988;10/11).
Business Community Initiatives: A Local Articulation? 
Unequivocally, the general thrust of urban policy and the emergence
of a philosophy of corporate involvement in the regeneration of
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Britain's cities have been contributory factors to the growth of
business input into economic development initiatives in Sheffield.
It is difficult to trace the full extent to -which such general
policy approaches and cultural changes have permeated through into
the corporate 'mind sets' of Sheffield's business community.
However, it is difficult to imagine that these forces had no impact
on business activity in the city. Indeed, an organisation such as
the Hallam Group, set up by BiC under the local direction of Hugh
Sykes, provides evidence of the link between philosophies to
encourage corporate involvement and responsibility and increased
business activity in the city's regeneration initiatives. The
Hallam Group, has been involved with local ventures such as
Hallamshire Investments, Sheffield Enterprise Agency (SENTA), and
the development of the Training and Enterprise Council. Similarly,
the Sheffield Per Cent Club (also initiated by Hugh Sykes) relates
to national initiatives engendered by organisations such as BiC.
The Per Cent Club's aims are linked to the notion of corporate
community responsibility by demonstrating that 'companies are
involved in the community' by promoting the 'culture of giving among
Sheffield firms' (Fogarty and Christie, 1990;94).
What is more interesting however, is that these examples of links
between national corporate initiatives and local enterprise are the
exception rather than the rule. In Sheffield, a philosophy of
corporate participation in local regeneration initiatives has been
internally, rather than externally, generated. Much of the city's
private sector input into establishing co-operative working between
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the business community and the Council has come through the Chamber
of Commerce. The Chamber, Sheffield's primary organisation
representing the private sector in the city, has been actively
engaged in almost all of the partnership initiatives that have
developed since the mid-1980s. For example, it was instrumental in
establishing an early forum for partnership, the Image Working
Party, was an original member of SERC, had directors on the board of
Universiade (GB) Ltd., has equal representation on the board of
Sheffield Partnerships Limited, and has representatives on the
boards of the Sheffield Development Corporation and Hallamshire
Investments.
Such visible participation and involvement in local regeneration
initiatives stands in marked contrast to the civically aloof
approach adopted by the Chamber in the early 1980s. As one business
figure noted:
There was a time [the early 1980s] when it was seen
that business was not thought of as any use at all.
Therefore, what we did was concentrate on running
z0our own businesses and that was that.
Another Chamber member commented:
In the early '80s, everytime you went to a Chamber of
Commerce meeting, all you heard was people going on
about left-wing politicsand flying the red flag over
the Town Hall."
We need then, to consider why and how such an isolationist and anti-
local authority stance was supplanted by an approach which sought
active engagement with the City Council over the issue of economic
regeneration.
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The economic imperative was important in bringing about changed
relations between the Chamber and City Council. The dramatic and
continued decline of Sheffield's economy during the early to mid -
1980s was a significant factor behind the Chamber's decision to
construct a more open and participatory dialogue with the City
Council. Within the Chamber, at its most senior level, it was
acknowledged that the collapse of manufacturing industry and the
deterioration in the physical environment of the city did not augur
well for future developments, investment and the profitability of
Sheffield's companies (ABCC, 1989). 22 When the evidence of decline
was coupled with the much publicised antagonism between the Council
and the private sector over its causes and its remedies, the fear
was that a barrier was being erected that was preventing investment
in the city:
It became clear that the squabbles within Sheffield
between various parties were actually being translated
outside the city and was doing the city harm, because
all it [sic]cwas doing was reinforcing a media view about
the Socialist Republic of South Yorkshire. And that wasn't
the right sort of environment to attract the inward
investment which in the early 1980s we desperately
needed...and people are not going to put money into an
area which they perceive as being risky. Therefore...
having our debates in public and megaphone diplomNy...
was not really going to help the position at all."
An example that illustrates how the Chamber's leaders saw the
partnership formula as a mechanism for generating investment in the
economy (in this instance from central government), is the Lower Don
Valley. This was an area plagued by dereliction and aborted
attempts at regeneration. The following quote highlights the extent
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to which the Chamber's leaders saw the potential for a partnership
based on the issue of the regeneration of the Lower Don Valley:
Somebody gave the hint, probably from the DoE, that
Sheffield and the Don Valley was a probable subject
for regeneration and government funding, provided the
case was made properly...There was no way that the
government could pick up the strategy laid down by
the left-wing Council and use that as the model for
making the case for helping Sheffield. So there began
to be a realisation that a partnership approach was
needed...That if the private sector and the public
sector could agree on the way ahead for the Don Valley
...and put forward a commonly agreed strategy then at
least that would be the )),asis on which the government
could take it seriously.'
The establishment of an organisation such as SERC with its focus on
the regeneration of the Lower Don Valley bears witness to the fact
that both private and public sectors in the city saw potential
benefits from collaboration. It was in both parties' interests to
be seen to be working together to regenerate the city's industrial
heartland in order to attract government finance (see chapters five
and above). This, then, was the view beginning to emerge within the
Chamber of Commerce by the middle of the 1980s. Emphasising the
counter-productive nature of its anti-Council and isolationist
stance, the Chamber's new approach was to seek an accommodation with
the City Council over the issue of Sheffield's economic
regeneration.
A precondition for the successful articulation of this new
accommodation was the creation of a unified and consistent Chamber
policy stressing the need for public-private partnership. However,
although one talks of the Chamber's movement towards more
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conciliatory relations with the City Council in generic terms, in
essence the force behind the move was a small number of individual
Chamber members and officials. Businessmen such as Bev Stokes
(chairman and chief executive of Bassetts Plc), Richard Field
(chairman of J & J Dysons Plc, a Sheffield based refractories
company), and Norman Adsetts (chairman of Sheffield Insulations),
together with John Hambidge, the chief executive of the Chamber,
were the vanguard of the private sector in terms of acknowledging
the need for more conciliatory relations with the City Council over
the issue of economic regeneration. The following quote is typical
of their approach:
In the early '80s, the local authority was the only
body in Sheffield that was making investment in the
future. The private sector wasn't doing it...they
weren't taking that broader view. They were taking
views about their own companies, but not about
Sheffield Ltd. as it were. In that respect, we felt
that we shouldn't shut off potentially the only organ
that had kept funding coming into Sheffield. I don't
think they [City Council] should be doing it all. It's
a matter of finding a mechanism...which enables public
and private sector to sidown together and say what is
going to be best for us. 4J
For a policy of active participation in regeneration initiatives to
become accepted in the Chamber it was necessary for it to be
consistently and continuously articulated at its most senior
levels. To develop such consistency and continuity the Chamber's
system of Presidential succession became the focus of attention.
This system, with its three year cycle of a member becoming Junior
Vice-President, Senior Vice-President and then President, followed
by two years on the management committee of the Chamber, offered a
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valuable base from which to launch and develop notions of corporate
involvement in initiatives to regenerate the city. As one Chamber
member involved in the initiation of this process commented:
It was 1984 when I became Junior Vice-President. We'd
got to a stage where a number of us said look, what
we really need is some continuity in this organisation...
a continuity in thought and deed so that we stick to
what we're doing for a while. Because whilst it may all
be very well for one person to sit there for a year and
say this is the policy of the Chamber, it's no good if
a year later someone else turns that over. So...we sat
down and did some manpower lolanning, and we saiAvell
ask a little bit further ahead. llot only Nell:1\4e as...yo\N
to be President of the Chamber of Commerce, we'll say
these are the views we think we should be getting across,
this is the role we think the Chamber should play, and
we've got to use the talents in the busilpess community
to help run the city, to have an input."'
Through this process, by mid-1986, Stokes, Field and Adsetts had
moved into senior positions within the Chamber - Stokes was
President, Field was senior Vice-President, and Adsetts was junior
Vice-President (Mins, CoC AGM, 21.4.86). These three businessmen
were to occupy succesively, the position of Chamber President
throughout the first three years of the partnership. Similarly
'like-minded' individuals who were to become Presidents of the
Chamber included Peter Cornick, President 1989/90 (managing director
TECHNOR, an information technology consultancy firm); B.E Smith,
President 1990/91 (Parnell, Kerr, Forster); and Don Lyon, President
1991/92 (managing director, H.Turner and Sons). Thus, from the mid-
1980s 'manpower planning' (a euphemism for identifying like-minded
people), encouraged by the cycle of Presidential succession,
provided a mechanism for developing a continuity of policy that
stressed the merits of working in partnership.
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The partnership approach which these individuals sought to project
was not without its critics, both within the Chamber and business
community at large. Same within the Chamber could not move away
from a perspective, clouded by the arguments of the early 1980s,
which viewed the Council as dominated by left-wingers, spending
large amounts of money financed through the rates. As one Chamber
member involved in the move towards partnership commented:
We were accused of being fellow travellers. We
said what alternative is t4ere? We felt that what
was happening was absurd.'
Similarly, another Chamber official suggested:
It was an interesting decision to take because
people were saying to the Chamber leadership what
on Earth are you doing campaigning on issues jointly
with a Labour controlled local authority as left-wing
as it was perceived to be in those days. 2iO4
The task for this group was to persuade doubters of the sense of
their approach. In so doing, they sought to raise the level of
awareness of corporate responsibility in the city, particularly
through business participation in initiatives designed to regenerate
the local economy such as SERC, Ballamshire Investments and SPL. To
achieve this there was a constant reiteration of the necessity for
working in partnership, and that by working in this way the Chamber
was contributing to the economic well-being of the city. This well-
being was viewed as a straightforward appeal to local business
profitability by emphasising that partnership would bring greater
investment into the city, but was also visualised in less specific
terms that stressed the wider economic benefits of partnersip
through a more productive and profitable community and labour force:
With business people you've got to somehow or other
set it into a context that makes sense to them. We
257
were past the point where you say if you do this you
will get profit. You have to say some kind of planning
is important. You have to get them to realise that they
get a bette nbottom line if the community as a whole
is healthy.'
From their positions within the Chamber of Commerce, Bev Stokes,
Richard Field and Norman Adsetts were able to orchestrate the
campaign to raise the public profile of the Chamber, and move it
away from its blanket anti-City Council stance. The articulation of
policy was channelled through initiatives such as the organisation
of business leadership seminars and the creation of the Chamber's
Image Working Party. Certainly, the improvement of the image of the
city was all important for the Chamber's leaders, and was seen as
the fundamental problem to be overcome if Sheffield's economy was to
be regenerated. That tackling 'image' was the number one priority
for the business community was never seriously questioned: 'there
was no serious debate...that doing something about the image of the
city was extremely important'. 30
 This was the starting point for
the Chamber's public expression of its new approach designed to
help reconstruct the profile of the city, improve Sheffield's
prospects for inward investment, and draw in local business
community participation in regeneration initiatives (see chapters
five and eight):
What I think we did...was to engender a spirit of
responsibility beyond ones awn office or factory
walls. There are many organisations in Sheffield
doing things in the community at large which ten
years ago they wouldn't have been involved in.
I think we've managed to engender the spirit of
Sheffield, and we need the right sort of image for
our city if we are going to see its economy pick-
3i
up •
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The Chamber of Commerce was not the only source of business
involvement in the private sector's 'move towards partnership. One
source of non-Chamber private sector input has come from British
Steel (Industry). Their involvment in the local regeneration
process is perhaps not surprising given that a significant purpose
of the organisation has been to aid the economic and industrial
regeneration of areas that have suffered from steel industry
closures. The inclusion, from 1986, of a senior representative of
the company in many of the city's partnership initiatives has served
as a symbolic reminder of Sheffield's industrial heritage. The
representative, Vernon Smith (formally the Yorkshire and Humberside
regional manager of British Steel (Industry), and from 1989 its
chief executive), was an active participant in SERC (he was its
first deputy chair), eventually became a director of SPL, and with
Hugh Sykes, was involved in the creation of Hallamshire
Investsments:
The timing of our decision to establish a regional
office in Sheffield was perfect, because at that
particular point in time, the City Council and the
private sector, had decided that now was the time to
start to do things together...We were known to be
people who wanted to help them, to make a contribution,
and we were iigNited to join pretty well everything that
was going on."
Apart from British Steel, the majority of private sector input into
partnership has come from individuals and businesses not involved in
the traditional steel and engineering activities of the city. This
reflects wider structural changes within Sheffield's economy with a
movement away from heavy industry to lighter manufacturing and
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service based occupations. In 1989, almost three quarters of
employment in the city was in the service industries, although the
remaining quarter of employment in manufacturing industry is a
figure second only to Birmingham among English cities (Watts, et al,
1989). However, it is noticable that despite the shift to the
service industries there are few private sector representatives
located in the service sector working in the partnership. Again,
this reflects the composition of the city's private sector. Apart
from the Midland bank, which is the largest private sector employer
in the city, Sheffield has few large service sector companies.
Despite the addition of Norwich Union to the city in 1989, in
comparision with other northern cities Sheffield has a small
commercial and service base.
None of the Presidents of the Chamber in the period under
consideration are associated with steel or heavy engineering -
Stokes' company manufactures sweets, Field's produces furnace
linings, Adsetts' makes insulating materials, Cornick is involved in
information technology, Smith is an accountant, whilst Lyon's
company is involved in the retail and distribution trade.
Similarly, chairman of the Development Corporation, Hugh Sykes, has
a background in accountancy rather than steel or engineering. He
founded Thermal Scientific Plc and Technical Component Industries
Plc and was deputy chairman of Harris Queensway Plc. In sum, these
businessmen form a new cadre of business leadership - one that
reflects the changing nature and composition of private sector
activity in the city.
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As has been identified, the main thrust of establishing these
business figures in the regeneration process has predominantly
occured through local business organisation and initiatives.
National business inputs did emerge but, in general, they have been
subordinate to home grown private sector projects. In part, the
relative absence of national initiatives can be explained by a tinge
of local chauvinism within Sheffield's business community, with its
'Sheffield knows best' philosophy. This attitude is prevalent
within the business community and has fuelled both the rise of
locally inspired initiatives, and a fair degree of scepticism of
non-local business projects. It is an attitude rooted in the
successess of the city's industrial past, a past that produced a
wealthy, self-confident and self-reliant business community. As one
Chamber member commented:
When the cutlery industry was booming, the steel
industry was booming...if the rest of the world
didn't agree with us, we could cope - they needed
us more than we needed them. There is still a
belief in Sheffield, that if we've got the answer
right then the rest of the world ought to admit it,
that it's not really our job ,to go and tell them,
they should be coming to us.''
This attitude has certainly underpinned a general wariness towards
outsiders whose approach, characterised as a troubleshooting 'we
want to do our awn thing in your city', was considered insensitive
to local mechanisms for co-operative working. As one leading
business figure commented:
There's so many things happening. It's far better
for someone to go to SERC and say what do you think
about this...then it's adopt by the city and
people know what's going on.
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Fogarty and Christie's (1990) account of business activity in the
city suggests that BiC was not well regarded by the local business
community, with many taking the view that it had been 'ineffectual
in its interventions in Sheffield' (p.103). Certainly, this
captures the atmosphere of general business antipathy towards BiC's
initiatives as revealed by research interviews with members of
Sheffield's business community. However, the point Fogarty and
Christie miss is that the effectiveness of any BiC initiative was
dependent upon the degree to which it was capable of being
integrated into the 'mainstream' regeneration activity of the city's
private sector - that is, could operate within a framework of
business participation set by the Chamber of Commerce. Two factors
played a part in determining the degree of integration between
national initiatives and local projects: the first was the
particular local organisation that articulated the national
initiative; whilst the second, was the business person who 'headed'
it up.
In Sheffield, local business articulation of national corporate
programmes has been primarily undertaken through the Cutlers'
Company, not the Chamber of Commerce. This is particularly the case
with initiatives inspired by Business in the Community. However, a
problem with this route into the city was that it by-passed the main
private sector organisation in Sheffield. By 1988, the Chamber of
Commerce had become the city's leading business organisation, and
was the motive force driving the business community further into
partnership with the local authority. In contrast, the Cutlers'
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Company was seen as little more than a 'gentleman's club', insular
and not working actively as an organisation to encourage
partnership. It was not that the Cutlers' Company stood against
closer public-private co-operation, but that it was not part of the
emerging regeneration network. 35
 However, this begs the question
of why the key private sector organisation in the city, the Chamber
of Commerce, was not the conduit for BiC's programmes? The answer
lies in the fact that the invitation to become involved in the city
in 1988, was extended to BiC by the then Master Cutler, Rowland
Walker. Walker had strong links with BiC through his personal
involvement with the Prince's Youth Trust and other charitable
activities, and it is not surprising that in his year of office as
Master Cutler he introduced BiC into Sheffield via the Cutlers'
Company.
There was, though, a degree of private sector scepticism over the
ability of BiC to network effectively with business leaders
operating from within the Chamber of Commerce:
The Master Cutler set up a team of people to work
with BiC...They were very nice around the table...
but they were doing something over there, whilst
mainstream activity was somewhere different. BiC
would come up here, all the big people were here, but
there was no business support for them at all, because
it wasn't mainstream. Now had they gone to the Chamber
of Commerce and said now what should we4o?, that
would have been a much better approach.'
The integration of BiC initiatives into the partnership proved
problematic because they did not filter into Sheffield through the
main private sector organisation, and into the established networks
and institutions of partnership. In general, initiatives ipspired
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by BiC did not touch the heart of business participation in
partnership, and consequently they met with varying degrees of
business enthusiasm. Projects such as the Sheffield Enterprise
Agency (SENTA) and the Sheffield and District Afro-Caribbean
Community Association (SADACCA), suffered from a lack of local
business support. In contrast, initiatives such as the Hallam Group
and Hallamshire Investments (which was only marginally aided by BiC)
and the Sheffield Per Cent Club, were actively encouraged within the
city's business community.
What determined the favouring of one initiative over another was the
extent to which it was directed by business people already immersed
in the culture and networks of Sheffield's partnership. The most
prominent ventures in which BiC had some involvement (the Hallam
Group, Hallamshire Investments and the Sheffield Per Cent Club),
were those headed by Hugh Sykes. Sykes, because of his position as
chair of the Sheffield Development Corporation, and because he was
locked into existing partnership arrangements through his personal
and organisational representation on a number of partnership bodies
and boards (see chapter six), could garner support from the city's
private and public sectors for these initiatives. As one leading
business figure revealed:
...it was only 	 BiC began to get in with people
in the mainstream, and do mainstream projects, that
something happened. The ones BiC were given were
SENTA, SADACCA, and Hallamshire Investments. The
only one where they got any support in Sheffield
was Hallamshire Investments. lrcause that was the
one that Hugh Sykes took on.'
Sykes was also instrumentral in bringing in BiC support to the
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development of the partnership's long-term stratgey for city wide
regeneration - Sheffield 2000. The antecedents of this strategy lie
within past local authority plans produced in the Department of
Employment and Economic Development (see chapter eight for a more
detailed account of the origins and development of Sheffield 2000).
However, they also relate to private sector concerns with the nature
of the local economy, and how to tackle the city's economic and
industrial decline. Sykes' interest in the concept of a city-wide
regeneration plan was initiated by the evidence of the partnership
developed in Lowell, Massachusetts, which he had visited on a BiC
fact finding mission. The choice of Lowell was an important one -
it had successfully used its public-private partnership to exploit
state and federal grants to revive its textile-based economy and
regenerate its run down areas. On his return, Sykes was encouraged
by BiC to replicate the Lowell model in Sheffield (Wade, 1990;98).38
For Sykes, the Lowell partnership was a potent symbol of what could
be achieved by the business community working with the public
sector.
CONCLUSION: WORKING IN PARTNERSHIP
This chapter has analysed the relationship of Sheffield's Labour
Council to the emergence of partnership by focussing on the
Council's changing approach to economic policy from the middle of
the 1980s. Closer co-operation with the business community was
justified on the grounds that it would improve their image with
central government, draw in private sector support for their
regeneration projects, and allow for continued involvement in the
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local economy in a climate of central government hostility to local
authorities. Explaining the economic policy of the mid to late
1980s and early 1990s in these terms draws out the sense of
continuity, as well as change, in Sheffield City Council's approach
to economic policy over the decade. Clearly, economic policy from
the mid-1980s was not public sector intervention in the local
economy in the form that it took in the earlier part of the decade.
In changed political and economic circumstances the reality was that
the mechanisms adopted in the first half of the decade were no
longer appropriate for attempting to generate economic growth and
employment. What the move to partnership represented was a change
to an indirect form of intervention that sought to secure local
authority participation and influence over the direction, structure,
and management of the local economy.
Within the private sector in Sheffield, the move towards partnership
reflected the general thrust of urban policy over the 1980s, and was
consistent with the encouragement of corporate involvement in urban
affairs by national business organisations such as Business in the
Community. National business-led initiatives did emerge, however
their local manifestation was not expressed through the Chamber of
Commerce (the main voice of the private sector in She ffield), and
thus did not feed into the established structures of partnership in
the city. The most successful BiC initiatives have been those
headed by individuals well placed in the network of partnership
institutions. Predominantly, the more significant advances towards
a greater degree of private sector participation came not from
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national business programmes, but from Sheffield based private
sector individuals, primarily from businessmen within the Chamber
of Commerce. For the business community, partnership offered a
mechanism to improve the image of the city and facilitate inward
investment, and to occupy a position from which they could 'have a
say' about the strategic economic decisions affecting the city. In
the process, it provided the opportunity for establishing a wider
involvement in broad scale local economic decision-making than
individual businesses could achieve on their own.
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CRAFTER EIGHT
POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN SHEFFIELD'S PARTNERSHIP
FOR ECONOMIC REGENERATION
INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter considered the emergence of partnership as a
policy approach towards local economic policy, by focussing on the
evolution of measures for policy co-operation in the City Council
and the local business community. This chapter moves on to analyse
policy development in two areas of the partnership's work - image
and promotion; and the attempt to integrate economic and social
policy into a regeneration package for the city. The analysis of
image policy suggests that this area bas proved accessible to
consensus generation because of a mutual recognition that there . was
a need to project a new image for the city. The result has been the
development of a policy that has used the discourse of partnership
to challenge the view of Sheffield as a city of political division
and economic decline. The analysis of SERC's attempt to produce an
integrated package for economic and social regeneration takes the
issue of consensus construction a step further. The regeneration
committee's initial activity involved developing a programme for
the regeneration of the Lower Don Valley (see chapters five and
seven). On this issue, as with that of image, there was little
difficulty in establishing a consensus amongst SERC's participants
because the economic regeneration of Sheffield's industrial
heartland was something that was acceptable to all. However, the
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attempt to introduce a less specifically economic development agenda
into the remit of the committte proved more problematic to consensus
generation. For instance, the implementation of a city-wide
employment policy was to prove troublesome, whilst the mechanism for
enabling social regeneration to take place has been a contentious
issue amongst SERC's participants. The chapter argues that to
overcome such problems compromise strategies have been produced,
which are as much about conflict resolution as they are about
regenerating the local economy.
IMAGE AS REGENERATION POLICY: CHALLENGING DIVISION AND DECLINE
A few well chosen words will not reverse Sheffield's
industrial decline. It must be emphasised that an image
is the focus for what must be a well-engineered, well-
researched and heavily resourced programme which through
a process of creating awareness and demystifing fallacies
will put Sheffield firmly on the map. (SCC/DEED, 1987c).
An immutable feature of Sheffield's partnership for economic
regeneration has been a fundamental concern with the image of the
city. There has been almost unanimous agreement that any attempt to
regenerate the city's economy would in part depend on the successful
development of a promotional campaign that projected an image of the
city in accordance with the 'new mood' of co-operation between its
public and private sectors. Within the business community the
necessity of establishing a powerful and positive image for the
city, as a prerequisite for regeneration, was reflected in the
creation of the Image Working Party within the Chamber of Commerce.
The task this group set for itself was to determine the best way to
attract inward investment into Sheffield, or, to sell the city to
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the private sector. It concluded that only by creating a positive
self image would capital flow into the city, and, in consequence,
there was a need to form an agenda for the reconstruction of
Sheffield's civic pride (see chapter five).
Within the local authority, there was also recognition that the city
needed a new, more positive image if regeneration was to occur. The
promotions working party, set up with officers from DEED and the
Department of Land and Panning, is representative of the degree to
which image was becoming a more salient issue for the City Council.
Moreover, the establishment of the Sheffield Development Office as a
'one stop shop' for potential developers and investors was an
integral part of the City Council's strategy for regeneration (see
chapter five). Within SERC too, the development of a positive image
and promotion of the city, and particularly the Lower Don valley,
were primary objectives (SERC Mins, 19.12.86). The Coopers and
Lybrand report an the regeneration of the valley stressed how such
regeneration might be achieved through image enhancing initiatives
such as flagship projects, city ambassadors and project champions 
(SERC, 1987).
Throughout 1986 and 1987 these developments provided the impetus for
producing a new image for the city. Local politicians, local
authority officers and members of the business community recognised
the salience of image and promotion as a critical factor in the
regeneration of Sheffield's economy.
	
Discussions between
councillors, business people and the local media, particularly in
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the Image Working Party, helped reinforce the notion that any
promotional campaign would be unsuccessful unless it was based on
firm commitments from within the city to reconstruct the perceptions
of the local community. With this accepted a joint promotional
campaign was set in train, one designed to change both the internal 
and external image of the city. This point is clearly articulated
in the following quote from a DEED paper on a putative promotional
campaign:
Both the City Council and the Chamber of Commerce
have come to the conclusion that one of the ways of
achieving the economic regeneration of the city will
be through the fostering of confidence and pride by
local businesses in their city...any external campaign
of promotion will lose its momentum unless there is
commitment to the city by its own community...it is
the logical starting point for a longer term promotional
campaign run jointly by the business community and local
authority. (SCC/DEED, Report on Promotional Campaign,
1987c).
Since the mid-1980s then, there has been a continuous attempt to
produce an image for the city concomitant with the existence and
operation of partnership. Indeed, the establishment of Sheffield
Partnerships limited, in March 1988, as the promotional vehicle for
the partnership represents the search for a clear conduit for the
dissemination of positive images of the city (see chapter five).
Primarily, the production of image has sought to eradicate the pre-
partnership characterisation of Sheffield as a city in economic
decline and rife with political division. The image projected has
been one of unity, solidarity and cooperation. The simple message
this image was designed to convey was the synonymity of Sheffield
with optimism, confidence, co-operation, and economic diversity -
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all characteristics to be associated with the new approach to
regenerating the city's economy.
To fully understand the significance of this process we need to make
a distinction within its mode of operation. Fundamentally, this
involves recognising two distinct, but related aspects of image
production - the need to alter perceptions within Sheffield, and the
development of a corporate image for the city. Superficially, this
division follows a chronological divide in Sheffield's promotional
campaign (see chapter five), however, the distinction is more than
one based on the temporal sequence of events. Rather, it is rooted
in a analytic distinction between strategies designed to
naturalise' the emergence of a new political alliance in the city
and those designed to aid the projection of that alliance into other
places (cf. Harvey, 1989;155). Both can be illustrated with
reference to the challenge offered by the agencies of partnership to
the popular perception of Sheffield as a city politically divided,
and their methods for internally undertaking this challenge and
externally promoting a new image. This attempt to change local
perception has occurred through specific promotional exercises and
through the reiteration of the notion of partnership by its major
players.
Keeping the Spirit Alive 
The 'Sheffield - Partnership in Action' campaign was the beginning
of the first phase of the partnership's image promotion exercise.
Launched in September 1987, its aim was to bring an awareness of the
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spirit of partnership to the business community and the local
populace, informing them of what the partnership intended to do. It
sought to do this in a number of ways: encouraging public-private
commitment to economic development; fostering an entrepreneurial
climate in the city; and by portraying Sheffield as a centre of
excellence and as an attractive place in which to live and invest
(SCC/DEED, 1987). The whole weight of the local media was brought
to bear on the preparation of the launch of the campaign at The Star
Business-Industry Exhibition. Adverts were placed in the press,
prominent politicians and local business people appeared on the
radio, and a 'good news' sheet (later to become Success in
Sheffield) was published to supply positive news and images about
the city.
A key mechanism for naturalising the partnership and its associated
image has been, paradoxically, a constant referral back to days of
political division in the city. Sweeping the political antagonism
of the early 1980s under the carpet has not been attempted. Rather,
there has been a more subtle process at work involving the re-
interpretation of division which stresses the extent to which the
business community and local authority have converged. By referring
to the political gap between the City Council and the business
community in the early 1980s its erosion from the middle of the
decade appears all the more significant and impressive. The
partners have played up to the division in order to stress their new
found unity.
	 This itself helped in fostering the notion of
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partnership, unity and co-operation both inside and outside of the
city.
On another level, this referral to past division is a consequence of
the very language of partnership. Within the discourse of
partnership notions of antagonism and division co-exist with those
of co-operation and mutual dependency. Indeed, the concept of
partnership bears the imagery of union and interdependency, but it
also conveys the very opposite - division and separation. Only from
division and separation can unity and dependency emerge; or, to put
it another way, only from the political divisions of the early 1980s
was it possible for the political union of the latter 1980s to
unfold. Thus, the language of partnership combines oppositional
terms - division versus union - but it is the very play of the
opposition of those terms which justifies the existence of
partnership. The logic of the language leads to an argument which
asserts that Sheffield's recent past of political antagonism and
division was necessary for it to produce its present, politically
unified, face. Through the local press and the 'paper' of the
partnership Success in Sheffield, 'good news' stories about
Sheffield's approach to regenerating its economy were regularly
produced. 'Talking-up' the city has been a constant refrain.
Indeed, the reiteration of the concept of partnership has been a key
mechanism for its penetration into the public consciousness:
It's a message that's very simple that people
understand. my own view is that it was the word
partnership that more than anything else got over
the message that the days of division and argupent
were over, that we're trying to work together.'
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As suggested, an important agent here has been the local press,
primarily the Sheffield Star. This is perhaps not surprising given
that its editor has been a member of a number of partnership
organisations and committees. Through its editorials, partnership
and its attendant language has been disseminated across the city:
One of the things we did was to actively write
editorials about what a good idea it is that
people come together, and look at aspects of
partnership and praise them. We did have a role
in public perception, We did the communication
bit to encourage it.'
The following quote is also illustrative of the extent to which
positive editorials acted as conduits for the partnership message,
and that such messages were vetted by key actors within the
partnership:
An inner caucus of a few people got together
to thrash out a perceived problem. I was then
writing a press release, and going back with
it to Hugh Sykes and Clive Betts, and saying
have we actually reached this stage where we can
agree to these words. So I was involved in that
sense.'
Similarly, Success in Sheffield, the 'voice' of the partnership,
published as many positive stories and images about the city as it
could muster. The images and message sent were always concerned
with unity, the overthrow of division and the 'naturalness' of
working in partnership. Emphasising what partners had in common and
what was good about the partnership over what differences there
were, was a key strategy in generating the notion that partnership
working was inevitable. The stress of the term partnership and its
projection within and outside the city has been a critical factor in
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defining the 'reality' of the 'need to co-operate' which both gave
rise to, and perpetuates, the partnership.
The projection of the image of partnership into other places will
now be considered. In other words, we will examine the geo-
political strategies employed within the partnership to carry its
image beyond the immediate environs of Sheffield. The protection of
the partnership image outward is immediately visible in two events -
an Industrial Society conference on 'Partnership' at the Adelphi
Hotel, Liverpool in March 1988, and a civic reception at the Mansion
House in the City of London in May 1988 hosted by the City Council,
the Cutlers' Company, and the Chamber of Commerce (see chapter
five).
The conference was an extension of the Chamber of Commerce's
Leadership and Privilege workshops which had taken place in 1986.
Under the banner of Action '88 (part of the Industrial Society's
inner cities initiative) the conference brought together leaders
from the public and private sectors from a number of British cities
with the intention of helping them work through how they could work
together as a city team (Action '88 leaflet). Sheffield's city team
consisting of Council members and officers, MPs, local business
people, educationalists, and representatives from the Church of
England and the Sheffield media, was actively engaged in presenting
its approach to partnership and took a lead in the workshops.
Within the conference's working groups Sheffield's team was able to
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promote itself as an innovator in the sphere of public-private
partnership and present its new found co-operation to other cities.
Sheffield Goes To London, the reception at the Mansion House in May
1988, had a purpose different from that of the Industrial Society
conference. Essentially, the conference had provided Sheffield with
an opportunity to debate with other cities the partnership
strategies that each might employ and how they should approach the
issue of urban regeneration. For instance, how imaginative could
the partnership be; how could partnerships be used to present the
city to visitors and potential investors; and how could common
concerns be translated into practical commitments? Moreover,
although Sheffield's team occupied a prominent position in the
proceedings, the conference was not specifically Sheffield oriented.
In contrast, the Mansion House presentation was solely about
promoting Sheffield's new image and the targeting of a specific
market. In essence, it was an industrial investment and marketing
exercise designed to sell Sheffield, and its partnership, to the
City of London. The whole affair sought, in ambassadorial fashion,
to bring an awareness of the partnership to a wider (specifically
private sector) audience and promote the city as a location for
industrial and financial investment (Field, 1989). The reception
was aimed at 'the bankers and opinion formers who might be involved
in some inward investment in Sheffield'. 4 The local press was a key
promotor of this initiative.	 The editor of the Sheffield Star
commented:
I went to a breakfast meeting in the Grosvenor
House Hotel to an invited audience of a couple of
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dozen leading businessmen and put to them a
proposition like 'this is what we'd like to do in
in terms of this supplement, but we need advertising
support to do it. If enough of you support this we
can produce this supplement and if its good enough
in terms of the revenue we get, we'll hope to pay
for the Mansion House. The response was phenomenal...
The Mansion House bill came to about £14,000 and
we picked the whole lot up. So we were playing a,
very active part in promoting what was going on.J
This form of promotional activity has not been the only mechanism
for projecting a new image for Sheffield. The 'urban spectacle' has
also been used to promote a distinctiveness and exclusivity for the
city (cf. Harvey, 1989). The £400m Meadowhall retailing development
is a monument of spectacle and display of the new Sheffield. Seen
as a phoenix 'rising from the ashes of the city's devastated steel
industry' it is represented as the centre piece of the revival of
the Lower Don Valley (ST, 31.8.90). Its place in the scheme of
regeneration was as much about creating a physical structure in an
economically barren landscape, as it was about creating new
emploment opportunities. Indeed, its construction signified the
rebirth of economic activity in the city, and projected the image of
Sheffield as a vibrant active place to a literally passing (along
the Ni) audience. Tongue in cheek, some have called Meadowhall 'the
largest hoarding in the country', 6 but such an ironic analogy is not
far from revealing a key function of this retail development.
Similarly, the World Student Games was designed to present the city
as a place of growth and change, acting as both symbol and
instrument of public and private sector unity and co-operation.
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That the main purpose of the WSG was to raise morale in the city, to
improve its image and to exhibit to the outside world the power of
unity as a regenerating force, is difficult to deny. The Games were
seen by many within the partnership as a practical opportunity to
demonstrate the triumph of co-operation over division:
It [the WSG] started as a bright idea and was
perceived as being something that would raise
the morale and image of the city. It could not
be carried, at least in the initial stage, by
the City Council alone and so became an occasion
for people to work together. Everybody could
agree that whatever other di4ferences there were
the Games were a good thing.'
Despite continual insistence by those public and private sector
individuals involved in organising the WSG that they formed part of
the overall regeneration of the city, only secondarily was the Games
about the provision of a pathway out of the mire of industrial
decline. Indeed, there was little in the way of an economic
analysis of the potential benefits of the Games either in terms of
the spin-offs for the city as a whole, or the impact of the
construction of games facilities on the communities in which they
were to be built:
The WSG was never seen as an economic regeneration
thing...We were kept well away from it until they
[the members] needed an economic justification for
doing it. It was a civic grandeur type project in
which the economic regeneration benefits of it were
never the reason for doing it, and therefore an
economipc development approach to the Games was never
taken.'
Much of this overtly 'boosterist' activity has run in tandem with a
more subtle form of promotion and image projection relying on the
co-option and creation of loyalties to place through the language of
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partnership. Most significant here has been the production of a
number of 'glossy' brochures in which the language of consensus,
cooperation, unity, participation and commitment to place are all
called upon to foster the notion of a new economically and socially
dynamic city. Three examples will briefly be considered - Sheffield 
Vision Become Reality (SERC, 1989); Forward into the 1990s - A
Partnership with the Community (SCC/DEED, undated); and Sheffield -
Room with a View (SLP, undated).
The Sheffield - Vision Becomes Reality document set out the economic
regeneration committee's vision for the future of Sheffield. It
stressed the city as a natural centre for business and industry; a
new decision centre; an international centre for sport, leisure and
tourism; an international centre for teaching, learning, research
and technology; and as a city of life (SERC, 1989). The document is
full of statements of intent but is short on the evidence of
implementation of partnership ventures. However, the importance of
the brochure lies not in its presentation of 'hard' evidence, but in
its projection of a message - that these economic aspirations for
Sheffield have emerged from a wide ranging consensus and unity
between the key functional interests in the city. The purpose of
the document is thus to present Sheffield not only as a place with
economic potential, but as a place where there is a real local
commitment to fulfilling that potential. Or rather, in the language
of partnership, creating a city where 'vision will become reality'.
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In contrast to the Vision document, Forward into the 1990s - A
Partnership with the Community is about the extent of community
participation in the partnership, rather than the degree of unity
between functional interests in the city. Its focus is on the
involvement of local people in a range of initiatives set up by the
local authority through the Department of Employment and Economic
Development. The tone of this document is more communitarian, with
its emphasis on the involvement of local people as well as the
business community in regenerating Sheffield's economy. Stress is
placed on employment and training; working with neighbourhood
groups; supporting the trade union movement; and supporting the
city's ethnic minorities and unemployed. The thrust of the brochure
is that:
...by working with local communities, local centres
and activities we aim to build a partnership with the
people of Sheffield and to ensure that everyone will
reap the benefit of the 'new' Sheffield. (SCC/DEED, undated)
The 'new' Sheffield is of course the one alluded to in the Vision
document - a economically diversified but dynamic city. Forward
into the 1990s propagates that notion but sets it within the context
of a caring and widespread partnership which can as easily tap into
the resources of local grassroots organisations as it can those of
the business community. Overall, the implication is that
'partnership with the people' offers opportunity - the opportunity
of actively participating in the regeneration of the city.
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The final example of a glossy partnership brochure, Sheffield - Room
with a View (SPL, undated), was designed to demonstrate 'what a
marvellous place' Sheffield was in which to live and work. 9 It is
perhaps the most illuminating in terms of illustrating the symbolic
representation of the partnership and its attendant imagery and
language of unity, cooperation, consensus and commitment to place.
The establishment of place is a key variable in the regeneration
equation, and this brochure demonstrates the establishment of
Sheffield as a 'growth friendly' place to potential investors.
Permeating the document are contrasting views on Sheffield as a
place - Sheffield as a place with an industrial past; as a place
with new industry; as a place with good educational and research
facilities; as a place with excellent leisure, recreational and
cultural facilities; and consequently, as a place for growth.
Conceptualising Sheffield as a particular sort of place implies
taking a particular view of the city. The brochure invites us to
take these different views of Sheffield, and we are asked to take
these views from particular standpoints - What we want the city to
be for us. In the brochure we see these different views of the city
through windows, windows of opportunity which allow us to imagine
what the city could be like for us if we chose to go there. This
city is one full of contrast, variety and co-existence - of fast
living urban life and rural idyll; of work and play; and of an old
and new.
Its language sets up these contrasts and varieties for us before we
take in the view:
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If you're looking for room - to expand your
business, to improve your quality of life or
just room to breathe - take a look at Sheffield.
You'll find room. With a view. (SPL, undated).
The section entitled room to breathe informs US that Sheffield is
Britain's greenest city, with a spectacular back garden - the Peak
District National Park - only a few minutes from the city centre.
We are told about beautiful scenery, and are shown pictures of
spectacular landscapes, which conjure up images of spiritual freedom
refreshing one from the pressures of daily life. We are also
informed about the 'fascinating traditions' of numerous 'pretty
villages' which nestle in the valleys around Sheffield. The rural
idyll is laid before our eyes, its sub-text hinting that Sheffield
is not really a city at all, it is part of the countryside.
In the next section, room to live, the idyll continues, but it is
that of prosperous Victoriana, offering the allure of traditional
stone built Victorian housing 'complete with stained glass,
cornices, fireplaces and picture rails'. However, recourse to past
forms of dwelling is not enough, and we are given the alternative of
residing in apartments with breathtaking views of the Peaks, or the
cosiness of a 'neat semi in a tree lined suburb'. To complete the
picture the image of Sheffield as the largest village in England is
appropriated to foster the notion of community. When we venture
outside of our Victorian villas, modern apartments or suburban
semi's, we are told there is plenty to do - particularly shopping!
The art of consumption can be developed in Sheffield's 'bustling
markets' or at Meadowhall, although the incongruity between the two
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forms is not alluded to. In the room to play section, we are
reminded of Sheffield's great spectator sporting traditions -
football, cricket and snooker. And for those with a less sedentary
predisposition there is a myriad of indoor and outdoor sports to be
pursued in the city's new leisure facilities or in its surrounding
countryside. Culture too, is not left out of the equation with
stress on Sheffield's galleries, museums, theatres and cinemas.
However, the city is more than a place of consumption, it is also a
place of production and the next section, room to work provides us
with this perspective. The emphasis here is on the replacement of
old industry by new 'high quality commercial, industrial and
technological developments, situated in greenfield sites'. We are
shown a picture of two middle-aged women, one black, one white,
apparently packaging some product for SKF and Dormer Tools. The
image is of one of racial harmony, but it is also one which suggests
that the labour market encompasses women returners - a lucrative
labour force for many employers. The theme of production is
continued in room to grow, a section in which 'the unique
partnership of the public and private sector' which 'works hard for
the city' to ensure 'good support for its newcomers' is seen to be
the motive force behind the 'positive atmosphere of confidence in
the city'. The demise of Sheffield's industry in the late 1970s and
early 1980s is translated into 'major opportunities for development'
to be seized by those employers who want to expand their companies,
in a city that has accommodated 'quality craftsmanship' in
engineering and manufacturing with new industries and ,their
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associated forms of employment. The notion of growth is also
contained in the education section of the brochure, room to study.
We are shown pictures which stress the multi-cultural nature of
education in Sheffield, and told of its excellent quality, from
school to higher education. However, the key message is that the
higher education institutions in the city offer a research reservoir
which ultimately will benefit local businesses through its
technological and mental resources.
Fundamentally, the development of an image represented a way of
coping with a change that involved unving away from a city based on
an 'assortment of production spaces' towards one visualised as a
space of abstract technological, financial and consumption
processes. The partnerships, through its own institutions, has
pursued an incrementally interventionist promotional strategy to
market the city. This process has involved promoting the particular
qualities that working in partnership can bring; it is here that the
production of images of the 'quality of life' have played their
part. Reference to cultural amenities, a high quality built
environment, residential districts and open spaces have been
important resources in marketing the city. In this way, image
policy has been a tool of economic development. Its target has been
private investors, companies, developers, and public and private
bodies and organisations, and that segment of the community able to
consume what the parnership had to offer. The image has also been
directed at a wider citizenry in a form which stresses that co-
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operation and unity between all sectors of the community, will
ultimately produce a better quality of life for everyone.
Since the mid-1980s then, the production of an image for the city
appropriate for partnership has been a high priority for Sheffield's
partnership. Altering perceptions within the city and promoting a
corporte image for the city beyond its boundary's have worked in
tandem in an attempt to create an overall image for Sheffield and
its partnership.	 Promotional campaigns, the staging of urban
'spectacles' such as sports events ( gSG), and retail experiences
(Meadowhall), and the constant reiteration of the notion of
partnership through partnership newsheets and brochures such as
Vision Becomes Reality, Forward into the 1990s, and Room with a
View, have been the mechanisms employed to create the new image.
Through the dual process of internal and external image production
the pre-partnership Characterisation of Sheffield as a place of
economic decline and political division was challenged by an image
which favoured unity, co-operation and consensus, and stressed
optimism, confidence, activity and modernity. These were now the
Characteristics which the partnership, through its image policy,
strove to associate with its approach to regenerating Sheffield's
economy.
SERC: POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND STRATEGIES OF COMPROMISE
The Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee (SERC) is the
principal partnership organisation in the city. It was formed in
December 1986 in an attempt to bring together a wide range , of
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organisations with a stake in the well-being of Sheffield's economy.
As outlined in chapter five, the concept of SERC was formally
developed by local authority officers within DEED, although it was
also the outcome of informal discussions between councillors and
members of Sheffield's business community. SERC has acted
prodominantly as the umbrella partnership organisation, co-
ordinating various city-wide initiatives. Thus, it acts as a focal
point for local initiatives and provides a location for the exchange
of information and its dissemination into the community.
SERC itself has no executive powers of decision-making. Nor has it
mandatory power over any participant organisation, or those
involved in other partnership initiatives. Moreover, it cannot
compel its members to reach agreements, and similarly it cannot
enforce any agreement made within the committee to be adhered to
within the wider membership of its participants. That SERC can
operate at all is primarily by virtue of its ability to be able to
claim a moral legitimacy for itself. This legitimacy rests on two
arguments. Firstly, that it has a wide participation and thus
articulates the views of a range of interested parties within the
city, and secondly, that it is a wholly voluntary organisation.
Such volunteerism clearly requires the recognition of dependency
between actors involved in the process of regeneration, and a high
degree of consensus between partners over what needs to be done.
SERC is the practical manifestation of the acceptance of ,mutual
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dependency and development of consensus in Sheffield with regard to
economic regeneration - for example, the plan to regenerate the LDV.
However, it has also been the site where conflict between partners
is resolved in the form of compromise strategies. This point can be
illustrated by a discussion of how SERC has approached employment
and social regeneration policy in the city. It is an important area
because it highlights tensions within SERC over the concept of
regeneration and policy development.
A City-Wide Employment Policy - The Sheffield Charter For Jobs 
In August 1988, after SERC had been operational for nearly two
years, the first report was presented to the committee on the
employment and social benefits of regeneration. This was the first
instance where, in a formal manner, the agenda of the committee
moved towards the consideration of the social dimension in their
efforts to revive the economy. The report, submitted by DEED,
argued that although there was a growing confidence in Sheffield
about its economic recovery, the question of how to ensure that the
benefits of that up-turn be maximised for local people had to be
addressed. Job opportunities, recruitment policies, training
provision, and the special requirements of disadvantaged groups,
were all identified as areas that should not be overlooked. The
recommendation of the report was that through the partnership a
voluntary code of social responsibility and good employment working
practice should be established to ensure that these issues were
taken into consideration by all SERC's participants, and in all
aspects of the city's regeneration.
	
The	 response ,of the
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regeneration committee was to 'invite' its membership to develop the
idea in order to implement a city wide policy through mutual
agreement and negotiation with individual developers and employers
in the early stages of development and employment programmes (SERC
Mins, 26.8.88).
In October, papers dedicated to this issue were presented to SERC by
the City Council, the Trades Council and the Sheffield Council for
Racial Equality. What emerged from this work was the reiteration of
the theme of employment which dominated the earlier DEED report.
This concern was expressed in three ways. Firstly, that SERC
should actively encourage the development of manufacturing and
industrial employment; secondly, that in order to obtain 'real
benefits' from economic regeneration a charter of good employment
practice should be established; and thirdly, that an employment and
social benefits team be set up within the local authority structure
to explore the potential employment gain from development within the
city (SERC Mins, 28.10.88). That the employment issue emerged as
the focus of an examination of the social consequmzes
regeneration is not surprising, given who initiated it and who
prepared the papers for SERC. The impetus for the 'social review'
came from the City Council and officers within DEED, whose
perception of social benefits was predominantly in terms of the
provision of employment through the attraction and retention of
jobs, and the dismantling of patterns of discriminatory employment
practice within the city. For the trade unionists on SERC the
process provided an opportunity for outlining a series of city-wide
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employment policies designed to benefit trade union members in terms
of local employment training, pay scales and working conditions.10
The most tangible outcome of this activity was the emergence of a
good employment initiative, dubbed the Sheffield Charter for Jobs 
(SERC, 1989a). The intention was to set out a series of mutually
agreed policy stances in relation to employment and equal
opportunities which would then be adhered to by all existing and new
employers in the city. Between October 1988 and March 1989 drafts
of the Charter were developed by representatives from SERC.
Predominantly, the drafts were produced by the trade union
representatives on the committee, although there was input from the
Sheffield Council for Racial Equality and the Chamber of Commerce.
The early drafts of the Charter were considered solely by SERC's
executive committee and were focused mainly on labour force training
and equal opportunities. By Spring 1989 enough work had been put
into the development of the Charter for it to be considered at full
committee level.
The draft presented to SERC in May 1989 included seven policy
commitments. These were a commitment to recruit from the local
community; a commitment to provide for employee education and
training; a commitment to improving the type of employment -
particularly by creating full-time and long term jobs; a commitment
to equal opportunity; a commitment to allowing employees to belong
to a trade union or similar collective organisation; a commitment to
the operation of a positive health and safety policy; ,
 and a
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commitment to ensure that the benefits of regeneration were spread
widely (SERC, The Sheffield Charter, Third Draft, April 1989a).
However, at the May meeting the problematic nature of the Charter
became apparent. The problem was that whilst agreement could be
reached amongst SERC's individual participants an the concept of a
mutually agreed charter of good employment practice, agreement on
what could be accepted as good employment practice was contestable,
and secondly, an argument emerged that as drafted the charter would
be counter-productive to the goal of economic regeneration.
In the process of producing drafts of the Charter it became clear
that there was little prospect of obtaining wide ranging private
sector assent for its policy commitments (SERC Mins, 26.5.89). The
Charter itself was clearly very prescriptive and its employee
orientated approach reflected a trade union and local authority
employment perspective which was not necessarily one shared within
the business community. Although private sector individuals within
SERC accepted the Charter, they were joined by very few other
private sector employers. In the Chamber of Commerce it was made
clear that employers would not sign up to policy commitments that
they either did not agree with, or could not act upon.
Additionally, they argued that the Charter initiative was peripheral
to the mainstream activity for regenerating the city, width was to
improve Sheffield's image and attract inward investment. Moreover,
many private sector employers asserted that pursuing such employment
policies would repel rather than attract new job opportunities.
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The Charter episode illustrates the problematic nature of addressing
employment and social issues within a regeneration agenda dominated
by physical improvements, image management and the attraction of
inward investment. Although connections between economic growth,
and employment and social issues had been made and accepted by all
the participants within SERC, there were still differences between
partners over how this issue should be handled. Ultimately, the
Charter dropped off SERC's regeneration agenda because the committee
lacked power to compel its membership to enforce the charter on the
constituencies which they represented. That a consensus was reached
within the regeneration committee was of little consequence once it
was acknowledged that consensus could not be sustained outside its
own confines - and that could not be achieved. The problem for
SERC has been to extend the communality of interest that has
developed within the committee outside of itself. What this has
demonstrated is that any notion of wider group interest has been
restricted to economic development issues.
The argument fostered by the private sector that the Charter was an
inexpedient initiative that would detract from the overall approach
to regeneration, faced little challenge. Indeed, despite some
criticism of the stance adopted by the majority of the private
sector, the Labour councillors on SERC were not willing to turn the
Charter into an issue of political contention. This was because
there was little political advantage to be gained once the Charter
had effectively faltered in SERC. More importantly however, by the
time the Charter had reached the stage of substantive debate in
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SERC, the employment and social objectives within it, had already
begun to be reworked into a new long term strategy for regenerating
the city. Similarly, the trade unions would have been unable to
develop the initiative on their own, and had little option but to
abandon it and redirect their efforts to contributing to the
emerging long term plan for regeneration. As long as the issues
discussed within SERC focused on image promotion, and generally
improving and diversifying Sheffield's economic base, such
differences remained hidden. However, when the focus Changed to
consider specific initiatives devoted to employment and social
issues the problematic nature of how to distribute the benefits of
regeneration became abundantly clear.
Sheffield 2000: Towards a Programme for Regeneration
A central difficulty for SERC then, has been to unify the social
and economic dimensions of regeneration within a partnership
framework for local growth and development. One way in which this
unification has been attempted has been through the development of a
long term strategy for the city's future - Sheffield 2000.
Fundamentally, the strategy is based on identifying what sort of
economy Sheffield needs for the twenty-first century, and how such
an economy could be achieved. It is important because it represents
the formal articulation by SERC of an economic niche for Sheffield
within a changing national and international division of labour.
Sheffield 2000 originates from the objectives and proposals
developed in the Sheffield Economic Regeneration Strategy (SERS),
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and two earlier SERC documents, Vision and Sheffield Vision Becomes 
Reality. The former was a detailed local authority plan designed to
aid the implementation of an economic strategy for the city, but one
based on public-private co-operation (see chapter seven). In
contrast, the latter documents were less detailed and more
aspirational, being an outline of SERC's aims for an economic niche
for Sheffield, and stressed the city as a natural centre for
business and industry; as a centre for decision-making; as an
international centre for sport, leisure and tourism; as an
international centre for teaching, learning, research and
technology; and as a city of life (DEED, Sheffield Vision, second
progress report, 25.4.88; SCC, 1989). Sheffield 2000 was designed
to bridge the gap between the detail of the SERS and the
aspirational content of Vision and Vision Becomes Reality. As the
main architect of Sheffield 2000 related:
We had the SERS, and we had Vision and Vision
Becomes Reality. For some time we had the
problem that Vision and Vision Becomes Reality
said this is where we want to be, and the SERS
was supposed to say this is how we get there, but
they didn't actually mesh. There was a growing
feeling that they needed to mesh and that led to
discussions about doing that. Parallel to this there
was a discussion going on, brought up by Hugh Sykes,
along the lines of the 'the city needs a corporate
plan'. I didn't like the idea of a corporate plan
because that was too economistic, but certainly that
notion came together with the notion of pulling
together the strategy and the vision. Now out of
this a working group was set up to pull th4,together
and that was when it became Sheffield 2000."
This comment about the integration of a local authority strategy and
a partnership inspired plan, together with the concept of a
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corporate plan for the city, helps explain the parentage of
Sheffield 2000. Unequivocally, the strategy's antecedents lie
within past local authority plans produced within the Department of
Employment and Economic Development, but it also relates to private
sector concerns with the nature of the local economy, and how to
combat industrial and economic decline. The interest in a
'corporate plan' for the city has a resonance with aspects of the
work of BiC and their attempts to demonstrate the catalytic
potential of the business community in regenerating urban areas.
In chapter seven, it was shown that although BiC has "had a modest
input into the city, where it has entered this has been through the
conduit of Hugh Sykes. BiC's input into the notion of a 'corporate
plan' did not deviate from this path. Sykes' interest in the
concept of a city-wide regeneration plan was supported by BiC, and
particularly by Peter Henschel, the former deputy mayor of San
Francisco. 12
 Henschel was key member of BiC, and had been involved
in establishing BiC's involvement in Halifax and Blackburn. The
majority of BiC's ideas had been drawn from the experiences of North
American cities, particularly Baltimore, Pittsburgh, Boston and
Lowell. Sykes, encouraged by Henschel, sought to replicate the
Lowell model in Sheffield. The choice of Lowell was an important
one - it had successfully used its public-private partnership to
exploit state and federal grants to revive its textile-based economy
and regenerate its run down areas. Indeed, in seven years the
Lowell partnership had helped reduced unemployment from 15.5 per
cent to 2.5 per cent. For Sykes, the Lowell partnership symbolised
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what could be achieved by the business community working with public
officials. A Chamber of Commerce representative on SERC commented
on the initiation of the 'corporate plan' (Sheffield 2000) in the
following way:
Hugh Sykes came back from Lowell in America. He came
back with two sheets of paper which said what Lowell
were going to do [about the regeneration of its economy]
I wrote up the same thing for Sheffield on two sheets
of paper. John Darwin of DEED toot 	 forward into
the beginnings of Sheffield 2000.1'
The first phase of Sheffield 2000 began ill late and col-AA:na.
until the autumn of 1990. In SERC, a Sheffield 2000 steering group
was set up consisting of councillors Helen Jackson and Nike Buckley,
Norman Adsetts and Peter Bolton from the Chamber of Commerce, Hugh
Sykes from the Development Corporation and Blanche Flannery from the
Sheffield Trades Council. Complementing this was a working group
within which much of the detailed drafting of the strategy would be
undertaken. This group included John Darwin from DEED, and one
representative each from the Department of Land and Planning and the
Development Corporation. In addition, an executive team was
established to provide 'input and ideas' to the development of the
strategy. This team was made up of the chief executive of the local
authority, the directors of DEED and the Department of Land and
Planning, the chief executive of the Chamber of Commerce, the chief
executive and community director of the SDC, two representatives
from the Sheffield Council for Racial Equality, and one
representative each from the Trades Council, the Confederation of
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Shipbuilding and Engineering Union, the University and Polytechnic,
and the Training Agency (SERC Mins, 25.8.89).
The initial work for Sheffield 2000 was devoted to a review of
previous economic proposals for the city, and an examination of the
wider economic, social and physical context of the city's
regeneration. Much of this activity was carried out in the autumn
of 1989 through a series of seminars and workshops organised by
officers from DEED, and the private consultancy firm Deloitte,
Haskins and Sells. These seminars concentrated primarily on the
economy, infrastructure, human resources and new technology. From
them emerged a series of issues which were to become the foundations
of the eventual strategy. These were the growing importance of
green initiatives; leisure; human resources; information technology;
new materials; and knowledge and technology transfer (SERC Mins,
27.10.89). More generally, the exercise sought to place Sheffield
within a Changing national and international economy by identifying
Sheffield as part of a region suffering industrial decline, lacking
economic diversification, growth sectors and decision centres,
lacking applied research capability, adequate investment in human
resources, and requiring improvements to its physical
infrastructure.
The seminars and workshops culminated in the identification of what
became known as the Sheffield Arrow or Sharrow - a list of 'outlook'
themes representing statements designed to project and promote the
image of the city. The themes were similar to those outlined in
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SERC'S earlier Vision Becomes Reality document, identifying
Sheffield as a caring city; a green city; a world city; a learning
city; a healthy city; an information city; and a productive city
(SERC Mins, 22.12.89). Underlying these themes were objectives for
the regeneration of the city, in particular:
- retaining and developing the city's industrial base;
- increasing the number of decision-making centres in Sheffield;
- developing a tourism strategy;
- diversifying the economy to include more growth sectors
- improving information networks;
- and, developing a wider regional approach to social and
economic regeneration.
A second series of seminars and workshops was organised in early
1990 in which the working group and the executive team used the
'outlook' themes and objectives to identify priority areas for
development. Five areas were isolated for future action within the
meetings - business and industry; decision-making centres and
infrastructure; research and technology; sport, leisure and tourism;
and social regeneration. Over the following months these priority
areas were reworked into a proposal for developing a self sustaining
economy in the city. In so doing, the working group identified five
areas of intended economic growth - manufacturing; public service;
information; leisure; and environmental or green issues. These
growth networks, as they came to be known, were intended to act as
magnets' which would attract related economic activity, and
generate sufficient momentum to sustain their own growth. This
critical mass was to be achieved by a combination of consolidating
existing economic activity within the city, helping it grow and
diversify, and by attracting inward investment. Underlying all this
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were three core elements intended to permeate throughout the
strategy - the development of physical and human investment;
working in partnership to achieve the aims through project
champions; and ensuring that each growth network could identify how
it would contribute to ending poverty and discrimination (SERC,
Sheffield 2000, Executive Summary, June 1990).
The second phase of the Sheffield 2000 process was devoted to
developing these five growth networks. The organisational structure
for phase two included the establishment of a steering group to
recommend policy and oversee the project, a core management group
charged with implementing the strategy, and a co-ordinating group to
bring together the project champions of the growth networks.
Additionally, each growth network was to have a development group
and a work group within Which the detailed proposals for the network
would be produced. All of these groups were staffed by nominated
representatives from SERC's constituent organisations, as well as
local authority officers from within the Department of Employment
and Economic Development. Work focussed on identifying priorities
for each network, and how to link particular organisations (project
champions), and financial, social and knowledge resources in the
city, in order to allow specific projects within the networks to be
developed (SERC Mins, 28.9.90). Most of the work was carried out
between winter 1991 and summer 1992, and was devoted to establishing
objectives and developing activities for each network.
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Beyond the Factory Gate: Social Policy in Sheffield 2000? 
Primarily, Sheffield 2000 has been about finding a productive role
for the city in a changing national and international economy.
Phase one of the process was heavily geared towards establishing a
new economic discourse for the city, based on high technology-high
value industry, specialised research and information and the pursuit
of leisure developments, rather than one focused on its industrial
past of steel production and heavy engineering. As a consequence,
much of the early work was designed to foster a new discourse
concentrated on economic regeneration as a counter to the collapse
of the city's traditional industrial base. The project's initial
seminars and workshops were predominantly concerned with the nature
of the local economy, local infrastructure and the issue of new
technology (Sheffield 2000 workshops, 2.10.89; 3.19.89). There was
little concern with issues such as inequality, housing or education
in the papers produced by the consultants Deloitte, Haskins and
Sells, or officers from within DEED. SERC's voluntary sector
representative commented:
I went to two seminars, and the social issues were
seen to be in a separate box. The result was complete
exclusion of social concerns from final papers, and
it was as though we hadn't been there. i4
Phase one then, was carried out in isolation from many of the social
issues on which its economic analyses impinged. A counterweight to
this was the submission, to the Sheffield 2000 working group, of a
paper outlining an agenda for social regeneration. This paper,
prepared by the City Council's central policy unit, considered the
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aims and operational objectives needed to create a 'better quality
of life' for all of Sheffield's community. Moreover, it highlighted
those sections of the community who could 'miss out' on the benefits
of economic regeneration unless efforts were made to cater for their
needs (SERC Mins, 27.10.89; PB). One consequence of this was the
establishment of a Social Regeneration Group (SRG), consisting of
representatives from the Voluntary Sector Consultative Forum, the
Sheffield Council for Racial Equality and local authority officers.
Its first act was to hold a conference in January 1990 entitled
Quality of Life in Sheffield 2000, focussing on the social aspects
of regeneration in the city. This conference was conceived as an
alternative to the emphasis on economic factors in the initial
Sheffield 2000 seminars, and in the planned second series of
seminars. The initiator of the conference asserted:
The attempt was to set up a conference first, the
'Quality of Life' conference, which was conceived
far more in opposition to phase onof Sheffield
2000 than it was a component part.'
Two major concerns emerged from the conference. The first was how
to integrate social regeneration into the economic strategy, so that
the marginalisation of sections of the community could be avoided;
the second, was the necessity of pursuing specific and targeted
action to ensure the widest possible dispersion of the benefits of
economic growth (SERC Mins, 26.1.90). The following comment from
the chair of the SRG illustrates the context within which specific
initiatives were to be located:
The line that the SRG went on following the
conference was focussed on empowerment and
responsive institutions. The theme was that
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institutions should be open, flexible, responsive
and provide appropriate services, and should do
so with the people who are on the receiving end
rather than for or to them. Also that those who
are concernerWith making decisions on the large
scale should also be concerned with the impact on
those not directly affeqgd, externalities, things
beyond the factory gate.'
Post-conference activity focused on the preparation of a report on
the social consequences of economic growth (SERC Mins, 30.3.90).
The SRG's report was presented to SERC in the Spring of 1991,
eighteen months after the initiation of the Sheffield 2000 process.
The report argued that a social perspective should underlay the 2000
strategy by addressing the issues of community development;
community care for the elderly; reducing unemployment; and
alleviating poverty and debt. The report also stressed that
Sheffield's regeneration should be characterised by the promotion of
community empowerment (SERC, executive summary, Sheffield 2000, June
1990). Such areas of interest highlight the extent to which the SRG
sought to extend the debate on the distributional aspects of
economic growth beyond the issue of employment. However, the work
of the SRG was designed to do more than impregnate the regeneration
debate with social concerns:
Social regeneration was always about embedding
social concerns in the economic agenda, though
it was also concerned with enabling people to
have a say, a voice for themselves. Whether that
be the voluntary sector, those org sed community
groups or those not yet organised.
This wider remit including the notion of community empowerment can
be seen in the SRG's guidelines issued to the growth networks.
These stressed that integral to each network should be a process of
assessing the social policy implications of its work; initiating
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social impact studies; identifying potential partnerships with the
community; and developing specific social regeneration proposals
(SERC Nina, 23.11.90).
The output of the networks demonstrates the extent to which the aims
of the SRG were achieved. The information network is the best
example of a network which did make some attempt to accommodate some
of the objectives of the SRG. Indeed, the work programme of this
network exhibits a more explicit awareness of the need to consider
the social implications of economic Change than does others. The
aim of the information network was to develop a locally controlled
information technology network geared towards social and economic
development in the city. The aspiration was to establish a
'network culture' amongst those not benefiting from changes in
technology that would spread awareness of the knowledge of existing
technologies; help coordinate the city's information and
communication developments; provide a counterweight to the dominance
of market forces in information technology; and provide information
technology training (SERC Mins, 22.3.91). The greater level of
social awareness within this network can be explained by the
existance of a political framework for its work, that other networks
did not have. The chair of the SRG hints at this in the following
comment:
The individuals on that network, largely local
authority officers, were already concerned about
information as a dimension of social life, and a
dimension of further inequality because of the
access and use of information reflecting the power
of those already comfortably off, primarily business.'
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However, despite the recognition of social issues within this
network the concerns of the SRG were given equivocal treatment in
phase two of the process. Reports presented to SERC by other
networks are full of action plans which relate only marginally to
the guidelines of the SRG. For example, the priority areas for the
manufacturing growth network were Sheffield's traditional industrial
base; new growth sectors; provision of business advice; technology
transfer; and land and premises (SERC Nina, 25.1.91). There is some
recognition of the social dimension in the leisure network, in terms
of acknowledging the difference between elite and grass roots
leisure and sports development, but it is vague in terms of catering
for a wider level of leisure participation or the impact that
leisure developments might have on adjacent communities (SERC Nina,
25.2.91). In general, embedding a social dimension into the work of
the growth networks was thus problematic. Indeed, despite the fact
that the management group for phase two included the chair of the
SRG (whose primary role was to maintain the social dimension on the
agendas of the networks), his attempts to 'push social things
towards them' were received equivocally. 19
Accommodating Economic and Social Policy in Sheffield 2000: A
Strategy of Compromise? 
The economic regeneration committee's long term plan for the
regeneration of the city's economy was designed to facilitate the
integration of the social and economic dimensions of regeneration so
that they could operate within the consensual mode of Operation
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required within SERC. 	 The 2000 strategy repackaged and softened
policies on employment quality and equal opportunities outlined
within initiatives such as the Sheffield Charter. Unlike the
Charter with its definite points and prescriptive aims, the
descriptive, more vague social commitments of the 2000 strategy have
proved less problematic for SERC's participants, and their wider
memberships, to accept. None of SERC's constituent parties has had
to get agreement from its own members over anything other than a
diffuse and partial set of proposals.
This reconstitution of the social has allowed SERC to claim that it
has integrated social regeneration into its 2000 strategy. Nowhere
is this more evident than in the regeneration committee's assertion
that it was committed to 'the integration of social regeneration
within economic regeneration' and 'the goal of sustainable social
regeneration' (SERC Mins, 26.4.91). However, integration implies
the fusion of economic and social objectives so that they work in
unison, informing and influencing each other. This has certainly
not been the case in the process of Sheffield 2000, and it is
unlikely to permeate into its outcome. It would be more appropriate
to suggest that SERC has accommodated social considerations within
the strategy process rather than integrated them into it. This
accommodation has allowed the two main participants of SERC, the
City Council and the Chamber of Commerce, to make similar claims.
The City Council can claim that it has been able to infuse the 2000
strategy with a social conscience, whilst the Chamber of Commerce
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has used Sheffield 2000 to promote the concept of ethical corporate
community participation.
To keep the social on the regeneration agenda, policies concerned
with good employment practice and equality of opportunity have been
toned down, and the wider issue of who benefits from economic growth
has been only marginally addressed. Pressure from the SRG has
resulted in acknowledgement that social concerns have to be part of
the regeneration agenda, but it has not resulted in any structural
concern with the social consequences of economic growth. Indeed,
there has been little practical commitment to developing a strategy
that incorporates mechanisms for enabling community involvement in
the regeneration process. The references to community empowerment,
non-discriminatory employment practices and the alleviation of
poverty and debt, which appear in phase two of Sheffield 2000, are
there by virtue of the insistence of the SRG representative on the
management group. They have become accommodated in the strategy
despite, and not because of, the work of the growth networks, and
are unfiltered by contact with them. 20 The consequence is that they
appear as statements of 'good intention' rather than programmes of
action integrated into the individual strategies of each network,
and have had to be imposed from the top of the Sheffield 2000
organisational hierarchy, rather than emerge from the process
itself. As one of SERC's trade union representatives commented:
The problem we've had is that we could only really
do it down the different levels. The support for the
specifics has had to come down rather than up, and
its an uncertain process. We haven't got it all the
way down, more work needs to be done on that. It
[Sheffield 2000] needs to be more accessible down
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the line. There's a lot of pieces of paper flying
about on Sheffield 2000, lots of details of plans,
but consultation with ordinary people goes deeper
than that. I think there is a gap - one we need
to address - of getting discussion of what it means
in individual people terms. We're quite good at grand
strategy, but we need to be better at talking to the
individual on the street and saying this,is what it
means to you, this is what you could do."
CONCLUSION
Overall, the explanation for the development of economic and social
policy within SERC can be set within the context of partnership
outlined in chapter three. Briefly, this asserted that politically
partnerships are concerned with the management of economic Change.
Ideologically, they are part of an urban policy climate that has
sought to increase the role of the private sector in the process of
urban economic regeneration. These two dimensions of partnership
converge within the notion of mutual dependence, and it is the
acquiescence to 'mutual dependency' that blurs the political and
ideological dimensions. Partnerships then appear to be the only way
to achieve regeneration, rather than as a politically determined
option. Although particular partners may recognise the political
and ideological nature of the collaboration, once a partnership has
been formed there is a tendency for the partnership to concentrate
its efforts where clear areas of common ground exist. This
reinforces the notion of dependency. Within partnerships concerned
with economic regeneration, these areas of communality tend to focus
an image management and inward investment. The partnership in
Sheffield is no exception. The regeneration committee has
concentrated mud' of its activity on improving these areas, , and has
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had little difficulty in establishing a consensus between the
partners, as in the case, for example, with SERC's plan for the
regeneration of the Lower Don Valley.
However, returning to partnerships in general, although it is clear
that consensus can be established, the problem is to maintain it.
Certainly no two partners ever approach the partnership with the
same values, objectives, of criteria for evaluation. The views of
the partners may differ markedly in how they assess the impact of
partnership initiatives and how they judge its success. In
Sheffield, differing conceptions of regeneration were most evident
in how SERC dealt with the issue of employment policy and social
regeneration. Within the committee it was not difficult to get
agreement on the economic development issues that needed to be
addressed. However, when the social dimension reared its head the
result was a dispute, based not on the merits of having the social
dimension on the regeneration agenda, but on the means of
incorporating it into the agenda. The direct and prescriptive equal
opporunities policies of the Sheffield Charter were unacceptable to
the wider business community. When issues such as equal
opportunities, discrimination and the wider distribution of economic
benefits were re-introduced into the 2000 strategy, they were more
diffuse and vague than in their previous incarnation. In effect, it
was a 'trade off' between the social and employment goals of the
community, trade union and political representatives on SERC and the
market-based criteria of the private sector representatives from the
Chamber of Commerce.
	 This 'compromise strategy' resolved the
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dispute by massaging the ideological differences, and allowed the
regeneration committee to continue its claim of consensus.
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CHAPTER NINE
BRIDGING THE GAP? PRIVATEMANMIENT AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY
IN SHEFFIELD'S INSTITUTIONS OF PARTNERSHIP
INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter considered the development of policy within the
partnership, particuarly through its main institution - SERC. The
chapter argued that differing conceptions of regeneration within the
committee produced a compromise strategy (Sheffield 2000), which
represented the partnership's pragmatic intentions for Sheffield's
long-term development. The result was the production of a
compromise strategy in the name of the 'greater good' of the city.
The aim of this chapter is to consider differences between partners
that are, paradoxically, more difficult to bridge - those focused on
issues of managerial style and public accountability.
In Sheffield, a clash of public-private managerial styles and
differing notions of accountability can be seen in two vivid
examples - the Ubiversiade (GB) Ltd. and the Sheffield Development
Corporation. A third, less spectacular example, is offered by the
operation of the economic regeneration committee. In SERC's case,
this umbrella institution of partnership has been constantly, if not
explosively, faced with pressures over the manner in which it
approached the management of the partnership in general. These
three institutions of partnership have been chosen because they
represent a wide forum for partnership (SERC); a public-private
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partnership venture established for a specific purpose (Universiade
(GB) Ltd); and a centrally imposed, but locally incorporated,
instrument of economic regeneration (the SDC). This chapter begins
with an examination of the regeneration committee, followed by a
discussion of the managerial problems and styles in Universiade (GB)
Ltd. and the Sheffield Development Corporation.
SERC: A 'BOARD OF DIRECTORS' OR A 'FORUM FOR DISCUSSION'? 
The economic regeneration committee was the first formal expression
of public-private partnership in Sheffield. It is the umbrella
institution of the partnership, and the point from which various
partnership initiatives have sprung, or have been orchestrated.
SERC's initial participants were relatively high profile individuals
and organisations in the city. For example, it included the leader
of the Council; the chairs of the Council's Employment Programme and
Transportation and Planning Programme Committees; the chief
executive and president of the Chamber of Commerce; the regional
directors of the DoE and DTi; trade unionists; senior administrators
from the University and Polytechnic; and was serviced by senior
officers from the Department of Employment and Economic Development
(see Chapters five and six).
As the first institutional manifestation of partnership it is
unsurprising that such individuals and organisations should be
involved in what was ostensibly a committee set up to prepare a plan
for the regeneration of the Lower Don Valley. In these early stages
of partnership the belief was that 'everything' was possible, and
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'everybody wanted to be part of it'. Participation in the committee
has, however, changed over its life time. As the partnership has
developed more organisations have been drawn into sending
representatives to sit on the committee. Community groups such as
the Voluntary Sector Forum and the Sheffield Council for Racial
Equality have been incorporated, as have the Chamber of Trade, the
Development Corporation, the TEC, the Church of England in the city,
and latterly, the health and police authorities.
However, it is not only the extent of participation that has
changed. There has also been a variation in the level of
representation on the committee, and some organisations have played
a less active part within it:
There aren't many bodies who've stopped coming,
if any. But the level of representation has some-
times changed and that's been a reflection on how
much they've wanted to be involved in it, and that's
been the problem.'
For example, the regional office of the DoE have played less and
less a part in SERC's deliberations, primarily since the inception
of the Development Corporation in the Lower Don Valley. 2 It is not
that this central government department no longer sends
representatives to SERC, but that those representatives that do
attend are not of the same level of seniority as those who formed
part of the original committee. Similarly, the Development
Corporation, in the early stages of its existence, was represented
at a very senior level through its chief executive and chairman.
However, over time, that level of representation has not been
maintained and the SDC is now represented by less senior individuals
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who tend to act as observers rather than as active participants.
In contrast, the TEC is represented at SERC meetings on a regular
basis at a high level through its chairman. This however, can be
explained by the fact that the chair of the TEC is deputy chair of
the regeneration committee.
This changing level of participation and representation is the
consequence of a number of factors. The initial view of the
regeneration committee was very much focussed on the regeneration of
the Lower Don Valley. An ex-SERC representative commented on the
regeneration committee's initial composition and eventual change in
the following way:
SERC was set up explicitly to look at the regeneration
of the Lower Don Valley...it comprised those people who
had money and influence - to make a difference. If you
look at who was first on SERC and who was added later
you see the process of dilution of the powers that be,
or conversqly the incorporation of more sections of the
community.'
Certainly, if one considers SERC's early activity it is clearly
oriented towards 'making a difference' in Sheffield's industrial
heartland. This is not surprising given that SERC was predominantly
a product of the City Council's officer working party set up to
develop a strategy for the Valley's regeneration. Similarly, the
initial membership of the committee was as it was because its
members were the ones identified in the Council's Lower Don Valley
strategy report as key agents necessary for any initiative to be
successful, and because they had been taking part in the informal
meetings in the city discussing ways to regenerate the local
economy. It also has to be acknowledged that SERC's activity was
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focused on the Lower Don Valley in order to head off the imposition
of a Development Corporation. That this was never an achievable
strategy (given that the government's favoured route for
regenerating derelict areas of inner city was the UDC and that the
DoE used SERC's work to make the case for a UDC in the Valley), does
not detract from the fact that local councillors and officers
believed that the example of SERC, and its work, could be used to
negotiate a way of regenerating the Valley on terms that would be
acceptable to them. (see chapter five).
With the introduction of the Development Corporation in July 1988,
one of SERC's main reasons for existing was taken away. One critic
of partnership suggested that, 'the guts was pulled out of SERC when
Sheffield got an Urban Development Corporation. 4 However, SERC has
always been about more than a concern with one part of the city.
Even though its initial focus was on the LDV its brief always
included a wider view of the regeneration of the city as a whole,
whether that be through co-ordinating promotional campaigns, working
to boost internal confidence, or co-ordinating various partnership
initiatives. Nevertheless, with a key area of its work no longer
open to it, the committee needed new activities on which to focus.
Primarily, this reorientation has been undertaken through the
development and co-ordination of Sheffield 2000. Embarking on such
activity has inevitably necessitated drawing in more actors and
organisations into the structure of the committee, with a particular
need to appeal to community organisations.
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However, this change of focus away from a strict concern with the
economic and physical development of the LDV has meant that some
organisations have played a less active part in SERC's
deliberations. This is the case with the regional DoE which has
switched its focus to the work of the Development Corporation, thus
channelling its input into the regeneration of the city through
centally established policy mechanisms. Similarly, the Development
Corporation itself, although sending representatives to SERC, will
inevitably have as its primary concern the development of its area
and implementation of its own initiatives for regeneration. There
has also been a growth in the institutions of partnership, developed
since the regeneration committee was established, to further
collaborative working. Some, such as Sheffield Partnerships
Limited, Hallamshire Investments or Universiade (GB) Ltd. were set
up to do specific things within the partnership, whilst others, such
as the Hallam Group are more loosely focused organisations within
which general regeneration issues and initiatives are discussed. In
addition, the TEC and the SDC, although imposed on Sheffield by
central government, have become part of the network of regeneration
activity within the city.
Clearly, since SERC's inception there have been fluctuations in the
focus of the committee and in the extent and level of participation
of its membership. The growth in new partnership institutions has
meant that a proportion of the debate that originally took place
within SERC, has moved into other formal or informal partnership
structures. However, as the number of institutions and the level of
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collaborative working in the city has proliferated the regeneration
committee has progressively widened its gerth to accommodate these
new structures. The paradox here though is that whilst SERC has
become a more encompassing organisation, its raison d'etre has
become progressively less easy to define. This has resulted in a
number of crises of confidence in which its role, focus and
structure have come into question. Predominantly, two forms of
criticism have been levelled at the committee - firstly, that it is
too Council dominated and bureaucratic, being part of the local
authority committee system; and secondly, that is has deteriorated
into a 'talking shop'.
The former criticism emanates predominantly from private sector
representatives on the committee. As an original, now ex-Chamber of
Commerce representative asserted:
If you go into a meeting then the chances are very
high that if you speak to a paper, that paper will
have been prepared by a City Council officer. So
anything you see today, Sheffield 2000 or Sheffield
for health will have the stamp of Sheffield City
Council... and generally expounds the views that
they would hope to find favour. The arguments why
that is so are legion - they've got the staff and
resources.5
Another Chamber based SERC representative commented:
The nearest we've got to formulating some total
work in SERC is Sheffield 2000. How balanced an
approach is that? Well it's better than nothing
but it is perhaps influenced more than you would
want by the local authority. It has got the
resources, whereas if you look at the business
community in all these things it has lacked any
kind of resource to put a lot of planning thought
into it. So, it invariably slides back into the
officers of the Council...There's always the risk
that what you start injecting is rather more a set
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of political priorities than the original partner-
ship would have chosen. 6
Similar criticisms have also been voiced within the regional DoE:
The City Council were using SERC as a means to
exercise their influence, and to a certain extent
control, a development strategy. They liked to think
of it as a tripartite arrangement...but the City
Council's tactic was to try and make sure that the
private sector were suppgrting what the City Council
were seeking to achieve.'
For the business community, the counterweight to what was seen as a
Council dominated body lay in the Hallam Group, the Business
Leadership Team set-up as part of Business in the Community's
national urban regeneration programme (see chapter six and seven).
Formed under the direction of Hugh Sykes and Richard Field, with a
remit to 'support and co-ordinate' the city's regeneration projects,
the group sought to harness the resources of Sheffield's business
leaders to the task of regeneratining the city (The Sheffield
Telegraph, 1.12.89). The Group included those businessmen already
immersed in the activites of the partnership, as well as other
business people who were not involved in partnership initiatives.
Additionally, members of the group included senior figures from the
city's educational establishments, and the chief executive and
treasurer of the City Council (see chapter six).
Despite its national origins, and given the criticisms of SERC which
have gradually grown within the private sector, the Hallam Group can
justifiably be seen as an alternative buisness dominated co-
ordinating organisation. Indeed, understanding the Hallam Group as
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an alternative locus of regeneration activity is all the more
convinving when one considers that Sheffield already possessed a
strategic level co-ordinating organisation in SERC. The difference
was that some people in the business community saw the
regeneration committee as becoming more bureacratic and Council
dominated, too heavily populated, and increasingly diverging from
its original aims. The Hallam Group offered the opportunity to
escape these 'problems'. 	 As one President of the Chamber of
Commerce noted:
If you've got lengthy meetings [in SERC] you will not
not keep key business people involved, because that's
not the way they operate. We don't operate on lengthy
meetings, lengthy debates and run things by committee.
In SERC, you've got a wide mixture of people with a lot
of different interest. All of them want to have their
say, and that can be quite a tedious process...In the
Hallam Group we get the opportunity to discuss what is
going on and in what way we can help, and sometimes
champion projects...projects whch just wouldn't happen
unless somebody picked them up.
Within the leadership of the Labour Group the benefits of possessing
resources greater than those of other partners and the ability to
set the agenda of the regeneration committee was clearly
acknowledged:
We've got a lot of officers in the Employment
Department or Planning Department, who despite
other pressures have got some resources to put
in. Alright, the private sector have got the
Chamber, but they are dispersed, and if we
exercise our abilities to influence we can be
a very powerful force...I think SERC have a
fairly clear agenda of what we [SCC) want to
see. Most private sector people wouldn't
necessarily agree with us, but you offer them
part of the process and they come in...Then you
throw up the issue that you can't really have a
healthy approach to development unless you take
on board the social issues...I'm not saying we've
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got to the point of the accepAance of them, but
we've got them on the agenda.'
Moreover, an ex-councillor member of SERC Commented:
There were all sorts of moans from the private
sector of it being over bureaucratised. And it
was very bureacratised in the way that local
authority things tend to be. But nevertheless,
of course we wanted to keep tabs on tlIppgs. So
that was part of the reason for that."'
Private sector concerns with the dominance of the City Council in
SERC are specifically related to the widening of the regeneration
committee's remit - moving away from the notion of a 'board of
directors' for the city focussing on the regeneration of the LDV, to
that of a forum for more general debates on regeneration. Indeed,
the inclusion of a social dimension in SERC's work (rather than
purely focusing on economic issues), and the pursuance of
initiatives such as the Sheffield Charter, was considered to be of
little relevance to mainstream regeneration activity in the city -
the physical and economic aspects of urban regeneration (see chapter
eight):
SERC started, and the City Council tended to
administer it. What happened was that the City
Council got agreement off SERC on a number of
points which were peripheral to the mainstream
of the city...and th'prefore a lot of the business
people dropped off."
However, the analysis of the process of Sheffield 2000 presented
above, suggests that although social issues have been considered and
accommodated within the overall framework of Sheffield 2000, they
are still subordinate to the primary concern with physical and
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economic renewal. Moreover, although the City Council has more
resources in terms of officer time and expertise to put at the
disposal of a committee such as SERC, and so dominates it in that
way, it does not dominate the agenda in the manner in which some
within the business community suggest. The introduction of the
Development Corporation into the LDV, despite SERC'S plans for the
Valley's regeneration, is a clear example of the extent to which the
City Council's ability to steer the course of regeneration was re-
directed by the orientation of central government policy. That the
Council does not have carte blanche to determine the regeneration
agenda is implicitly acknowledged, by those private sector
representatives on SERC who claim that the City Council are in a
dominant position:
Doing things within a partnership context does a
great deal to moderate what might have come out
anyway from the local authority...If you look at
the sort of planning policies and strategies for
future development that the Council was producing
through its own resources eight to nine years ago
and compare it with what is coming out now. What's
coming out now 4 a lot more pragmatic and a lot
more realistic."
The weakened position of the local authority in determining the
shape of regeneration is (unsurprisingly) more explicitly recognised
by the politicians:
We're in a position where the very fact that we
have a government that isn't supportive of local
authorities...means that our ability to be as
successful as we might has been weakened. In the
end, there are certain things you can't do because
you haven't got the powers, you haven't got the
resources. Government will always intevgene if you
try and do things in a particular way."
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The widening remit of SERC and its movement away from a sole concern
with economic issues and the physical regeneration of the LDV, has
led to the criticism that the regeneration committee has become a
'talking shop' - achieving little, and achieving what it does very
slowly. However, this criticism is misplaced, and based on a mis-
understanding of the function of SERC within the partnership,
particularly as it has progressed and developed over times. Since
its inception, the regeneration committee has always been a talking
shop, but this only became visible after its initial activity in the
Lower Don Valley was curtailed by the introduction of the SDC.
SERC's constitution clearly indicates the extent to which it was to
be an organisation of discussion rather than direct action. Indeed,
SERC has no executive powers, has only limited financial resources
and cannot mandate any of the individual organisations which sit on
it to do anything - in consequence, it can only progress through
consensus and producing compromise strategies. In this sense, SERC
could never be anything other than a talking shop. When there was a
communality of view, then some form of action could follow, but
again this has been limited by the fact that SERC has no dedicated
resource base upon which to draw. This has meant that any
initiative or programme of action agreed by the committee has had to
be carried out by one of its partners, and often this has been the
City Council. Primarily, SERC has been a location for the exchange
of information and the airing of preliminary ideas, rather than an
organisation charged with the implementation of particular
initiatives.
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That a talking shop arena exists is seen by one senior planning
officer as vital to the well-being of the partnership. He suggested
that in discussions between the City Council and the private sector
over the structure and changing role of the regeneration committee
the belief was that:
If SERC becomes a different animal where will we
hold those not exactly open debates, but where will
we have that debate which you ban in an organisation
which doesn't take decisions...?
The same officer went on to say:
I think the general feeling was that there was a
value in having a talking shop around, whilst there
were other bodies at would actually be able to
do things as well."
However, the retention of a talking shop body such as SERC is vital
in a related, but distinct, way - that is in the presentation of the
political image of the partnership. SERC's validity as the umbrella
partnership organisation rests on its capacity to incorporate, , and
retain within its ranks, a range of groups and organisations in the
city. SERC may have become 'too cumbersome', but the talking shop
function of the organisation is vital, because while it remains, it
keeps alive the notion of Sheffield as having a wide participation
in its partnership.
UNIVERSIADE (GB) LTD.: A 'CLASSIC' PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP
In Uhiversiade (GB) Ltd. we were introducing the
community to the concept of playing for high stakes
with major investment.'
Uhiversiade (GB) Ltd. was set up in March 1988, as an operating
subsidiary of Sheffield Leisure and Recreation Trust, to administer
and raise finance for the staging of the World Student Games. In
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many respects, Universiade (GB) Ltd. was a typical example of a
public-private partnership: established for a clear and single
purpose (the WSG); composed of equal representatives from the public
and private sectors (three senior city councillors and three
prominent local business people); and working to produce an outcome
(or benefit) which each partner could not produce alone (sponsorship
and finance for the Games). The company was seen to represent the
icing on the cake of the working relationships between the City
Council and private sector which had been developing over the
previous two years. Indeed, all the six directors of the company
had been involved in either some or all of the earlier partnership
initiatives in the city. What follows is an outline of the history
of this partnership company, and a subsequent discussion of why it
failed as a partnership venture.
From the outset, it was not envisaged that the 1991 Universiade
would be financed by either central or local government. Instead,
the budget for running the Games was to be determined by the success
or failure of Universiade (GB) Ltd. in raising revenue.
Approximately £35 million was the estimated figure considered
necessary to run the Games, with the intention to raise the majority
of this finance through private sector sponsorship deals, television
and marketing rights and admission charges. Only a small proportion
of the total was anticipated to come from public sector grants or
subsidies.
324
Between March 1988 and December 1989 the company was in a bullish
mood over its ability to raise the finance through sponsorship
packages - a number of deals had been struck with individual local
companies; a £2 million contract has been signed with British
Satellite Broadcasting as the host broadcaster for the Games; and
the Sheffield '91 Club had been established to arrange advertising
and ticket deals for local companies in relation to the level of
their financial contribution to the Games. Moreover, the chief
executive of the company was assuring the board of directors that by
Christmas 1989 sponsorship deals worth between £10 and Ell million
would be in place (The Star, 7.11.89). Yet despite these claims and
activity, little in the way of concrete evidence for the raising of
sponsorship was publicly declared, and by the end of the year
Universiade (GB) Ltd. was experiencing extreme financial
difficulties. A £3.4 million expenditure against an income of less
than El million in nine months of operation was certainly a
financial difficulty for the company (Sheffield Telegraph, 2.2.90).
The response was swift:
With little to show in the income account, exposure
of proper financial controls and evidence of staff
profligacy over entertaining and expenses, the chief
executive was sacked and a holding operation mounted.
(Darke, 1991;9).
The dismissal of the chief executive was followed by the
reorganisation of the management structure of the company, a
revision of its business plan and the installation of a leading
local businessman (prominent in the coalition, and a director of
Universiade (GB) Ltd). as a caretaker chief executive. This change
provoked a realignment of policy, and a survival package was put
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together. This included a scaled down budget from £30 million to
£27 million for running the Games; an intensified appeal to local
organisations for support in cash and kind; an extension of this
appeal to a wider region; and the floating off of the Cultural
Festival under a separate committee, with a remit to seek its own
sponsorship (SCC/DEED, WSG Impact Study, 1990;34; Sheffield
Telegraph, 2.3.90).
With this package laid out, Universiade (GB) Ltd. continued to
organise the running of the Games. However, despite attempts to
raise the profile of the Games and reform the image of the company
the credibility of Uhiversiade (GB) Ltd. as a vehicle to deliver the
Games had become seriously impaired. Indeed, although levels of
verbal support were high, little private sector money was
forthcoming, and by Summer 1990 it became clear that the company had
been unable to work through its financial difficulties. In June,
Uhiversiade (GB) Ltd. ceased trading. In the event, the City
Council took over the company's responsibilities, assumed the lead
in the directional co-ordination and management of the Games, and
designated a senior local authority officer as Director of Games
Administration (SCC, Policy Committee, 6.6.90).
Thus, with a little over a year remaining until the staging of the
Games, the public-private partnership established to steer its
organisation and raise its finance had folded. Moreover, it
collapsed in a way that did little for public confidence in the
Games, and had potentially ruinous implications for the partnership
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initiatives that had underpinned most of its inception. That such
ruin did not befall the partnership with the failure of Uhiversiade
(GB) Ltd. is partly a consequence of the extent to which good
relationships had developed between those councillors and business
people involved. However, the lack of a widely expressed Town Hall-
business community recrimination was also a realisation, by both
senior councillors and businessmen, that the consequences of a
public slanging match about the demise of Uhiversiade (GB) Ltd.
would be detrimental to the overall image of the city, which the
partnership had been attempting to nurture. However, this is not to
suggest that criticism did not emerge, but it emanated primarily
from a small section of the business community, and a section of the
Labour Group which had always been opposed to the staging of the
Games on the grounds that it offered little but gloss in terms of
regenerating the city.
Financial mis-management and the poor company image that this
projected has been the most consistently advanced reason for the
failure of Universiade (GB) Ltd. Both public and private sector
directors of the company have claimed that the ineptitude of their
chief executive was the root cause of the demise of the company. 17
Similarly, opposition parties on the City Council have claimed that
Council directors were irresponsible in their management and
monitoring of the financial activities of Uhiversiade (GB) Ltd.
(Sheffield Telegraph, 5.1.90; SCC, Policy Committee, 6.6.90).
Academic commentary on the WSG has also laid the blame for the
collapse of the company on staff profligacy and a lack of financial
327
control (Darke, 1991). However, there are a number of other factors
which add to the explanation for the crash of Universiade (GB) Ltd.
One problem was the clash of operational styles and methods within
Universiade (GB) Ltd. Fundamentally, there was a conflict between
the way in which the City Council directors wanted to steer the
company and the way in which its chief executive wanted to sell the
Universiade concept. Primarily, this was the result of the chief
executive not wanting to play what one private sector director
called 'the political game' of partnership. Another private sector
director commented:
Peter used to say to me, 'you go and be nice to
the city councillors. You've got to live in this
city, I've got a job to do. I don't have time for
all these nicgties - you do the niceties and I'll
do the work."
The problem was that the 'political game' or 'niceties' were
important. They were particularly important in a close knit
partnership such as in Sheffield, where most of the participants
were local, and in the Uhiversiade company specifically, where both
the leader and deputy leader of the City Council were directors.
What follows is a lengthy quote from a private sector director of
Universiade (GB) Ltd. Although anecdotal in nature it provides an
insight into the relations between the Council directors and the
chief executive, which helped to prevent effective working
arrangements in the company:
I know for a fact it will never come out but I will
tell you happily...Yes, we'd had problems. We'd had
ups and downs, little arguments, but nevertheless the
Games were progressing. The logistics were well under
control when the secretary of FISU came for the opening
of the Don Valley Stadium. At that opening ceremony
328
Peter Burns made a speech of welcome...Following that
speech Clive Betts wrote a very long letter to him saying
a casual visitor could have been forgiven had they not
understood that the City Council was involved in the
project. Now, Peter Burns was doing a job, Peter Burns
was trying to sell Universiade and the facilities to
the private sector, and a sacrifice that the City Council
had to make was that they wouldn't be shouting from the
roof tops. Because, whatever we say about partnership
there are still people who believe that it's all a
charade, that the city council are taking the business
community for a ride. Peter Burns was trying to do a job
of selling the Universiade. He knew, I know, and they
[the City Council] ought to have known, that had he made
too much of a song and dance about, heffield City Council
then it would have put people off.'
There is also a question mark over the extent to which a company
such as Universiade (GB) Ltd. was the most appropriate vehicle for
raising the finances for the operational costs of the Games.
Amongst the business community generally, there were doubts that a
partnership company was the best way of raising finance. Three of
Uhiversiade (GB) Ltd's. private sector directors echoed similar
sentiments about progressing the Games on a partnership basis.
Their argument was that a 'substantial body' should have been
prepared to underwrite the Games from the outset, by which they
meant the public sector in the shape of the local authority :20
I've always believed that the City Council should have
bitten the bullet and said look we are going to put
£12 million into these Games. I think that if you'd
given the WSG company sufficient confidence to know
that the pump was well and truly primed, rather than
just sucking at the edges, I think that the poten4a1
gathering of revenue would have been much easier.'"
This assertion was based on the argument that the law profile of
the Games would deter private sector investment. Certainly, before
the WSG came to Sheffield, it was an almost an unheard of event in
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the sporting calendar, and this undoubtedly affected the ability of
the company to raise money. However, to claim as some of the local
private sector individuals in the city have done, that the Council
should have 'bitten the bullet' and committed themselves to fully
financing the Games, shows a misunderstanding of what it was
politically and fiscally possible for the Council to do, and what
the Games represented for the Council in terms of regenerating the
city.
Although initiated and effectively lead by the City Council, the
Games provided the opportunity for the local authority to
demonstrate on an international scale the extent to which they were
working in partnership with the private sector to regenerate the
city. The Games were a major symbol of partnership and as such had
to be organised on a partnership basis. The problem was that the
City Council overestimated what the private sector could deliver in
terms of investment. This can be seen in the operating structure of
the company itself.
Uhiversiade (GB) Ltd. was set up as a cash company with no
significant capital assets. Loans for the company were backed by
both the public and private sectors, but there was to be no
substantial working capital after the first year of its operation.
In consequence, the company was always going to be reliant on its
ability to generate enough income to cover its expenditure. The
problem with this sort of structure is that even assuming success
in generating income, such income would inevitably follow, rather
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than lead, expenditure. This would certainly be the case given that
the company would need time to establish itself and develop
marketing strategies before it could begin the task of setting up
sponsorship deals and drawing in money. With little in the way of
capital backing after the first year of its operation this was an
issue that was not addressed from the outset. In December 1988 the
company was £800,000 in deficit, a year later it was £1.9 million in
the red, and by May 1990 it was in financial difficulties to the
tune of £3.9 million. Ultimately, it was the company's inability to
tackle the problem of expenditure exceeding income that led to its
collapse.
THE SHEFFIELD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION: PRIVATE SECTOR LEADERSHIP IN
A PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANISATION
I don't have to worry about public wrangles. My job,
and that of,the SDC board, is to regenerate the Lower
Don Valley."
This section considers some of the problems that occurred within the
Development Corporation as a consequence of a clash between the
entrepreneurial operational methods of its chairman and the
operational procedures required within a public sector organisation.
These problems were brought to light in a series of allegations made
by the SDC's chief executive, Keith Beaumont, concerning the working
methods and managerial style of the Corporation's chairman, Hugh
Sykes. The allegations overlap, but they can best be summarised as
conflicts of interest between Sykes's role as chairman of the SDC
and his association with a number of local property development and
engineering companies; Sykes' abuse of his position within the
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Corporation; his mis -use of public funds and facilities; and his
lack of understanding of the concept of public accountability,
combined with consistent attempts to act in an executive capacity
(SDC/DoE, 29.5.90;1).
These allegations were described by one source as a product of
'office politics', framed within the context of a clash of
personalities between Sykes, a successful entrepreneur, and Keith
Beaumont, the chief executive, a senior DoE civil servant (The
Sheffield Star, 5.7.90). The relationship between the two was
certainly fraught with tensions and difficulties, and one board
member commented on it in the following way:
He [Keith Beaumont] wasn't the right kind of go getter
that Sykes wanted. But Keith Beaumont was of immense use
to him at the DoE, because he knew the DoE. But Sykes
suspected all of that. Beaumont had appointed very largely
puWAc sector staff, and I think Sykes felt a bit hemmed
However, the problems that emerged between Skyes and Beaumont and
which resulted in the Chief Execuitves allegations are the product
of more than 'office politics' or 'personalities at war'. More
saliently, they illustrate the potential consequences of private
sector managerial styles within a putative public sector
organisation. As one SDC board member commented:
In partnerships the relationship between a managing
director and chairman which is what one part of the
partnership is used to, and a chairman of a committee
and a chief officer which is what the other is used to,
are very different. You've got to try and find a middle
way which almost brackets the public and private sectors.
Its between board and executive that problems arise in
partnerships.
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We turn then, to a discussion of the chief executive's allegations.
Let us first consider the issue of conflicts of interest between
Sykes's promotion of companies he was involved with, and his
position as SDC chairman. Hallamshire Investments, a company of
which Sykes was both co-founder and chairman (see chapter five),
offers one example of such a conflict of interest.
The main allegation was that Sykes was frequently involved in SDC
board discussions concerning land development and disposal
proposals, in which Hallamshire Investments had an interest. Sykes
is alleged to have consistently sought to engineer sales of land and
development agreements to Hallamshire Investments in an attempt to
promote a 'close relationship' between the SDC and the company
(SDC/DoE, 29.5.90;2). For example, at a meeting in January 1990
between the Development Corporation, the City Council and Shearwater
(the developers tendering for the Canal Basin/Cutlers Wharf
redevelopment), Sykes is alleged to have proposed that Hallamshire
Investments would be a 'suitable' joint venture partner for
Shearwater. This alleged proposal was made despite the fact of the
Development Corporation grant-aiding the Canal Basin development
scheme to the tune of £10.5 million. Similarly, it was alleged that
at an SDC board meeting later that month, to consider short-listing
developers for the 28 acre Atlas North site, Sykes chaired the
meeting despite Hallamshire Investments tendering for the
development. The chairman allegedly did not declare an interest,
took part in the debate and questioned why Hallamshire Investments
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was, in the event, not short-listed for the development (SDC Mins,
18.1.90).
A second example of an alleged conflict of interest concerns Sykes's
involvement in the purchasing of Albion House by Alpha Estates, a
property development company in which he had a financial interest.
Sykes is alleged to have financed the purchase of Albion House, a
prestigious office block at the Whicker (the gateway to the Lower
Don Valley) through Alpha Estates, even though the company was
applying for a city grant from the Development Corporation. The
application was made through a shell company Bergfell, which was
taken over by Alpha Estates once Sykes had disposed of his shares in
the company. However, at the time Sykes was attempting to dispose
of his shares in Alpha Estates (to avoid a conflict of interests),
he was allegedly negotiating with Andrew Taylor (managing director
of Alpha Estates) for Hallamshire Investments to purchase Bergfell
and Albion House. Moreover, these negotiations allegedly occurred
at a time when the City Grant application was under consideration by
the Development Corporation. Prior to this, Taylor had allegedly
sought advice from Sykes about how to acquire land from the SDC in
order to provide additional car parking space to enhance the
viability of Albion House (SDC/DoE, 29.5.90;3). In the context of
the city grant agreement, it was also claimed that Taylor proposed
to let space in Albion House at a nil rent to the Prince's Youth
Trust, of which Thigh Sykes was chairman of the South Yorkshire
Appeal (The Sheffield Star, 27.6.90). Similarly, it was alleged
that in correspondence between Sykes and Taylor, dated, December
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1988, Taylor questioned Sykes on the possibility of Alpha Estates
acquiring land from or via the Development Corporation (SDC/DoE,
29.5.90;3).
A third alleged example concerns Sykes's involvement with
Rotabroach, a company based in the Lower Don Valley, and Northern
Strip Mining Ltd (NSM). Again, it is alleged that Sykes took part
in SDC board discussions relating to Rotabroach, including the
decision to exclude them from the Corporation's CPO programme. This
occurred even though Sykes was chairman of Neepsend (a Sheffield
based engineering group) of which Rotabroach was a wholly owned
subsidiary. Similarly, it is claimed that although Sykes was open
about his financial interests in Northern Strip Mining Ltd., and
about the company's intention to tender for an open cast mining
contract at Tinsley Park airport site, he participated in SDC board
discussions and decisions concerning the company's planning
application (SDC/DoE, 29.5.90;4).
We will now turn to consider the SDC chairman's alleged abuse of his
position within the corporation and his alleged mis-use of public
funds and facilities, together with his apparent lack of
understanding of the concept of public accountability.
The issue of alleged abuse of position can be illustrated by
reference to Hugh Sykes's attempt to appoint personal friends to
senior positions within the Corporation. Primarily, this concerns
his pressure to appoint Derek Latham and Associates, an eponymous
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architectural and planning practice (SDC/DoE, 29.5.90;4). From late
1988 until early 1990, 	 Sykes is alledged to have consistently
sought to force the executive to appoint this company to undertake
consultancy work for the corporation. Sykes is alleged to have
'browbeat' staff in an attempt to impose his will on the executive
over the appointment of Latham. As a result, Derek Latham was
employed as a concept co-ordinator to establish a design panel and
to act as its convenor. It is claimed that Latham and Sykes's
relationship was close, with allegedly Latham reporting directly to
Sykes and putting forward arguments to be aired in board meetings
against recommendations of the executive with which Latham did not
agree. Indeed, it is claimed that the planning director could not
put planning applications to the board unless they had been approved
and initiated by Derek Latham (SDC/DoE, 29.5.90;10). It is also
suggested that by October 1988, Latham was writing confidentially to
Sykes and drafting letters for him to send to other consultants
instructing them to carry out work for the Development Corporation,
none of which were reported to the Corporation's executive officers.
When challenged about his involvement with Latham at a board meeting
in November 1989, Sykes denied that he had any involvement in
Latham's previous work for the Corporation, and attempted
(unsuccessfully) to force through Latham's continued appointment as
concept co-ordinator. Indeed, even after Latham had officially been
informed to cease work for the SDC, and that the decision had been
endorsed by the board, his company still allegedly carried out work
for the Corporation at the request of Sykes (SDC/DoE, 29.5.90;5).
As a side issue, it is interesting to note that the Peak Park Trust,
336
of which Hugh Sykes was chairman, also appointed Derek Latham as a
planning consultant.
A further example of the alleged mis -use of Hugh Sykes' position
concerns the decision to appoint consultants to carry out a study of
Sheffield's economic potential - that is the consultants hired to
carry out the initial work for Sheffield 2000. Initially, this
decision was taken solely by Sykes without reference to the
executive of the Corporation or SERC, the co-ordinating body for
this initiative. Sykes sought to appoint consultants of his own
choosing by means of single tender action, but was eventually forced
to recognise that competitive tendering was necessary. In the
event, Deloittes, Haskins and Sells were appointed as the Sheffield
2000 consultants (see chapter eight). However, following their
appointment Deloittes enjoyed direct access to Sykes, who it is
alleged, repeatedly altered their terms of reference without
discussion in the SDC board and executive or the regeneration
committee. For example, when the officer with line management
authority instructed Deloittes that they had to remain within their
consultancy budget of £20,000, he was informed that Sykes had
independently authorised expenditure of £40,000 (SDC/DoE,
29.5.90;6).
Hugh Sykes's relationship with Sheffield Partnerships Limited (SPL)
has also been the subject of criticism (SDC/DoE, 29.5.90,6/7).25
The Development Corporation is a member of, and makes financial
contributions to, Sheffield Partnerships Limited (a contribution of
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£150,000 for the year 1989/90) (see chapter five). It is alleged
that Sykes 'considered this to be an area where he could expound his
own policies without any reference to the board' (DOE letter,
29.5.90;6). Indeed, it was Sykes who put forward the names of
Councillor David Heslop (the Conservative Group leader) and Rowland
Walker (SDC board member) to serve on the board of SPL, on the basis
that the Development Corporation 'wished to nominate'. However,
these nominations were never endorsed by the SDC board. Similarly,
Sykes's preference for a project by project approach to the
promotion of the city has often been at variance with the
'strategic' view taken within the Council's Economic Development
Department •26
Sykes's alleged authoritarian style of management also extended to
the appointed of the city's Director of Tourism. Initially, Sykes
made an offer to personally pay for the costs of recruiting a
tourism director. Following this he sought to get the Corporation,
without board approval, to meet the expenses and costs of this
recruitment. Another example is the Quickstart scheme administered
by the Development Corporation. The Quickstart project was
initially proposed in December 1988 but was judged by Sykes to be a
low priority. However, by the following Spring, at the suggestion
of a 'third party' the scheme was given urgent priority rating. The
officer in charge of the implementation of this programme was then
forced to implement it immediately. On the pretext of the need to
act quickly a financial commitment of 00,000 was entered into
without any board approval.
	 These three examples of , SPL, the
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tourism appointment and the Quickstart project are brief but
nonetheless significant matters in which Hugh Sykes sought to
involve the SDC and commit resources, in terms of officer time and
money, without allegedly the authority for so doing.
Another interesting area which illustrates the managerial style of
Sykes is in his conduct in board meetings. It is alleged that Sykes
habitually altered the timing and dates of meetings without
consultation (SDC/DoE, 29.5.90,8). 27 More importantly however, was
the claim that Sykes held special meetings in advance of the main
board. Generally, these took place the evening before in the form
of private dinners and in further pre-meetings with selected board
members, before the gathering of the full board. The chief
executive and directors were excluded from these meetings as were
certain board members, but were required to be 'on-call'. As one
SDC board member, excluded form these special meetings commented:
Talk about smoke filled rooms...I've never
come across anybody who did it as well as Sykes.
He was far worse at that, at not consulting people,
or consulting them separately, dealing lath them
one by one. He's a past master of that.'
Sykes also allegedly exercised a complete veto on all board papers
and on the subjects that the board was allowed to consider. It is
also claimed that Sykes treated board decisions with scant regard,
ordering changes of direction and policy as he saw fit. An example
of this can be seen in the board's decision to institute Compulsory
Purchase Orders (CPO) on businesses in the Lower Don Valley (SDC
Mins, 4.9.89). The board instructed that every business and
individual affected should receive a map of the CPO area, , a legal
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letter and a circular letter from the chief executive. Yet a few
days later it is suggested that Sykes overturned these arrangements
completely.
A final point to be considered is the allegation that Hugh Sykes
continually refused to accept that his role as SDC chairman had no
executive capacity, by attempting to have authority delegated solely
to him from the board. Sykes frequently sought to have executive
powers delegated to him in spite of advice from lawyers, the deputy
chair of the SDC and the finance director. However, in the absence
of such authority Sykes proceeded by means of establishing 'advisory
committees' to deal with particular subjects. A public relations
committee was established, as were those covering finance and
property. As far as the PR committee was concerned Sykes, it is
alleged that Sykes, without a hint of consultation, invited Bev
Stokes (a prominent member of the local business community involved
in partnership activities) to join. However, Stokes had no official
connection with the Development Corporation.
In the event, these allegations by the chief executive of the SDC
were investigated by a DoE inquiry headed by Sir John Garlick, a
senior civil servant. The full results of the inquiry were never
made public but a statement made by the then Inner Cities Minister
Michael Portillo reported on the main findings (The Sheffield Star,
29.8.90). Although the inquiry reported that Sykes had not
attempted to secure financial gain through his role as chairman of
the Development Corporation, it did identify four areas of concern:
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firstly, that Sykes had to make a clearer distinction between his
private business and his public role with the Corporation; secondly,
that there should be no suspicion of conflicts of interest and that
Sykes should consider his position as chairman of Hallamshire
Investments because this was the area where a conflict was most
likely to occur; thirdly, that there should be better procedures for
the appointment of consultants to the SDC; and finally, that the
Corporation should regularise the employment of secretarial staff
(The Sheffield Star, 29.8.90; The Independent, 8.9.90). However,
Portillo's statement did not reveal the results of the investigation
into all the allegations made by the chief executive, such as the
agenda-setting dinners and pre-meetings held by the chairman with
selected board members.
That the full extent of the inquiry was never revealed, or the fact
that Hugh Sykes was allowed to continue as chairman of the
Corporation, does not detract from the real importance of the
allegations made by the SDC's chief executive. Their value is that
they catalogue a clash of managerial styles and procedures,
predominantly that of a successful entrepreneur unused to working in
a bureaucratic government system. It is quite clear that the chief
executive of the SDC saw a number of deep rooted problems within the
Corporation based around the behaviour and activity of the chairman.
These problems were considered to be seriously damaging to the
structure and organisation of the Development Corporation. Firstly,
the conflicts of interests which existed between Sykes' role as
chairman of the SDC and chairman of a number of other companies such
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as Hallamshire Investments and Alpha estates, with which the
Development Corporation sought to do business. Secondly, the
chairman's lack of understanding of the concept of public
accountability - this applies both to the issue of conflicts of
interests and to that of Sykes' appointment of consultants and
staff. Thirdly, the vetos which Sykes tried to exercise on issues
presented to the board, and the tendency to run board business by
means of an inner cabinet which excluded certain board members.
Overall, this led to the criticism of Sykes by his chief executive
as someone with 'a total contempt for all DoE and Treasury rules,
procedures and financial constraints' (SDC/DoE, 29.5.90;12).
The allegations centred on operational methods rather than any
substantive suggestion of financial impropriety or corruption.
Hugh Sykes probably stepped over the procedural line in his position
as chair of the Development Corporation. However, it would have
been surprising if someone as successful as an entrepreneur as Sykes
would not have wanted to take a more 'hands on' or autocratic role.
Hugh Sykes was used to working within a system where the key
relationship was between a chair person and managing director. In
the Development Corporation, Sykes found himself in an organisation
where decision-making was more protracted and more bureaucratic.
Not only was he operating within a committee system, serviced by
executive officers, but there was the additional layer of the DoE
regional office in Leeds and its head office in Marsham Street that
had to be considered. This additional layer of bureaucracy was
acutely recognised within the local authority:
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The Government set up an operation which is essentially
private sector influenced, but in many respects it is
an adjunct of the DoE. Their [the DoE's] bureaucracy is
far worse than than anything local councils manage to
throw up. You've got a wonderful contrast that people
who are appionted by central government from the business
community, who are used to workng in a purely private
sector environment, suddenly find that they're0Aotally
hemmed in by all these government regulations.'
Within the local business community the problematic nature of
working in a public sector organisation was even more clearly
recognised. To conclude, as one private sector SDC board member
commented:
Business people like to agree a vision and get on with
the job. The idea of waiting three months for a decision
from the DoE is anathema5A .to
 wait three months to get a
decision, it's not easy.'"
BRIDGING THE GAP? 
A general feature of local authority-business community partnerships
for economic regeneration is that they fuse public responsibility
with private management. Such interaction between these sectors
often produces conflicts and tensions over the management of
partnership initiatives and institutions. In such circumstances,
problems become focused not on what is to be done, but an how it is
to be done. From the analysis of Sheffield's partnership it is
evident that differences in managerial styles, working methods and
notions of accountability were peppered throughout its institutions
of public-private collaboration.
In SERC, struggles over whether it should be a tighter more pro-
active organisation, or whether it should be a 'broad church' forum
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for local discussion, has been a reflection of the differing
perceptions held by the public and private sector over its role and
function in the partnership. In the Uhiversiade company, there were
also clear differences between the public and private sector
directors, and the Chief Executive , over how to manage and approach
the marketing of the WSG. These differences meant that neither set
of directors were ever comfortable with the direction that the
company took. Additional misunderstandings, such as the private
sector not fully recognising the symbolic value of the company to
the City Council and the City Council miscalculating an the amount
of investment that the private sector would put into the Games,
knocked further nails into the company's coffin. As far as the
Development Corporation is concerned, the allegations made by the
Chief Executive against the Chairman vividly illustrate the
problematic nature of a robust private sector management style
unleashed in a public sector organisation.
Predominantly, these problems are the result of contrasting
managerial styles and notions of accountability, and competing
claims on how to achieve given partnership aims. In Sheffield,
these differences or gaps in understanding have not always been
bridged successfully. Struggles over how to manage particular
initiatives and organisations demonstrated that going beyond the
identification of joint 'aims' was no guarantee of reconciling the
issue of public responsibility with that of quasi-private
management. As such, they reveal cleavages between partners which
were less amenable to the bridge building compromise solution that
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15. ft
was employed in the formulation of Sheffield's long-term plan for
regeneration.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis has argued that new systems of co-operation have begun
to develop in response to the fragmentation of formal governmental
authority. In Sheffield, local state institutions and functional
representatives of private sector interests have begun to work
together in alliances where co-operation and policy formulation are
beginning to operate outside formal systems of local goverilluent.
Sheffield's partnership for economic regeneration is one
institutional manifestation of such arrangements. This concluding
chapter summarizes the findings of the research and relates the
example of Sheffield's partnership for economic regeneration to the
broader process of local goverment restructuring. Firstly, the
chapter offers a review of the partnership; secondly, it relates the
empirical findings of the research to the theoretical discussion in
the first part of the thesis; and finally, it considers some
connections between the experience of Sheffield and the concept of
partnership generally, and its implications for local government
change.
PARTNERSHIP IN SHEFFIELD: A REVIEW
Since the early 1980s, economic policy has been a major political
preoccupation in Sheffield. Faced with a deteriorating industrial
base and rising levels of unemployment it is not surprising that a
considerable amount of political effort in the city has been
directed towards stemming the tide of local economic decline. In
the early part of the decade, the approach of the City Council was
advanced through a series of policies for public sector intervention
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in the local economy. Under the auspices of the the City Council's
Department of Employment, project based initiatives designed to make
'small gains' in economic terms, but which provided alternative
visions of economic development, were combined with a corporate
level programme to create a commitment to public sector employment
and new approaches to economic regeneration.
As the decade wore on, the continuing collapse of the economy and
the existence of an urban policy climate orientating further towards
the private sector made the re-evaluation of past economic policy a
necessity, particularly the notion that regeneration could be
achieved by the public sector alone. Within the political
leadership of the Labour Group, and at senior officer level in the
Department of Employment and Economic Development, it was realised
that the private sector would have to be more actively solicited to
participate in the regeneration of the local economy. It was
believed that more co-operative participation in economic policy
would put the city in a position where its projects might be viewed
neutrally by central government. Certainly, the City Council found
itself in a position where it was unable to get additional grants
from central government because of the highly politicised nature of
its recent past.
The political leadership on the Labour Group did not see this action
as putting a break on the interventionist stance they had adopted in
the first half of the decade. Rather, they saw it as an attempt to
create a framework where opposition, both internally and externally
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could be muted and their political and social agendas be advanced.
As far as they were concerned, co-operation with the private sector
offered a vehicle for the furtherance of their plans for the
economic and social regeneration of the city. Working in
partnership was justified on the grounds that working in co-
operation with the private sector provided the opportunity for
intervention in the economy in a way that the radical policies of
the early 1980s had never been able to offer. For the political
leadership partnership was seen as a method of maintaining
continuity with the economic policies of the early 1980s.
However, partnership is certainly not public sector intervention in
the local economy in the sense that it was originally conceived.
Indeed, working for labour between 1981-1983 and working with
capital from the middle of the decade were different strategies for
regeneration. In the early 1980s, the City Council was not on good
terms with the private sector, but much of that argument was a
reflection of the Labour Group's disenchantment with central
government policies and their attempt to offer local alternatives
to Thatcherism and the policies of a paternalist and welfarist
Labour Party. What partnership represents is the recognition that
such alternatives were not possible in the way the city's Labour
administration had envisaged. By the mid-1980s, an indirect form of
intervention which sought to retain some influence over the
economy's direction and structure (rather than exerting overt
manipulation or management) was perceived to be the way to
regenerate the local economy.
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The political, social and economic climate of the late 1980s meant
that the City Council had to construct a constituency of support for
local economic policy from sectors it did not draw on in the earlier
part of the decade. This new constituency was primarily found
within the local business community (particularly the Chamber of
Commerce), and not the City Council's more traditional allies - the
trade union movement. This is not to suggest that the trade unions
have played no part in the regeneration initiatives in the city,
indeed they have. For example, in contrast to some other cities,
the trade unions in Sheffield have co-operated with the business
community in the operation of the TEC, and have representation on
its board of directors. Similarly, their initial participation in
SERC was directed at supporting the committee's plan for the
regeneration of the Lower Don Valley. However, given the nature of
the city's political history, dominated, as it was, by the Labour
movement, and a close relationship between the Labour party and
local trade unions (Hampton, 1970:216; 1986:134; Seyd, 1990:337),
one might have expected the latter to have played a more prominent
part in the partnership. That they did not is a paradox of
Sheffield's recent political past (see below).
The partnership that this new constituency has produced is a loose
confederation of partnership individual bodies, partnership
companies and partnership committees. No single organisational
structure characterises it, and the network of partnership bodies
and committees operate independently of each other with little in
the way of formal mechanisms or channels of communication.
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Initially, partnership debate tended to be informal in nature, as
it progressed however, it become more formal finding institutional
expression in organisations such as the economic regeneration
committee,	 Sheffield Partnerships Limited and Ballamshire
Investments. Although participation in such organisations is
relatively wide, the core of the partnership has never exceeded a
dozen or more individuals from less than a handful of organisations.
In the sphere of economic policy the range of key players is drawn
predominantly from the local authority, the Chamber of Commerce, and
the Development Corporation. In total, there are probably no more
than ten people who have played a major role in organising the
partnership, and this figure includes public and private sector
representatives.
Within the City Council it was the small group of people that made-
up the leadership of the ruling Labour Group which dominated the
political movement towards partnership, overriding opposition from
within the Group concerning the development of closer links with the
business community. Similarly, senior Council officers within the
authority played active parts in creating a climate in which such
developments could take place - most notably those in the Department
of Employment and Economic Development. In so doing, they secured a
prominent position for themselves and the Department in the
coalition, as well as the wider role of the City Council, in
attempting to shape the regeneration agenda.
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As far as the private sector is concerned the Chamber of Commerce
has been its most organised and articulate voice. Through its Chief
Executive and a succession of 'committed' Presidents it has embedded
itself in the networks of the partnership, and has improved its
image as a 'serious' player in the regeneration game. The motive
force behind the Chamber's movement into partnership has been a
small number of businessmen who from the mid-1980s began to change
the focus of the Chamber's local operations away from parochial
business concerns to more strategic economic considerations. Both
the status and influence of these 'committed' Presidents and the
organised voice of these individuals in the Chamber have developed
symbiotically.
Such a close knit partnership has allowed good personal
relationships to develop between politicians and local authority
officers and a number of private sector individuals. Although too
much stress should not be laid on this in terms of why partnership
arose, it is important in understanding how the partnership operates
and is structured. Indeed, one of the most notable things about
partnership in Sheffield, and a weakness, is its parochialism and
insularity. Apart from the involvement of national government in
the form of regional representatives of the Department of
Environment and Department of Trade and Industry on the Sheffield
Economic Regeneration Committee, there are very few national actors
involved. These representatives of central government constitute
the only non-local membership. The boards of the Training and
Enterprise Council and the Sheffield Development Corporation are
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mainly composed of Sheffield based individuals, whilst the key
business figures in the partnership are all locally based. Within
the partnership at large there has been only marginal contact with
outside organisation such as Business in the Community, the Phoenix
Initiative, or individual partnerships with development companies.
Where there has been involvement with such agencies they have tended
to meet the partnership at a tangent.
What binds such a small group of people together is the belief that
common working arrangements can only be of benefit for Sheffield's
economic regeneration. The shared values, agreed objectives, and
common purpose that is said to exist within this group is seen as
enough of a glue to hold the partnership together. Indeed, much
capital is made out of this by the key players who argue that it is
the localist make-up of the partnership, without any rigid structure
to it, that makes it operate so well. However, only a handful of
individuals from the business community in the city have actively
been involved in the partnership, and they are not representative of
that section of the private sector that can bring development
capital into the city. Indeed, representatives of multi-national
arms of capital are largely non-existent in the partnership, whilst
representatives from the property development sector are equally
thin on the partnership ground. Nor is the organised voice of the
private sector in the city, the Chamber of Commerce, capable (at
present) of challenging the Council in terms of their financial,
human, physical, and information resources. (However, one of the
key aspects of partnership so far has been the attempt by the
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Chamber to restructure and reorganise itself to offer a civic
leadership outside the local authority.) As a consequence, the City
Council has been able to maintain a prominent position within the
partnership in general, and on SERC in particular.
THEORETICAL MODELS, PARTNERSHIP AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE
In chapter two of this thesis the concepts of local corporatism,
growth coalitions and urban regimes were discussed in order to
provide a framework for analysing the subsequent empirical
investigation into the development of economic regeneration policy
in Sheffield. The chapter argued that although local corporatism
offered potential insights into how partnerships and state business
relations might operate, it had difficulty in analysing informal
relationships and an informal co-operative process of policy-making
and development. Alternatively, it was argued that by adopting a
coalition and regime perspective such informal processes could be
decoded more readily. In an environment where business interests
are being encouraged to play a more participatory role in the
management of city policy-making, formal authority (authority vested
in the elected control of state institutions) is becoming fragmented
and weakened. Urban regime and coalition theory, with its focus on
how government and non-government actors mobilise to produce an
effective system of co-operation in the wake of fragmented
government, should be better suited to illuminate how local co-
operative processes interact with Changing conditions in the wider
political economy. But how does the experience of Sheffield relate
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to either of these approaches? 	 Let us first consider the
appropriateness of the local corporatist paradigm.
If we adopt a local corporatist perspective one thing we have to
consider is whether the partnership has the ability to mandate its
membership on particular policy issues. SERC, the main partnership
body, acts as a co-ordinator of the various partnership initiatives
in the city, and provides an information exchange, but it cannot
compel its members to agree to anything. SERC has no executive
power, no specific resource base, no staff, and there has never been
a vote in the life-time of the committee. To operate, it has to
develop consensus amongst its participants. Even though there has
been a commonality of view, the limited resource base of SERC has
prohibited it from implementing any specific policy initiatives.
SERC's only real initiative, the 2000 strategy, has largely been
financed through the City Council and the Development Corporation,
with the majority of the research input coming from private
consultants and the Department of Employment and Economic
Development.
Another issue is the degree to which the City Council actively
supports the partnership and has the capacity to deliver on any
policies agreed within the partnership. The political leadership of
the Council certainly supports the partnership; however, in terms of
decision-making it has not ceded power to SERC. The regeneration
committee cannot impose any of its recommendations on the City
Council, all it can do is hope that they take notice of them.
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However, the issue is not so much whether SERC can impose its
recommendations on the Council, as whether the City Council can
deliver on any agreements reached in SERC. Predominantly, this
depends on the ability of the leadership of the Council to maintain
support for SERC's policies within the wider Labour Group. To a
large extent this has been achieved during the period with which
this research is concerned. Much of what has gone on in the
regeneration committee in terms of debate and agreement has not
challenged the direction in which the political leadership of the
ruling Labour Group has sought to take Sheffield. Because SERC has
no decision-making powers the City Council leadership could, in
theory, choose to ignore it. That the leadership has chosen to be
part of it, and accept its legitimacy as the main institution of
civic co-operation, is because SERC cannot seriously challenge it,
and because participation serves as a continuing symbol of
partnership.
The structures of partnership developed in Sheffield illustrate how
problematic it is for the representatives of non-government
interests within the partnership to ensure that their members
consent to and support agreed policies. The Sheffield Charter
illustrated that although a consensus and agreement could be reached
within SERC, when that agreement was taken outside the regeneration
committee it proved difficult to implement. The main private sector
organisation, the Chamber of Commerce, was unable to convince its
members to accept the Charter. 	 The majority of the Chamber's
members were simply not willing to sign up to what would have been a
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prescriptive set of policies with regard to the quality and
conditions of employment. What is more revealing is that SERC had
no power to sanction the Chamber for failing to get an agreement on
the Charter within its own membership. The problem for SERC has
been to extend the commonality of interest that has developed within
the committee outside itself. The Charter episode demonstrates that
any notion of wider group interest has been restricted to
uncontentious issues. Indeed, the differences that existed over the
extent to which the economic and social aspects of regeneration are
linked has precluded anything more than a vague identification of
how the two are to be integrated.
Within the overall partnership no mechanism exists that allows any
initiative to be implemented through a partnership structure. The
regeneration committee's role is to co-ordinate initiatives within
the partnership, it has no power to carry out policies that have
originated from joint working. Thus all the partnership initiatives
have to be carried out by one of the partners rather than by one
decision-making partnership body. In essence the majority of
initiatives are either carried out by the City Council; the
Development Corporation and the Training and Enterprise Council; or
they are one-off collaborative ventures between the Council and
private developers. The local business community, as represented
through the Chamber of Commerce, has only had a minor role in the
implementation of partnership initiatives. Its limited resources
and the small number of individuals within the Chamber organisation
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involved in the partnership, has mitigated against strong
involvement on policy implementation.
When compared with the parameters of local corporatism identified in
chapter two, there is no overall partnership decision-making body in
Sheffield; there are no mechanisms to compel partners to act on any
agreements; and the resourcing and implementation of the initiatives
remain largely with state institutions. There is nothing rigid
within the partnership that acrues to a decision-making process that
'dissolves the institutional separation of inputs and
outputs...and...links directly...interest representation and policy
execution' (Cawson, 1985a;134). The structure of the partnership
itself precludes this. The evidence from Sheffield suggests that
the notion of local corporatism is, on its own, an insufficient
explanation for the formulation of economic policy. However, there
is a need for a framework which helps us understand the emergence of
co-operative relations between government and non-government actors
in the development of local economic policy. It is here that we can
draw on the regime and coalition paradigm for insights.
Regime theory is about the mobilisation of resources for effective
government as a consequence of fragmented and weak formal
government. Specifically, regime theory focuses on how government
and non-government actors establish a system of co-operation through
informal arrangements and tacit understandings. The case of
Sheffield illustrates the way in which functional and sectional
interests in the community are beginning to become part of , a system
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of civic co-operation. Mechanisms for co-operation have included
the identification of a common cause around the need to improve the
city's image and diversify its economic base; establishing mutual
loyalty to place; establishing loyalty between co-operating actors
(individuals becoming accustomed to co-operation, reliant on each
other and wanting to maintain co-operative relations); and
establishing loyalty to the governing arrangements established
within the partnership: there has also been the establishment of
intra -partnership norms for making relationships 'dependent and
reliable' - the 'agree in public, disagree in private' approach so
favoured within the partnership.
How, though, do we explain the fact that although participation in
co-operative action over economic policy in Sheffield is wide
ranging, the main actors have predominantly been local state
institutions and business interests? Regime theory's perspective on
community power offers insights into this experience.
Fundamentally, regime theory questions the explanatory strength of
analyses of urban politics and development that perceive power in
terms of dominance and control, and see politics as the legitimation
of that control (see chapter two). Stone argues that the analytic
emphasis of the social control paradigm is on 'the difficulty of
maintaining a comprehensive system of control' - commonly known as
the cost of compliance issue. It is this pre-occupation with the
cost of compliance that has led to the emergence of 'third face of
power' explanations to account for the discovery of a lack of
resistance and conflict within studies whose theoretical framework
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stresses the domination and control of one group over another.
Within pluralist analysis, it is the problem of the 'cost of
compliance' that gives rise to pluralism. In contrast, anti-
pluralist analysis sees consent and legitimacy as manipulated to
reduce the costs of control. Thus, both pluralists and their
critics agree that a few rule, but both disagree over the nature of
compliance to that rule. As Stone contends, 'what pluralists see as
genuine, their critics see as manipulated' (Stone, 1989;225).
Stone's argument is that by following the 'social control' paradigm
a host of critics have mis -understood 'the character of power as it
operates in modern societies' (Stone, 1989;220). His alternative
model for understanding power, moving away from arguments
constructed around elite control of popular consciousness, is based
on the argument that society (in terms of its institutions for
governance, conceptions of the world, and the norms and values that
people use to make sense of their environment) is fragmented.
Society is held together by a 'loose network of institutional
arrangements' whose maintenance is a 'matter of struggle, with
contenders variously accommodating and resisting one another'
(p.227). In such a fragmented system, the issue is not about
comprehensive control, but about, 'how to bring enough cooperation
among disparate community elements to get things done - and to do so
in the absence of any overarching command structure or a unifying
system of thought' (p.227).
360
For Stone, 'the capacity to assemble and use needed resources for a
policy initiative' is the basis of his conceptualisation of power
(p.227). Consequently, in a fragmented world, governance is about
bringing together 'essential elements', rather than the task of
'comprehensive control'. Given this situation, co-operative
participants do not 'behave as if the underlying structure of the
situation is one of polarity between the few who dominate, and the
many who are dominated, but as if the capacity to govern is in
question' (p.228).	 The important questions here become who has
resources, how can co-operation be achieved, and where can a
foundation for that co-operation be placed? As Stone asserts, the
most attractive allies in this fragmented 'system' are the
organised, the best resourced, and those who can engage in a system
of co-operation - in capitalist society such requirements tend to be
found mainly within the business or 'investor' class (p.229).
In this model, the analysis of power is not so much about who
dominates who and how domination is achieved, but about the
development of a capacity to act - 'power to, not power over'. The
important issue is 'who can achieve co-ordination of effort among a
select few who are strategically placed' (p.229). If we apply this
framework to the example of partnership in Sheffield, we can argue
that a key reason why the business community became the central
allies in partnership with the City Council was not because the
business community could axiomatically command local compliance and
legitimacy to their involvement, but because the fragmentation of
formal government authority in the sphere of economic policy-making
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has helped to create a bias towards (particularly) business
participation.
Acknowledging this situation goes some way in helping to resolve a
paradox in Sheffield's local economic policy referred to in the
review section of this conclusion: that the constituency of support
for economic policy has revolved around new alliances between the
City Council and business community, rather than more traditional
alliances between the City Council and the trade union movement. It
is the structural characteristic of fragmentation associated with
the restructuring of local government, that enables those groups who
can act cohesively, are well resourced, and are systemically
favoured, to participate in, and influence, the regeneration agenda.
In a local government system becoming more diverse and fragmented,
the ability to meet these criteria is a key feature of policy
development, particularly as governance develops through co-
ordinating the efforts of those actors with similar aims, and
ability to act. In Sheffield, it has been the local authority
(despite the loss of powers and finance), the Development
Corporation and the business community (through the Chamber of
Commerce) that have primarily fulfilled these requirements in the
search for policies for economic regeneration.
SHEFFIELD, PARTNERSHIP AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT CHANGE
Conflictual relations between central and local government in the
1980s have given rise to a condition, at the local level, that is
conducive to public-private co-operation. The restricted financial
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base of local government, falling resources, capital controls, and a
welter of legislation have made local authorities more receptive to
collaborative working arrangements in the reconstruction of their
economies. Government urban policy has consistently sought to
increase business involvement in the regeneration process and lever
in more private sector investment. Overall the political and
ideological climate of urban policy engendered by successive
Conservative administrations has helped bring partnerships to the
fore. However, these political and ideological dimensions have
operated in a wider climate of economic and social change. Without
a doubt deindustrialisation and unemployment in Britain's
manufacturing cities is the context in which local developments,
both in Sheffield and elsewhere, have occurred. Local authorities
in inner city and urban areas have had to operate within a policy
environment that has drawn them into establishing more formal links
with private sector organisations.
The emergence of 'partnership' may well represent an attempt to
privatise local economic development policy, but the example of
Sheffield illustrates that this is by no means an inevitable
outcome. What was important in Sheffield was the ability of various
interests to shape the regeneration agenda and construct a mutually
agreed policy approach to cope with chaning economic conditions.
Clearly, particular partners may recognise the political and
ideological nature of their collaboration. However, once a
partnership is established there is a tendency for those partners
involved to ignore the contentious aspects and concentrate their
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efforts on non-contentious issues. This enables progress to be made
but reinforces the notion of dependency; partnerships appear to be
the only way to achieve regeneration, rather than as a politically
determined option. Within partnerships concerned with economic
regeneration, these areas of communality tend to focus on the easily
agreed topics of image management and inward investment.
The partnership in Sheffield is no exception. The majority of all
Sheffield's partnership initiative efforts have been directed
towards boosting confidence internally, improving the city's image,
and developing a long-term strategy for economic regeneration.
Achieving consensus on these issues was not difficult as all
partners could agree that such issues were important to the
regeneration of the city's economy. Diversification of the economic
base of the city has also been an easy target for consensus
generation. All partners could agree that there were potential
gains to be had from moving away from a reliance on single industry
employment, particularly as that industry had collapsed!
Although consensus can be established however, the problem is to
maintain it. Certainly no two partners ever approach the
partnership with the same values, objectives, or criteria for
evaluation. The views of the partners may differ markedly in how
they assess the impact of partnership initiatives and how they judge
its success. In Sheffield, the differing conceptions of
regeneration were most evident in the way in which SERC dealt with
the issue of social regeneration. In the committee it was not
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difficult to get agreement on the economic issues that needed to be
addressed: when the social dimension reared its head the consensus
was threatened. However, it was not so much the nature of the
social problem or the need to have a social dimension incorporated
into the regeneration agenda that threatened the consensus, as the
means of how social regeneration could be achieved. 	 The
prescriptive social and employment policies of the 	 Sheffield
Charter were unacceptable to the wider membership of the Chamber of
Commerce and were abandoned by SERC. When social issues were
reintroduced with the Sheffield 2000 strategy, they were
incorporated into the regeneration agenda in a diffuse and
unintegrated way. Indeed, similar struggles over how to achieve
particular aims also emerged within the management of the
partnership and its institutions. Differences in managerial styles,
working methods and notions of accountability in SERC, Universiade
(GB) Ltd., and the Development Corporation, demonstrated that going
beyond the identification of 'what you want to do', towards a co-
operative system that required the reconciliation of public
responsibility with quasi-private management was problematic, and
has been difficult to reconcile.
In conclusion, then, the example of Sheffield illustrates some
general characteristics about partnerships for economic
regeneration, whilst also displaying features unique to its own
political and economic circumstances. It demonstrates that
partnership working is primarily concerned with the management of
change in the face of widespread structural economic transformation.
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However, in contrast to the forays of other cities into partnership,
such as Birmingham (Birmingham Heartlands), Leeds (Leeds Development
Company), and Salford (Salford Quays) where co-operation has been
tightly focused on property development schemes (CLES, 1990; 48-51),
Sheffield's approach has been less property oriented. Sheffield's
partnership has typically focused on image, inward investment and
the development of a strategic plan for regeneration, seeking
economic diversification through the identification of new and
existing areas of strength. A concentration on image and inward
investment are characteristic features of public-private
partnerships, whilst the creation of a strategic plan reflects
changing preoccupations within economic development policy within
the local authority. This long term strategy has some resonance
with Aberdeen's 'Beyond 2000' strategy for the development of its
economy, although the composition of the coalition that produced
this plan is different from that in Sheffield (Lloyd and Newlands,
1988;35-37).
Partnerships are also part of an urban policy climate that has
brought about an increased role for non-governmental actors and
institutions in the process of local economic regeneration. One
result of this is an increasingly fragmented system of local
government, in which the formal authority of elected officials and
state institutions is being challenged by a range of functional and
sectional interests. Within the sphere of local economic policy
this 'fragmented' environment has brought to the fore the issue of
the manner in which local authorities intervene in the management of
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their local economies. Partnership is one of the main ways in which
'intervention' has been attempted through the construction of local
public-private networks for regeneration.
In some urban areas, such networks have been led by private sector
organisations such as the CBI (Newcastle and Bradford), the Phoenix
Initiative (Manchester, Salford, and Bristol), and BiC (Calderdale-
Halifax and Blackburn), the resources of which have been mobilised
to generate locally based business support for regeneration schemes
to work in tandem with the public sector (see Wade, 1990). In other
areas, such as Birmingham (Birmingham Heartlands) and Glasgow
(Glasgow Action) there has been greater leadership from the public
sector to create co-operative working between local and regional
authorities (the Scottish Development Agency in Glasgow) and local
private sector organisations (Harding, 1989a;14-15; Boyle, 1990).
In Sheffield, the process has involved establishing indigenous
informal Channels of communication and the institutionalisation of
those Channels within formal partnership organisations.
Organisationally, the partnership is diffuse with a large number of
'partnership' institutions working 'independently' through the co-
ordinating mechanism of SERC. The majority of participants within
Sheffield's regeneration network are indigenous to the city, even
within SERC the umbrella partnership organisation, few nationally
based public or private sector actors have been incorporated.
The example of Sheffield demonstrates that local authorities can
have a key part to play in developing regeneration networks by
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establishing both informal and formal co-operative relationships
with local functional and sectional interests. Sheffield, like many
other industrial cities, has sought to combat its economic problems
through the creation of mechanisms and institutions for co-operative
action. The framework that emerged was one which provided for the
enhanced role of business interests in economic regeneration policy,
but that also allowed the local authority a central position in the
mediation of local interests. The political implication for local
authorities is that as they widen (through force, inclination or
necessity) their constituency of support for local economic policy,
a politics develops that is about the way in which the public and
private sectors seek actively to resolve their differences,
establish mechanisms for co-operative action, and produce programmes
and strategies for regeneration.
THE POLITICS OF PARTNERSHIP
This concluding section seeks to set the thesis within the broader
context of the politics of public-private cooperation and the
changing nature of local governance in Britain. The focus is on the
type of partnership or civic cooperation that has emerged in
Sheffield over the 1980s and early 1990s; how this compares to other
cities; some of the contributions and benefits of being in
partnership for its participants; and locating Sheffield's
partnership in its local historical context.
Partnership and Urban Regime Formation
One way of considering issues such as the type of partnership in
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Sheffield and how the city's experience compares to other cities, is
to examine where Sheffield falls within pre-existing typologies of
local political cooperation. A number of studies have already begun
to 'map' such typologies for urban regInes in an attempt to analyse
the variety of civic responses to urban economic change and local
state restructuring (Keating, 1991; Digaetano and Klemanski, 1993;
Stoker and Mossberger, 1994). The typologies of these authors
emerge from their respective attempts to develop regime theory in
comparative contexts, moving away from its original US orientation
(Elkin, 1987; Stone and Sanders, 1987; Stone, 1989) towards wider
international insights into the variety of city response to urban
change.
The typology developed by Digaetano and Klemanski (1993) identifies
five types of regime with differing political orientations: a market
pro-growth regime that facilitates development by relying less on
the powers of the state and more on market forces; a government-led
pro-growth regime that uses public sector finance to lever in
private sector investment to effect development; a growth management
regime that seeks to moderate development by the use of state
powers; a social reform regime that focuses on community rather than
business development and redevelopment issues; and a caretaker
regime that tends to act minimally, performing routine tasks of
service provision (pp.59 -60).
In their analysis, Digaetano and Klemanski relate this typology to
regimes in Birmingham and Bristol, concluding that the former has a
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government-led pro-growth coalition whilst the latter has a mixed
pro-growth/growth management regime (p.78). Such 'types' of
governing strategies have also developed in other cities in response
to economic change and state restructuring over the 1980s and early
1990s (Brindley et al, 1989; Cooke, 1989, Harloe et al, 1990). For
example, the city of Lancaster developed a pro-growth strategy
focused on small firms and tourism to cope with economic decline
(Bagguley et al, 1989; Urry, 1990). In Liverpool, however, despite
similar problems of unemployment and economic change, the city's
recent history of economic decline, social unrest and political
confusion produced a weakly articulated strategy focused on social
reform (Parkinson, 1990). In the south, Swindon has produced a
growth management strategy based on a council-led cross class
alliance of local traders, unions, defence industry employers, and
British Rail, to harness the effects of rapid growth (Bassett and
Harloe, 1990). Whilst a little further west in Cheltenham, a pro -
growth/growth management strategy has been fashioned around an anti-
industrial pro-professional middle class image for the town (Cowen,
1990). However, applying this typology to Sheffield is problematic
and, ultimately, not particularly satisfying. This is because it is
difficult to locate the city's experience in any particular regime
category. It appears that Sheffield's regime, as currently
constituted, falls between a mixed pro-growth and a growth
management orientation with elements of the social reform paradigm
emerging periodically.
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A more revealing model for explaining Sheffield's regime is that
found in the typology offered by Stoker and Mossberger (1994).1
Their typology identifies three core regime forms - organic regimes;
instrumental regimes; and symbolic regimes. Each core form has an
'illustrative' sub-type associated with it. For example,
maintenance and caretaker regimes are sub-types of organic
cooperation; economic development regimes and land and property
regimes are sub-types of instrumental cooperation; and progressive
or revitalising regimes are sub-types of symbolic cooperation. The
typology also identifies four key characteristics of the process of
regime formation which apply to each core regime type. These are
the motivation for participation; the development of a sense of
common purpose; the congruence of coalition interests; and the
regime's relationship with its wider political environment (p.9).
Table (11) provides a matrix of regime type against the defining
characteristics of regime formation.
The evidence of the Sheffield case study suggests that its
partnership exhibits tendencies of a symbolic revitalising regime.
Indeed, if we over-lay Sheffield's experience onto this typology of
regimes, there is a significant degree of congruence with the
symbolic regime. If we consider the 'motivation to participate', it
is clear that non-material factors were important in establishing
cooperation between the city's public and private sectors. This is
not to deny the existence of a material basis for cooperation,
indeed, such a basis was present. For example, both the public and
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TABLE (11)	 A TYPOLOGY OF URBAN REGIMES
REGIME	 TYPES
Defining
Characteristics
Illustrative
Sub-Types
Organic
Caretaker, Exclusive,
Traditional
Instrumental
Downtown, Indus-
strial, Other Econo-
mic Development
Symbolic
Progressive, Urban
Revitalization
Purpose Maintenance of
status quo
Project realisation Redirection of
ideology or image
Main participation
drive
Local dependency Tangible results Expressive concerns
Basis for sense of
common purpose
Tradition and
social cohesion
Selective Incentives Strate g ic use of
symbols
Quality of coalition
(con2ruecce of
interests)
Political Communion Political Partnership Competitive
agreement
Relationship with
environment:
Local
Non-local
Exclusive orientation
Independent
Exclusive orientation
Dependent
Inclusive orientation
Dependent
Source: Stoker, G., and Mossberger, K. (1994) 'Urban regimes
in comparative perspective', Environment and Planning
C: Government and Policy, Vo1.12.
372
private sectors sought economic benefits for the city in terms of
increased levels of investment, more physical developments, and
reduction of unemployment. And certainly, in the case of business, a
strong rationale for involvement was the interlinking of the success
of their companies with the success of the local economy in general.
However, this motive for participation was not the sole
characteristic of business involvement. Indeed, the fact is that
there were motivations to participation which cannot be reduced to a
material base such as the 'pull' of local economic dependency or the
'push' for tangible results.
As a way of explaining this non-material basis for participation the
notion of expressive politics - a way of 'communicating values,
intentions and symbolic rewards' (p.14) - is particularly relevant
in the Sheffield case study. For example, local political leaders
saw partnership with the private sector as a way to invigorate
Sheffield's flagging economy, by drawing into the city both state
and private sources of finance. Also, Sheffield's business leaders
had a genuine concern for the success of the city, as well as
promoting ideas about corporate social responsibility. Notions of
civic pride also underpinned much of the private and public sectors'
attempts to establish a 'feel good' city, able to stamp its name on
the world again, and to promote itself proudly as England's 'fourth
largest city'.
Similarly, in terms of developing a 'common sense of purpose' within
the regime, non-material factors are also evident. 	 Indeed,
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Sheffield is a good example of the 'strategic use of symbols' as a
mechanism for purpose generation. The reconstruction of Sheffield's
image has been as much, if not more of a concern, as the
regeneration of the local economy within the partnership. The
process of image building has unified the city's public and private
sectors from the partnership's earliest informal incarnations to its
more formal and institutionalised expressions. The 'Success in
Sheffield' campaign was as much about the communication of the
discourse of partnership to a wider populace, as it was about
searching for sources of external finance. 'Talking-up' the city
provided a basis for coalition building and consensus construction.
This 'symbolic' process of regime formation resembles that
experienced in Glasgow (Boyle, 1990). Here, the creation of new
urban symbols appropriate for the city's post-industrial future
demonstrated the 'psychological, political, and economic benefits of
manipulating urban imagery' (Boyle, 1990;109). The Glasgow Garden
Festival and the designation of Glasgow as the European City of
Culture in 1990, were symbolic representations of the repositioning
of the city to attract mobile capital. Similarly, Sheffield sought
to use partnership and its associated symbols to stake a claim for
its position in a changing national and international economic
order. In both cities, the search for new urban imagery underpinned
the formation of new consensual coalitions.
Running parallel with the theme of expressive politics as a unifying
force is, paradoxically, evidence of a strong sense of 'organic
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localism as a mechanism for developing a sense of common purpose.
This organic localism is most clearly expressed in the 'Sheffield
knows best' mentality and the city's tradition of parochialism and
self-reliance amongst its public and private sector institutions.
This is an attribute grounded in the success of the city's
industrial past, one that produced a wealthy, self-confident and
self-reliant homogenous community. With the collapse of the steel
and engineering industries in the late 1970s and early 1980s this
sense of local pride, success and self-belief was weakened, but did
not fade completely. By the middle of the 1980s this localism
surfaced within the emerging partnership, providing a unique mixture
of traditional self-sufficiency with the need for the symbolic
regeneration of the city's pride, and its place in a changing
economic order.
What this combination of expressive politics and organic localism
suggests, is the extent to which a non-material base was important
for establishing a purpose within the partnership. Indeed, it is
difficult to find many examples of 'small opportunities' or
'selective incentives' (Stone, 1989;189) to adequately explain
participation and purpose generation in Sheffield's regime. This is
particularly the case with the business community, where selective
incentives to participation have to be seen either in terms of
personal aggrandisement through civic affairs, or in the context of
local dependency theory where the imperative to participation is the
interlinking of the success of local capital with the success of the
local economy.	 With the City Council, the notion of material
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incentives is perhaps more relevant. For example, the City Council
sought to win favour with central goveLment departments and attract
greater sources of funding to the city. Equally, it saw the
partnership model as a way to continue employment generating
projects such as the cultural industries quarter, by using
collaborative arrangements to attract funding once public sources of
finance had dwindled. Overall, neither 'small opportunities' nor
'selective incentives' are fully satisfactory as explanations for
participation or purpose generation. However, in other places, a
material basis to regime participation - in the form of tangible
results and selective incentives - has been more in evidence. For
example, property based development coalitions such as those found
in Birmingham (Harding, 1991; Digaetano and Klemanski, 1993),
Cheltenham (Cowen, 1990), Kirklees (Kirklees NBC, 1990), Leeds and
Salford (CLES, 1990), and Wakefield (Askew, 1990) have tended to be
more instrumental in nature with short term goals based around
specific objectives and easily identifiable projects.
In terms of the 'congruence of coalition interests' Sheffield's
partnership illustrates the tendency for it to accord with the
notion of 'competing agreement' (Stoker and Mossberger, 1994;20), or
as identified here, continual compromise. Although in Sheffield the
'big idea' was based on the need to regenerate the local economy,
around which an informal, then formal regeneration network emerged,
that idea did not prevent the existence of conflict and the need for
compromise and conflict resolution. In SERC, once the focus moved
away from the regeneration of the Lower Don Valley towards more
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specific employment related issues and the notion of social
regeneration, conflict and competing agendas came to the fore
resulting in extensive bargaining and compromise. Similarly,
problems over the management of partnership institutions with
executant powers, such as Universiade (GB) Ltd., and the SDC, reveal
a regime in constant struggle and continual compromise.
In comparison, in Bristol, struggles over regime formation have been
more overt and frequent where the variety of political perspectives
in the ruling Labour Group has produced a fragmented coalition
unable to establish a lasting consensus (Digaetano and Klemanski,
1993). Similarly, in Liverpool, social conflict and political
division prevented any sustainable regime from developing over the
1980s (Parkinson, 1990). In contrast, Birmingham's instrumental
regime, consisting of local political leaders, local authority
officers and local business people, has produced a political
partnership where negotiation and bargaining worked to clarify the
shared interests of the participants in the redevelopment of the
city centre (Harding, 1991; Digaetano and Klemanski, 1993).
Turning to the 'relationship of a regime to its wider political
environment', locally Sheffield developed a strategy that actively
sought to incorporate a wide range of participants. As has been
suggested, Sheffield's regime has not been able to draw on a
particularly strong material base for securing consensual
participation, and has been unable to offer material reward
incentives to encourage participation. Its greater reliance on non-
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material mechanisms, together with its focus on revitalisation, has
meant that it has had to seek wide support for its strategy for
regeneration, pursuing a policy of inclusion rather than one of
exclusion. The burgeoning growth of SERC and concomitant criticisms
of its cumbersomeness, bears witness to the continual symbolic
importance of this organisation within the partnership and the
necessity for it to be seen to be speaking for all interests in the
city, despite its limited powers of decision-making.
For both the public and private sectors in the city there were
considerable limitations to the amount of local political and
economic autonomy at their discretion - as a consequence of the
centralisation of state powers and because of the weak structural
position of much of the city's business activity in the hierarchy of
economic power. Thus, in both a public and private sense,
Sheffield's regime has had to turn to central government sources of
funding and seek to attract private development interests in
effecting change. In terms of its ability to lever such resources,
Sheffield's regime has a checkered history. It failed to persuade
central government of the viability of its partnership plan for the
Lower Don Valley, receiving an Urban Development Corporation
instead. Similarly, its scheme for a locally based training
strategy was by-passed by the introduction of the Sheffield TEC, and
its bids for City Challenge funding (developed on a partnership
basis) were rejected in both bidding rounds. The partnership also
failed to convince the private sector of the merits of funding the
WSG, a key symbol of regeneration, whilst Ballamshire Investments -
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the partnership's venture capital company - has had to rely more
heavily on non-local sources of investment than it would have
wished.
On the other had, despite the imposition of the SDC and the TEC,
these organisations have largely been incorporated into pre-existing
partnership arrangements. However, at the same time, there have
been serious problems over the level of discretion that local
leaders, particularly from the business community, have been able to
exercise in the UDC and the TEC. There is a clear belief in the
leadership of both organisations that each is hamstrung by the
political and organisational dictates of Whitehall. Overall, in
both public and private spheres, Sheffield's regime has been in a
largely dependent relationship with its non-local political
environment.
After Steel: Sheffield's Partnership in Historical Context 
A considerable amount of effort has been devoted to coping with the
problems of structural economic change and industrial decline in
Sheffield over the 1980s and early 1990s. Much has been made of the
differing strategies for regeneration adopted between the early and
latter parts of this period, with the movement being couched in
terms of shifts form 'radicalism to entrepreneurialism' (Lawless,
1990; Seyd, 1990). Certainly, there are marked differences in the
two approaches over these years. However, despite different
methods, both approaches sought to shepherd the city through
considerable socio-economic change - the former in a more overtly
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ideological manner, where economic growth was subordinated to wider
political and social objectives; and the latter in a way that
stressed the importance of both image, and private sector over
public sector investment. With hindsight, it is understandable why
there was a need to change the specific forms that these coping
procedures took over the 1980s, given the political and economic
restructuring that took place in the local state over the same
period. What is interesting however, is the contention that the
radicalism of the early 1980s was an aberration in the city's
politics and history of public-private relations.
Very simply, Sheffield has been, historically, a city of labour both
politically and industrially (Hampton, 1970; Seyd, 1990;335) with a
close association between the local authority and local trades union
movement. In general, the city's socialism has been of a
paternalistic and welfarist kind, whilst labour/capital relations
have been relatively free from conflict. Similarly, despite the
relationship between the local authority and local capitalist being
at 'arms length', it has not been one of constant distrust and
antagonism. This political accommodation worked well for much of
the post-1945 period when Sheffield's economic growth and stability
was based on the success of the steel and engineering industries
(Warren, 1986). Such economic success and prosperity brought with
it a strong sense of localism, self-confidence and self-reliance
amongst a community whose internal differences often amounted to
much less than those with the outside world.
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As the economic base of the city began to crumble in the late 1970s
and early 1980s, this political and economic accommodation broke
down. With the collapse of the steel and engineering industries
unemployment rose and the city found itself adrift in a rough and
unpredictable economic sea. The need to find a strategy to address
the economic uncertainties of the early 1980s, coupled with the rise
of more radical councillors in the ruling Labour Group - dedicated
to combatting both the paternalism of the Labour Party and the
market philosophy of a right-wing Conservative government - led to a
search for alternative economic and political solutions and the
emergence of the city's 'local socialist' period of politics.
However, the radicalism of the early 1980s never played out to its
conclusion - it created too many political tensions, both internally
and externally; and was damaging to the economic and political
stability of the city.
By the mid-1980s, a partnership approach emerged in the form of a
revitalising regime centred on the local authority and the local
business community. This regime focused on consensus construction
and image building within the community in its attempt to attract
inward investment and stem economic decline. Such collaboration was
not a return to that which went before 'local socialism' but the
growth of greater civic cooperation did mark a return to a more
stable and less antagonistic set of relationships between the city's
public and private sectors. More saliently, a new set of locally
based institutional arrangements for coping with industrial decline
and structural economic change emerged, in a period where economic
381
and political restructuring made it necessary for cities to mobilise
and coordinate their disparate and finite resources in an
increasingly fragmented urban political system.
NOTES
1. I should like to thank Professor Gerry Stoker and Karen
Mossberger for pre-publication access to their paper 'Urban
regime theory in comparative context', Environment and Planning
C: Government and Policy, 1994, vol.12.
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